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Ill'TRODUCTIOli 
Betore d1scuas1.ng a selected atud7 ror Parties trClll 
throe countries ot the Arab World, Egypt, S7r1a and Iraq, 
1 
I would t1rst 11ke to refer t o 11v1ral important tacts that 
pla7 an ettect1vo role 1n paralyz1na the progroac ot the 
Arabian nat1onal1om and tho Arabi.an democratic lite as co~­
pered •1th that 1n TUrke7, India, Japan, etc. I ehall ou.m-
aarico thoee tacto ae brietl7 as poeeiblo. 
1. Thi Situation : There 11 no doubt that tho Arab world 11 
locat ed 1n the center or the world, tor Juat a glance at the 
.. p or the world indicate• tbat tho Arab countries are situ-
ated at the Junction ot three iJlportant oontinenta: Asia, 
.Uric• and Europe. Th• construction ot the SU•& Canal 1n 
1869 doubled tho importance of thie area. One might a91 that 
t hi• aigni!ican t situation would be holptu l in h•etent.na tho 
progr••• ot tb1o area. Tbe next tact, however, io a1gn1!1cant 
1n bringl..na about the reverae . 
2. Tho Pore1sn Occupation: The otratagic poa1t1on in addition 
to the fertile eoil attracted the graat etate builders and 
conqueror• ot the paat and the 1Jlperial1ota or tho present: 
OttCll&ll, Kapoleon and the French, an4 the Engliob . It 111&7 
b• pointed out that t ora1gn oocupati on ot th• French aa1 the 
Bnaliah had brought aome Western 1dtoloer •1th it, such ao 
democra07 and social retorma. Thia would be true to a cer-
tain extent. However, 1n truth , theee occupations were de-
11 
atruct1ve to any genuine n.at1onalism. Under thi• occupation 
many nationaliat1c movements took place. For example, there 
waa the Arabi Paeha aove.,ent 1n 1882 1n l!Qpt; th• Iraql.&D 
Revolution 1n July, 1920; and 1everal 11Jllilar movement• 1n 
Syri a and Lebanon. Inasmuch a o I am not att e1QPting to d11ou1a 
Arab nation.aliam, I would juet like to confirm that the au-
thor1ti•• ot t he foreign occupation worked t o curb the Arab 
nationalistic movement• and , aa a reault , paral7ced Arab poli-
tical lit• by u11ng al l poa11bl1 me&nAo to auppreaa ·~ pol1t1-
cal movement Which m1gbt have tried to oppose 1mperialiat1c 
ruling. The colonJ.1ta div ided the country and diatr i buted 
vital part• ot it to Iran, Tu.rkey and I1rael (Arabatan , Alex-
Andretta and Paleat1ne) . 
s . The Ab11nce ot a Strong Leaderah1p: Again t hi a factor r1-
1ulted from the aecond factor. Tha occupanta brought di1unity 
t o Arab leaderah1p juat aa they had 1ucc1eded i n div iding t he 
country. Th• Engli1h authori ties ae t up a Royal Family 1n 
I raq and a l10 1n J'ordAn, r i•al1 to th• Ro1al PamilJ in Arabia. 
It ia unfortunate t hat t he f oreign 1ntluanca i 1 1till felt to 
a great extent . scma ruling part1aana we r e atra1d that tbey 
would 101• their otficee without the back1.ng of foreign power . 
•· There h•• never been a senu.1ne democracy i n tho Arab l'i'orld : 
Thia factor ia alao ot unqueationable 11lportanc1, tor a real 
damocrac1 ha1 never e:xiated 1n &nJ' conntry 1n th• lliddl• Eaat. 
Thia f actor 1a, of eourse, eon11atent . Democracy 1e a Weetern 
heritage. We did not adopt democracy. Rathe r, i t waa 1mpo1ed 
i11 
upon ua by the various oecupstiona. D1ctatorehip wae in-
directly J.apoeed under a blaiiket ot democracy and accordill8 
to the demands ot the occupanta. Tnere ha.a never been a 
treo election. Thar• h•• never been a tree preaa or tree 
aaeociation. Moreover, there hae never been political ota-
b111ty 1n the Arab world 1n general an~ 1n Iraq and ~t 
in particular since the growth ot Arab nat1onal1aa attar 
World tlar I. '!'here ii no doubt 1n my mind that thia came 
about •• a result or the f1rot and the aeccnd taotoro . I 
would therefore 11.7 that deaocraoy 1n the Arab countr1eo waa 
eatabliahed on unrealiat1c toundat1ona, unravorable toun-
dat1one , and weak and unnatural t oundatione. 'l'hua , the re-
sult wae futile and uaeleas . '!'be final political movement• 
in Syria and Egypt atand aa outatanding proof ot theoe un-
deniable taeta. In ahort, no genuine democracy baa •>::lated 
until th• present . 
5 . '!'ho Struggle tor Nat1onal1amt Thia factor 11 one of the 
moat important 1n the Arab world . Arab nat1onaliam oppoeee 
both Capitalism and Cocc:uniaa:.; but, at the , .,.. time, both 
C°"""""iam and Capitaliaa are at"9apt1ng to aupproaa the d..i1-
nat1on and t he eupremaoy ot the Arab nat1onal1am. 
To conclude, 1n the &dv&nc•4 Arab countri•a there are 
•••oral parties, 11ail• r t o thoae in Prence. Tbeae part1ee 
repreaent extree>e right, eJCtreme lett, pro-fleet and neutra-
liate. In every advanced Arab country there are more than 
five parties, as we ahall ••• in the diseuaaion concerning 
eacb Arab country. 
iY 
6. A Recent Factor : Cooperation : Aa a reault ot several 
factors that will be Eenticned 1n the next disousaicn, it 
1eems to me that there ia very clo1e co-exiatenoe and co-
operation between the extreme Arab leaders and t he Communiata 
as a r esult ot the Arab-Jewish conflict on the one band and 
the !!&at-West contliot on the other. Thi• factor also caae 
about •• a reault ot 1fe1tern disregard tor the Nationalist 
Secret Ko••menta and Weatern dependenc1 on their puppet 
governments which d iacloaed the Egyptian revolution of July 
2~, 1952, and t be Syrian aucceaaivo mil itary coupid•etat 
1949-1954. Thor• i • no doubt that a aSJt>ilar one will take 
place in Iraq aooner or l•tar t o link tbeae movements . 
In brief, tbe A.r&b ccuntr1ea, b1 virtue or tbe17 geo-
graphical contlnuit1, t heir a:.arked ll.ng\liatic 11ailarit7, 
their cultural homogeneity, their Jr:&Jl1 001mton tradition.a, 
and their i nterwo•on biatorical background, ma7 be grouped 
together for t he purpoaea ot a cultural atud7. Thia is par-
ticularly true i n tba field of government and politics becauae 
ot their common politioal heritage and their m&J11 atr1k1ng 
a1milar1tiea 1n their political atruoture and electoral a1a-
t••· A selected 1t~ ot the parti••' background, compo1ition, 
orga.nization, prc))A8anda, object and 11ader1hip, 1n Egypt , 
Syria and Iraq, will be valuable to prove th• modern awakening 
ot the Arabian nation, and to threw light on th• peoplea• de• 
aire to enjoy atabl1 and abaolute demooratic life without in· 
ternal or external political pressur.. 
C!IAl'TJ!R I 
EGYPT 
Egypt; was toe 1·1rat Arabian eou.ntry to throw orr tb.e 
yoll:e or tne '!'llrk1•n nae, wn1eh tro:o tne tilDe ot Uuna=&d 
l 
A.11 onwards was narc1l7 mure 'tha.'"l no:alnal . on cne other nand, 
!uropean 1nl'iuenc• ••• gre<luaLy penetret1n" 1nto EsYPt and, 
t o a 1arge extent, aupplant1ng 'l'llrk1•h pree1om1nanee. (l) 
Tne i.mpacc or tne Weot oeca~~ ~bv1ou1 in t he pol1t1eal 
cun•t1tut10nel 1'1eld w1tn gradual adoption ol' 'lles tem pat -
terns 01· government and pol1·"&icai. 11fe . on ?~ove:cber 10, 
1866 , Isma 'li Paena , Khed1ve or ~gypt , creat-4 e consultative 
elected Asser<bly or Not ables along tne linea or Western Par-
11ament . <2> It was t"1e that toe A••eably had been :oer<1ly a 
puppet organization, and nad been aet up by Iama •11 Pasha 
only ~n order to eneb!e h:Lm t o pose as a oun1"&1r;ue1onal 1'.ller, 
thereby tac111cat1ng ni• tas~ of obtaining new loans from 
Br1t1•b anci Frenon 1·1nanc1er& . <3 > 
Tne Asse~bly undeniably performed only an advisory !'unc-
tion wltnout &n) real legislative powere . It tuok almost 
a1Jcty years ror th1• Aaae:tbly to develop into sometnlng like 
a Eu.ropean Pari1ament . 
{1) Parliament & Perciee in ESJi!t, by J .M.tiiiidau. lntrodue t1on . (2) See Histur1ca1 Daya , by Anmad Bahha AdQln, p . 30, v.l, no . 3, 
ane1 1100 llO<lem t!gHE 61 Crott:er . • ·i·ne Coup 0 1etat - Iaaa11 and 
tne Cnamper or Nota lea , p . 82- lUO . 
(3) ~y inl'on:tation ia taken mainly tr<>= "H11torice1 D&yo•, by 
Alm!Ad Bann.a Aoelin, p . le, v . l, no . 3 . 
2 
The poil.tioaL parties &J.so in1t1at•~ Western modela 
1n their organ1t&t1ono, progra!!l3 , pr<Jpag•nda , etc . Al -
though outwardly western12ed and compact, tew 0£ t hem have 
snown any :J1gna or democracy 1.n tne weatem sense ol' the 
wurd . 
AS 1.n O~ner Lana¥ a.na Otner P•rluds , '418 rise ot po-
11 t1C&- groups 1.~ Egypt was due to t~ree ma1n, closel7 
1nter-related , rectors : -
l . 'l'ntJ apreaC1 or education. 
2 . Tne l<n<>wleC1ge tna i. a be"&i;er ata t.t of t nings 
was poaa1blo . 
3 . Tne 81.l•PlCl On to•ara.s rure1gners . 
(4)T 
_n spite or tne 1'9.p1<1 dt:v eJ.op:nont or t he pr8S3 1n 
~t ae a reeult or tnese tnree above ment1oneo. inter-
related 1·aetors, despite eh• increase 1n ene number ot 
newspapers and per1uQ1ca1s , ana no,w1tnatanai ng the obvious 
ap1r1t 01· d1aountent witn tore1gn 1nr1uonce a!! over .!!;g;pt 
1n t lle time 01 Iama •11, part ies did not appear on toe pol1-
t1C&i scene tli~ tne discontent • •• centereo. in such secret 
uroan1za~1vos as were tu be the forerun.~era ur PO-leical 
parties . Koetly these were groupa loosely connected •1th 
one personal1ty or •notber ae Court ano •erv1ng 1ts in-
terests . The latter rom ot pol101cal aaaoo1at1on was to 
last , moreover, tnroughout t he Br1tian occupation, and, to 
a lesser extent , r i ght up t o the downfall ot ohe corrupted 
{4) Histor1ca~ Diya, appearance of oppressed pr1n., p . ~O. 
vol . 1, no . I. 
(5) gov~rn:ce.nt unC1er tne monarcn1al s ystem, 1n 19S2 . 
!.n the fourtt' quarter or t:l!e nineteenth century there 
were three contr1butory elements to ~ne quaei -national re-
VlVaJ. J.n J:;gypt1-
(l) A.larghanl •s movement ror reton:ie 1n Isl am had 
been th1'12St lnto tb.e background bf the banlsh-
~•nt or lte leader trom EgJPt . (G) 
G ... l Addin Alatgban1 •s• • poJ.1t1ca. and 
spiritual leeder. He was born 1n Iron (or Af-
gllanlstan) in 1~39 . li• dled in conate.nt1nople 
in 1~97 . lie wae an important Ialam1c t1gure 
in the aecond half or the nlnotoentb centur; . 
He advocated th• theaia ot Pan-Islamiam and 
acti•oly propagated ror reton:i ln tl'.e corrupted 
Islamic societies. Alatc;han1 waa vorr n:gb.11 
educated ln tno Islamic •tudiea . Ill• enthusiastic 
activities and his tremondoua eloquence awakened 
tne J.alamlo people , ~hom he had viaited. He be-
came pr1=• m1n1ater of Iran, end v1•1ted Lendon, 
Paria and Berlin . H• waa cnaractertzed as a 
greet rei·oncer and a very able a<l.min1atrator, 
but •a• verr revolutionarr and opposed to western 
1mper1oliam. He established a school ln Cairo to 
teach hla political and social reforms in Islam. 
Hls teaching was based on weatern education, but 
f5) and (6) " !•lam A• .1.t Is Seen bi Weaternera*, by Pn1llp 
Hit~l & Byarod DOdge . pp. 41, 42,~. 53, 52, 68, 74, 75, 76 
witnout tenglble change in the principal rulea 
ot I&lam . He wrote many books i'or his scudente 
oo demonstrate his liberal political and social 
struggle . He also formed a secret polltical 
party to carry out his political vlewa , known as 
11The National Free Part y . n 
The Alatghani movement survived 1n tho ohird 
decade ot ohe twent i eth century under the L'.uslem 
brethren . 
(2) Th• movement far constitutional retorms , headed 
by Sharif Pasha, had been weakened by ~he au~omo.­
tic tendencies of Isma•11 and Taufig Khedives of 
E€Yl>t . 
(~) The movement led by fellah ott1cera (fal'IT~ra)(?) 
was the only strong movement which rema i ned . Its 
chlefa tried their best to lead Egypt to what obey 
cons1dered independence from foreign interference . 
The leader or the movement was Ahmad Arabi Pasha, 
Egyptian officer of fellah birth. Student of 
Alafgbani, and like bis schoolmaster, be was anti-
foreign and extremely revolutionary. In 1882 he 
4 
led the Egyptian anned farces against the arbitrary 
rule in Egypt . He demanded a conot1tutional govern-
ment, responsible to an elected parliament, and 
equality ar Egyptian• •1th Other foreign elements, 
('I) From: "Islam As It 10 Seen by Westerners•, by Phlllp Hltt1 
and a group ot a\lihors, pp . 39, 40, 41, 49, 53; and 11 '11he Severe 
Trial or the Const1tut1an• by !{.ullam.ad Zaki Abdu...-Xadir, p . 10. 
1n public ••rv1cee, perticularl; 1n the army . 
ttis revolution brought about tno Britlsn occu-
pation 1n Egypt, which las t ed a.Lllloat to 1952 . (B) 
Arabi was tbe tlrat Egypti an leader 1n 1:o<lern 
Egypt to aal< tor equality of Egyptian farmers with 
'i'Url<a and Other foreign el"'1!ents since tho riae of 
the r~le or 'luha.,._d Al1 1 s f~ly. Me was a nati onal, 
patriot ic and very enthua1astic 1n his ondoavor to 
rororm t he domeat1c corruption which threatened Islam 
on the same rooting as torelgn forces threatened th• 
Islamic aooietios . 
There were 1even part1es 1n E@ypt betwten l9o7 and the 
outbreak or •orlc •ar 1 1- Al::Uzb Alwatanl, the People ' s Party, 
th• constitut1on11 tto1or:s, the Kat.onal Fr•' Party, the Part7 
ot Nvbles, tho P1rt7 or Indopondent Egyptians, and the Young 
Egyptian Party. Th• first wa• tho largest 1n nUJ11bera , moat 
voc1teroua and bust orga: 1ted . ·1·ho seconcl and third were 
smaller and were satel•1tea or the Sr1t1ah occupation and the 
l':hed1TO respectively. Ih• o<;hera were pol1t1c•L~Y 1na1gn1t1-
cant groups, - tn• National Pree Party and tho Party or Inde-
pendent :!gypt11n1 being more •oecup1t1on11t• than tno People •• 
Party, an4 the Party ot !~<>bles being :iore attached to ~b.e 
Khed1vo than tho Const1tut1onal tterorms . 
Practically none or tbeso partiea were organized along 
Europea."! l ines, for Aln1•'o Al.watan1 , •nlch al.gilt aeem the ex-
(8) Seo tuil dlacuaalor. about Arabi KOvolt In *ROdom Egypt" 
b7 EY•l:;n Barins cro~•r, pp. l4V- l93, TOl . l . 
6 
ception, was so only 1n tneory . <9 l Kuetata Kll01l , leader ot 
Alnizb Alwatani, waa a capable leader 10 that hio party was 
the first real organization or a polit1oal party 1n Egypt and 
proved. to be ao •tt101ont 1:1h.at even afte1• n1e deai.h, when ita 
popularit7 waa on tne wane , ~t Still remainea a factor 1n po-
11t1cai life. Ka.mil'• Party demands ..... , (l) Pl>rmatio~ of 
an active Executive respone1bl• tor Parl1a&ent•s rece1v1.ng ad-
v1ce, not orders, rro~ Br1t1~h advisers . (2) Various 1mprove-
n:enta in education . (.I) 'rhe graaual replacement cl' foreign 
off icials by capaole Eg,-ptians . (4) Hel'orm of the Capitulation• 
by enb.anc1ng tb.e powers of the M1.xecl Tr1bunala . lt 1s very 
true that Kami! dled bel'ore he could complete ru.s ,.orkl lO J and 
there was no one or .qual capacity anQ knowledge t o taKe up 
wnere he nad let' ott . In prac~ice, tb••• p•rties were chiet-
ly based upon peraonal attachments to t ne leader, and the 
leadership 1tselt waa often merely the olo1k or private &JI; -
bit1on. Thls accounts for the steady decline and rapid di•· 
app•arance er th••• parties a• soon •• tb.e particular parsonaga 
to wnom they were bound died or fel. t""m favor . Again, Albitb 
Alwatan1 :zru.at be oon11dered the exception. anc the tact that 
lt was the onl1 one to aurv3.ve th.e ?l.rat .1urid .var ::e.ey be 
dlrectl:i- attribut•o to thia . 
Tne publ1abed program.a of all th••• parties abow an amaz-
ing resemblance to one another . Save tor oduoai1on, they were 
11ttie inter•ated 1n internal 1a$Uee. cultura~. aocial or eeo-
nomic . They all regarded the OArd•lllpa or the te11ah1n (far-
(II) and (lo) 
activities. • 
=11"1.::•c:t.;o.;;r;;l.::c.::•;::l'--"Di~y.;:;• • by Xfuiid Bihha /lddln) • 
p . 104 *full'• 
7 
mers) wito an a11£oat S\lpre:?Ce 1nd1tterence . ,foJ.le their pro-
graMs migc.t snow ao~e •Yl"Pathy and concern, ~n none of their 
act1v1t1eo wae there any effort tu &!lev1ate tn• lot ot their 
more unturtunate countrymen . Centered in cno towns, these 
parties felt the presence or the British occupation more 
acutely th.an the fellah d1d . on tho wnole , it was 1n their 
att1'tUde towarda tn• occupat1on and degree ot vigor w!tb whlcb 
tney opposed or aupportec it tnst th••• parties a1fferec from 
one another . 
Alhl tb Alwatan1 was the cnild ot Altellah V.ovemont which 
•a• led. by Ab.mad. Arabi - moat illlportant ce1'ure the Firs• V/orld 
•ar, out reduced to little ~ore thAn a ~ere C)1>ner curing •he 
poat-•ar years. Its place ••• taken 07 th• Alward, tne Del•-
ga~1on Party, wn1ch acopeed =osc ot its •atccworde, esp~c1ally 
the ant> -i3r1t1ab alugana an<I the union v1· all ltgn;t1ens, re-
gardleae or re11g1on, u. a at ruggle ror tn• complete indepen-
dence ot Egypt . 
THll AL•IA:'D 
A . ?1RS'i· l't.i<l'.OD. U!ADJ;R;;,, ... !' OP ZAOHL..'£. . 
l . Creat1un 01· Alwat4 Partz. 
Alwatd Almiar1 ••• toe ~tian D&legai1on to toe Peace 
conference wnicb met 1n Par1a , Apr1! 24, l~io, anc its pr1.,.ry 
purpose was to defend tne Egyptian quoat1on etter a bloody 
revoluti on agalnat the British 1n ~gypt, in 1~19 , led by sa •ad 
Zaglllul who became tho t1rat leader ot ~h• Alwatd Party. 
It seema eo m• vo17 nece8sary to knu• aomeen1ng about the 
8 
bac'sround of Zagnlui wno led tne .t:gypt1an n•tlonal gove::.ent 
•1th extraord..1nary ab1!1ty &no estabi11ned the strongest party 
1n Egypt . 
(ll)Zaghlul ••as ol' follall b1rth ; ha<I takun part 1n t he Arab. 
Robell10n ot lH~2 ona later, wn1le a student at Alazhar Univer-
sity, was a a1ac1plo of ~Ulla"""'d Abduh . l!Wlac=ad Abauh was a 
jurlspraaent phllosupher, and social and pol1t1cai reformer . 
t• 1nsp1red th• 1ntro<1uction ot graaaoi d•cocrac:r to J:.(l'Pt . 
Be waa mil der than n11 revolut1on&l:"J teacher Alarghan1 and nia 
co1ieague A.tlmad Araoi in t nis regar<I . H• participated with 
oia scnooi~a~ter 1n tne 1001al 11beratlon of the Isl a.m1c eo-
Cl.8t16S WithOUC lmt1.8Cll.&t8 1nt:ervent.1.0n 1n the ::ta1n l'UJ.8 or the 
religion . However, he was more cuna•rvativ• 1n that regard. 
Llke his scaoolmaater, be p~b~ished aev6re~ buok.9 to explaln 
fiia personal vl••• ot the evolution ur cne Ialaau.c societies 
1n t he1r approacn tu tne 8eoeorn pattern or l1to . <12> 
lrnlle etudyln8 law in Paris , Zagnlul oame unaer French 
1nfluonoe. ln l~u6 ne was President of the Pounding Committee 
ot the Egypti an On1vera1ty . L<>rd Cromer, tho Brltlsn High 
co~1as1oner 1.n Eg7pt , • no nad noticed n11 talents , s ecured 
tno post ot l11n11ter ot Edueac1on , and lacer tb&t or W1n1ater 
(13) 
or Juaeice, ror rum . .;,.1. •ad waa weil - acqua111eed w1th ~he 
ai;rong and. weax po1nt 1 or but:h n1s 1·011ow•r• ano his opponents , 
and was a tearless and eloquent orator. He seemed woll - auitod 
'{'ITJ'-Historlcal Diya , by Abiad Bililia Addln , p . IS, v .l, no .3 . 
Also, pp . B0,90, v. l, no . 6 . 
Til!T ~•e " Islam A• lt Is Seen by Westernara•, by ?h1lip Hitti, 
et al . , pp . 25, 26, ~Q , 4u, ~l, 62 , 68, 74 , '/6 
(13) ~· a:ore inrorzation about Zae;hlul 1n the llinistry ot 
F.ducat1<>n & J\Ucice, by t.velyn Bering Cromer, p . 535, v . I!. 
for the leadership of the national movement for independence, 
since K. K•m11 , leader o! the Albizb Alwatani, had died before 
he cou ld complete his role and there was no one of equal capa-
city or knowledge to take up where he had left off. 
Zaghlul•s victory in the election to the Legislative As-
sembly and his active part 1n the debates of that body secured 
him a number of staunch friend.a and admirers. Zaghlul and his 
supporters demanded the abolition of the capitulations, conati-
tutional reform., 1.mprovemente 1n educ-a.t1on, agriculture, and, 
above all , the independence of Egypt . 
(l')rt was around Zaghlul and bis group that the Alward was 
to be formed. However, it must be remembered that until 1924 
the Al•a!d Party did not regard itself as a political party, 
but as the agent of the m&aa .Public •ill. 7/hen it was ulti-
mately obliged to enter the l ists as a party, it was because 
of the responsibility it felt tor the enormous confidence re -
poeed in it by tho Egyptian people, particularly during the 
years of 1919-1924. Moreover, the growth of representation 
made the parli amentary sphere t he logical area for its act1vi-
tie a . 
After many meeting• and deliberations Zaghlul and his 
friends and colleagues fonz:ed Alwafd f rom members of the Legia-
la t1ve Assembly . The most em~entmembers of the Delegation 
were, besides Zaghlul, Ali Sharawi, Abdul Aziz Fahmi , Ahmad 
Lutfi Alaayyid, Abdul L&tit Almakabbati, lluhrumnad Ali, He.mad 
Albasil and sanyut Hanna . These folks represonted tho various 
(l4) Lenczowski, Tho Midd18 Eaat in World Al'?alrs, p . 315 . 
( 15) 
religious and •ooial element$ ot Bgypt. 
The first proclamation ot Alwafd was issued 1n Novembor, 
1919, aoon after their fruitless meeting with the British 
Commissioner tor Egypt, Sir Reginald ll1ngate . Alwatd then ia-
oued a pr oolwnation demanding a public mandate tor acbieving 
the comp l e to independence of Bgypt by peaceful means . Tile 
party rece i ved an ovoMJhelming support from d!.ttorent social 
and reli gious c l asses , rangi ng from educated yout h and re li-
g i ous elements to labor and fellahin. However, the compo-
sition began to vary soon after its formation and never re-
mained f1.xod tor very long, because of disputes between cer-
tain mel:lbers and Zaghlul . Cl G) 
2 . The Organization. 
Alwatd , which led the national ~ovement for total inde-
pendence, organized itself early i n its career. Through a 
special apparatus ot propaganda, its adherents 1n the towns 
were so well- disciplined that at a sign shops would be closed, 
boycotts started, and strikes organized . It ~d colllll!ittees 
and branches 1n tho remotest villages , all or which were con-
nected to the House of the Nation - Zaghlul' • residence . lt 
wa s this organi zation which gave Alward its lJM>ense majority 
in the 192~-1924 Parll&111entary election. Yfne n the Alwafdiata 
l eft for Europe 1n April , 1919 , a centra l COl!l!llitteo was left 
i n Bg:rpt to keep t he Delegation informed of local events and 
to ass i st i t w1tb funds . 
(15) Historical Daya , by Ahmad Bahha Add1n, p . 118, vol . l,no. 3 . 
(16) See a r i ch d!icuaaion for cr eat i on of th• Party and its 
leader, in "Ylbat Followed ta" Rebellion", by Abdul Hahmah 
Arrater 1, vol . l . 
u 
3. rnternal Organ11at1on. 
(l7 JThe tirat program or tha eonatitution or Alwatd contained 
26 paragraphs . Artic lo 3 atated that evory mambel' of the Alwatd 
is sworn to secrecy. Articles 6 and 23 1tated that "Membera or 
COlllli asions of Alward may be appointed for c1rta1n misoiona . • 
Articlea 9 •DC! 12 1poke about the appoint .. nt or a president, 
a secretary aid a treaaurer. Artic le ll descr ibed the tunotiona 
ot the Prea1dant, 1ay1ng:- The Preoident dirocta i t , preoidea 
a t its meetinga, watches over ito organization, ouperviaea the 
procoedinga ot tho Co.,,,,i1aion1, the work or the oecretary aDC! 
the eoDd1tiona ot the fund. Zaghlul wao the tirat President 
and the leader ot the party till he died on Auguat 23, 1927. 
The secretary control• tbe written work ot Alward, ito a.rchi•e• 
and all its pepar1 except tha accounta . The tirst aecr<1tary 
waa MUatata Alllahha1, Who became t he Proaident after ZasJllul 1 1 
death . The treaaurer 1uperviae• all i to accounta and is re-
1ponaible ! or the tunda. 
Article 15 1tat1d that •protocol• ot meotinga will be 
patterned on the Buropean mod.el . • Articles 16 and 19 stated 
that "A mel:1ber ot Alwatd can deal witn p1r1on1 ot political 
1taDd1ng in it1 name only with tho parmia1ion or t he Proaident, 
t o whom he muat aleo report tbe contents ot hia conversation 
in writing. 
The party elected a oentral committee tor the Egyptian 
Alward, compo11d ot pr ominent people who were expected to eol-
l1et tunds . 
(17) The wrieten Program ot Party (text available 
lie Library) and a pert ot te.:rt ia excerpted trom 
Part iea in Be;:rpt, by J. Landau, pp. ~2-leo. 
in Cairo l"lib-
Parl1uient & 
12 
Two main point• have drawn rq close attention rega.rding 
th• organization ot Alwatd. 
(l) Tn• thoro~ organization ot thia bod1. 
(2) The extenaive power• conterred on the Preaident . 
Aa a matter ot fact, tb• Preo1dent not onl7 pre• 
aides over meetings ana a1gno all protocols, but 
alao even aupervisea all the work done b7 the 
ottieera ot the Alwa!d and 1ta ~•ml>•ra, Wboae 
dealinga with pol1t1oal peraonagea are oloael7 
controlled b7 bl.lll . 
4. Propaganda. 
Alwatd, to eerve ita as.a. and achieve ita internal an4 
external policies, bad copied the Western pattern of partr 
organization and bad iasued prograanatic man1teatat1on. It 
had not been a political part7 in the accepted aenae or tba 
t ·erw. 
Notwithstanding internal diaeenaion and dilteronce or 
opinion, Alwatd never "let up" on ite v1goroua propaganda. 
It continued to hold .. etinga againat foreign interference 
in tbe &tta1ra ot 11g7pt, to arrange demonatrationa and to 
publiah manileatoea against t he British or Eg7ptian Govern• 
menta . These latter were either diotributed olandeatinet, 
or printed 1n the da117 preaa. 
( 18)'rhe pre es waa indeed a powertul organ t or Alward prop&• 
ganda. Though many newapapere, aerioue or satirical (like 
Alka1hlcul), attacked it and 1ta policy, not a tew supported 
(18) Press aupport sa• aa, iilitorlca1 Dli1a, by lfui&d Biliii& 
Addin, p. 133 
i t . ln 11124, it controlled, besides 1ts 01·t1e1al or gan "Kauk&b 
Alsn.er~11 , a. humorous weekly csJ.led "Kbaya.L Alz11.lu - cne name 
01· a popuJ.er e.muse:nent - and nsa t:ne support or w AJ.sh.ram-', 
"Albaiae.h11 , "\'iad.i Aln1J.e11 and .. V.1sser" . 
It ls not knovm exactly 00•11 much, i t' any, of its propaganda 
Alwaro. spread in ot.net· Arab count:r1es . ~me evidence 1s round 
i n a report by the Cairo Correspondent. of t!1e Daily Herald in 
wtlich l:le wrot e chat t ne pilgri ms vn Mount Ararae , near ?~ecca, 
ree1t e<1 prayers for !lberation of i:;gypt and ror lcs llb&racor, 
Zaghlul . 
Alward approached vari ous leadi ng peroona! lties in World 
affairs . Alwafd a1spetened mru:iy t el egrams to ~res1aent Wil son 
and otner American po.L1t1ca~ i~aders as we.Lt as to the Ameri can 
~enat e . ·.1.·hen ii; sent one or ii;s ablest memoers , Munru:mnad Mahmud 
ttasoa , to t.ne United States to endeavor co enlise SYlJ\P&t hy t'or 
its cau3e . 
(l9 )The propaganda uf t ne Alwatd was even more ~iae!y spread 
l.n Br1ta1n . .ln l\:119 , 11A Vlnito Book11 o.r aooumonts, put:>l1shed by 
Alwafa, •as printed 1n Paris , 1n i::ngll sh . 'l'n.!.s book contains , 
besides letters or Al~afd to tne Br1•1•h autnor1o1es 1n 2gypt , 
ot he r letters t.o Mt• . Lloyd George and to tne Hou.Se or Cvm?liOna . 
The ~ypt1ane in London , main.Ly tne student s , strove to 
ampllry tn1s propaganda . '!'hey a r ranged meetings w1 th Br1tlsh 
Members uf Parliament , printed men1festoes , and org&n1ted demon -
s t ra t ions . Duri ng the M1.Lner negotlations 1n 1920, the Egyptian 
assoelaolon 1n Britain ana Iruland added to the llst or 1t s pub-
(19 ) See ~arl 1ai:ienE & i;arty in "EgypE, l>y J . Landau , pp .1$7- 160 . 
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11eat1ona a oooklet, 1n wn1cb i~ suyportea Al•ata and severely 
or1t1c1zea the Bric11n auggeationa 1n tb• propo1eQ M1Lner-
Zaghlul agreement . 
Al•afd contorea 1ta propaganda 1n Par1a . It aent lettera 
to Clemenceau, ond puo11ahed or encouraged the publ1cat1on or 
various other worka, like the eext or report to General Al1enb7 
on tne causes or unrest ano discontent 1n ~pt, 1n !'llglish and 
Pra~cn tranala~iona . 
Later 1n tne alU!la year Alward puolisnea another document 
trom 1ts ww.nite Book", viz., 1~s Report to the Peace Conference 
on British Atrocities in ~gypt . Thla booklet stresses <he help 
rendered b7 EgJPt to the cause or <he All1es curing the war, the 
disregard or tne Srlti ah tor tne individual libort7 and tho 
etrong retusal ot the ~~"YJ)t1ans, aa representea b7 A!wafd, to be 
aero salable m•rcllandtae in tne market or poltcioal transact1on1 . 
Soon afterwards Alwatd published anotnor ooukJ.et conta1n1ng 
tho speeches delivered at a luncheon g1von b7 it to about 200 
po! tt1ca! persunalitiea, 1nc!uding repreaen•ativea of <he Allied 
1nci neutral pres a . Zaghlul spoke first , pro<e1ting egetns< the 
contin::ation by tn. Paris Peace Conference ot cno Br!t1an Pro-
tectorete over Egypt . Ii•• Tas1r spoke next ot <ho unkept 
pros1soa or the Br1t1sn G~vel"!'l.ment , ot Egypt•a con,r1but1on to 
the Aii1ed cauae and of Egyp• •s grea<er righ< to independence 
that the< ot the 'l'UrkJ.en prov1ncoa . <20> 
Alwatd contacted many or the Egyptians liv1ng 1n Prance, 
too . Moat o!' th••• t<>ok an active part 1n explaining its aim 
and demand• to the French at private mooting• aa ••1• as in pub-
(20) Tb• 21dd1e Eiet , by uaifoi'd t . ~oakl.na, p . ~S, ~ne A.."\6lo-
LS11'tian l!Ol ation1 . 
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lie lectures end banquets . Tno greatest amount ot propaganda 
was d1101lll.nateu by tne Y..gyptle.n1• Aasoe1•t1cn 1n Parts and by 
S1!ll1lar b<><11es 1n Nanc1 and L7on . 
'l'he J<gyptlo.o A••ociacion• in Britain and Paris were by no 
meana th• only onea WllO supported tile c=p•ign ror ,;g;rpt1an in-
deperadenc• . By a lplC11l CODVOC&tivn Ot tno ~~ypt1an Asaoci• 
et1on in ~aris, torty ropresen~at1ves ot al• ~h• t.01Pt1an Asao-
elatlone in Europe mot in Parie in l92u. They etudied and di1 -
cuasee1 tll• proposal• ttloburated by ~!1lner and eubmltted them 
to tile i<gy~t1an delegation dur1ng tile London ne~otlatlona. ih• 
congre11 rejectea en. Atlne r propo111s unanimouely, ma1niy be-
cauee lt cona1oeree1 tllat tlley gave ~ypt only a n01:11nal inde-
pendence, as the military occupation, the 1nterteronee or Br1-
ta1n 1n internal arre1ra of Egypt, ana cbe poealbiiity ot Bri-
tain'• torcl.ng Egypt eo enter a war as her ally, were not our-
tailed . 
s. Tile Poilcy or the Party. 
<21>Article one ot tno party•s progra: scaceo that •tile l:lAlln 
aim 01· th• party 1e to acllleve Egypt' a independence by peacet\ll 
meane•, and Article ~ eta t•d chat " tho party 1a empowered by 
tne people to repro11nt tbem.• 
.Tnen Al•afd ••• creaced. 1~ aoon 11su::od ~h• charaeter ot a 
national union or peraonal1t1es !eaa1ng a popular movement tor 
independence . It waa more like an organ1zaci on designed to 1'1sht 
for 1ndepondence than a pol1c1cal party •1th a oet progra:n and 
(21) ·fn• text of Party' s Progre.JD, Crom Parliament & Par~y In 
Egypt, by J . Landau . 
l & 
t'lxec1 aus . At'ter t:ie rai1ure or tile 1£11ner-z.a~ul nogotiat1on1 
oomo important members left the party, coo11der1ng that BQpt •a 
interests demanded t he accep~ance ot tno points wh1eh Britain 
was a1reac1y W1111ng to concode . <22 ) 
?;otlll.ng could have been "'ore narail'lll to Alwafd th.an 1nact1on . 
Consc1oua or th.at, it• leaders tried to g1•• 1t an extre~•~y ac-
tive coaracter tnrouRbout . Tb.a..Ylka to tbla act.1v1am an.a. ~\I ett1-
c1ent organ1zat1on Al•at'd euce•ede4 111 un1t1n~ the great majority 
ot t he Egyptian•, irroepective ot' relig1oue or aoc1a1 d1tferoncea , 
1n an opposition front diroctea a gain•t the Br1cish . 
(231Aa to the Party ' • general po11cy, dertned b Zaglllul 1n Illa 
appeal t o the Powers at the bog1nnlng of the Egyptian Rebellion 
1n l~i9, Alwa td worked tur independence, ~h1cn was the right ot 
ES7pt ; and rur con1titut1onal govern::ent, <Z4 I witn resorvat1on1 
reapoct1ng roreign rienta , ma1nly t he cap1tulationa, tile public 
debt and the neutrallty or the SUez Canal . Later, rerorms 1n 
eauoation and 1n thtt moral anti maeer1aJ. st&CUI 01· tne tull8..h1n 
and workmen were actdeQ tv tnis prQgre,m. An adjuatment was cade 
1n 1921 to accept notni.ng out ebsolute 1nc1ependence, internal 
anc1 external . IDt•rn•l 1noependonce $1c;n1f1as co2plete super-
v1a1on over .f1na.nc1a1, ~•g1~~•~1ve, jud101a1, ao.a1n1&~rat1ve, 
agrlcul~Jre.l ana c0111..oerc1a! aepart:ents, pol1ce and public work1 . 
Tn1s l.mpiiea evaouat1on by toe Br1t1ah and the oeasa~lon or all 
L'ott1gn lntert'eronce 1n Egyp tian affairs . In tne external re -
(221 Se@ about n•~~ uf m~n~lone~ member . -ff!~t~rleaL Diys , by 
Allmad B&hha Ad11n, p . !~l . 
(23) Tne secuoa Egyptian roo~i.1on took place ~ar . 8 , lv.9. It 
'bruke out 1n to• La• ~nvol due to arree t or ~ 'aa Za1:-hlu.l ~ b1a 
aaaoc1ates . H1stor1cal Daya , p . 1~ 1 . See also Par~1a,:,.ent & Party 
1n l:.~t , b7 J . L&iiaau, p. 16~ . -
(24)~t1cle 2, 01 Party•• Program. H1s<or1ca1 :..7a, p .117, for 
tu!l d1acuas1on or l91V Rebol11on. 
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la~1ons, Egypt DI.lit nave tul~ con~ro• ur tn• cunauc~ ut 1ta 
rorelsi> pol1cy 1n 1ta own 1ntorests. 
The program, after aaaert1ng t hot Egypt nad never oeen 
part ot' the Br1t1an Emp1re , etressed four points:-
(1) Egypt ought not to be do"'1J:ated by an7 foreign 
power tbat could be nelped b; a treat1 ot al-
llance between Egypt end Sr1tal.L . 
(2) satety or tLe Sue~ Cllllal : 1ta neutral1t1 ••• 
already ensured by international treaties (1888) , 
and the Egyptian army could bo reaponaible for 
the neutrality ot the Canal . 
(3) Guarent••• for the 1neor<>ste or the Br1t iab sub-
jects 1n Egypt: tore1gnera 1n Ee:rPt were safe 
even betore tne occupstlon, and the cep1tulet1one, 
.,n1ch could be mod.1t1ed by eventful agreement , 
safeguarded alJ. foreign 1ntoreata . <25 l 
(4) Guaranteoa tor tho Br1t1sn aluirenolders in Egyptian 
publlc debt11 those :lnteroat• were alread7 safe-
guarded by the •calase de~• Cet~• publ1que• , the 
exlstence ot •hlch mlght be prolong-4 . 
Up to l\;2Z AJ.wefd nad J.od •ne :::ovexent ot· :::n-P• •a 1ndopen-
denoo and Zagblul bad oeen •ne popular nero ot Egypt . 
Alwafd tried to tind common ground with other ~gyptlan 
pol1t1cal groupe but tho lntemel dltferencea n.ade its leaders 
real1&e that Al•afd ••• not the people , as ebe1 bad thought, 
but onlJ a party . 
(25) lhi~ FOilowea the rtebe!l ion, by Abdul Rihiin Arrare •!, 
p . l'/0-183, v . 1 . 
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<26 )In Novo~er, 1922, Alwatd, with •n• aid ano approbat1cn 
or Alll.\zo Alwatan1 presented a ~emorandwo re-asserting the right 
or Egypt t o independence to the Conterenco Of Lauaar.no . Tho 
me:norandum 1• 1n tour 3ect1ona: 
( 1) rho Judicial status of Egrpt a1nco 1840 waa des-
er1bed , stres s ing ~hat only an 1n~ernet1onal 
agroemont could change tne Convontlon or London 
• :al.en gre.n;ed t o Egypt 1.0~eni1l autonC.i:Q' - con-
f'l r:ed by subs•~uont f'1mane - verg1nl' on inde-
pendence . Britain occupied Egypt and maintained 
hor hold on 1t 1n det1anoe ot ell international 
troatiea end ot the declarations ot Brit1ab 
ste.tosmen . 
(2) All tne points wlUcn Britain •reserved" !'or her-
self were unjuati1ieo by ;be real conditions of 
ttunga and attacked ;;gypt•a sovereignt y, bot h 1n-
ternal!y and externally . All Britain • ~ protoxts 
were actuate<1 by the desire to keep .1:.Qn?t under 
Britian tutelase. 
(~) Contrary to th• arguments ot the Br1t1an govern-
cent, toreign capital in E$1pt was not in danger 
as Egypt was 1n a hoalehy t1nanc1al condition. 
(4) The ~udan bad a!ways been part or ;:;gypt and , be-
cause ot tbo ~i1lt$ 1 was still tlle sourco or life 
tor Egypt . 
(26) llhit l'Ollowea the tcebel!ion, by Abdul t!Sllliian Arre.!'e•i, 
p . 76 , vol . 3 
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In conclus1on, the memorandwn stated that the Egypt1an• 
were bent on obta1n1ng thelr lnaependence and demanded from 
the Conference, -
1 . Recogn1t1on of the complete 1ndependence of the 
Nlle Valley, 6gypt e.nd the Sudan. 
2 . Evacuat1on of a l l English troops !'rom the Nile 
Va.1ley . 
3 . Continuation of the ef'fectlve neutralization of 
the Suez Canal . 
<27>Alwafd had never recognized the 1922 Declaration vt Inde-
pendence as 1t ccns1dered 1ts reservations repugnant . As the 
1923 Egyptian Constitution was a consequence of this Declarat i on, 
Alward opposed it, too , lll81nly on the following grounds1 
(l) That the constitution had not been t"or:nulated 
by the representatives ot' tbe nat ion . 
(2) That a.11 reference to the bounderies ot Egypt 
and the un1 ty of the ~ale Valley had been 
omitted . 
( 3) That Egypt was not me> re independent under the 
new constitut1on than under the protectorate . 
<28lcuriously enough, Alwatd partieipeted eagerly 1n the first 
e lection held under this Cons titution and was its staunchest de-
fender when the Palace 01~lea triea to subst1tute leas liberal 
conot1tut1ono 1·or 1t . Zaghlul. and his foiiowers t ook the 1923 
(27) FOr text of Declaratlon, see Historical Da~s , by Ahmad 
Bahho. Addln, p . 14<! . :>ec also, What F'O.Uowod t e RebelJ.1on , by 
Abdul .Rahman Arrafe t i , v . ! . (28) !'Or the constitution of 1923 and its election, see p . 145 
of H1s~or1ca1 Days , ~· cit . ---
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elec t ion very serioualy, organizea their propaganda thoroughly 
1n the tO•n• and v1ilag•• and, ~hank• to gooa or~en1zat1on , won 
tne election, i ts supporters get ting 188 •eat• aea1n•t 27 for 
all other pert1es in th• Chamber or Deputies . 
<29)Tho Zaghlul Government lald only a f ew internal projocta 
before the 1924 Parllamont . Aln1n You•if, one of Zaghlul •s cloae 
collaborators, tell• u• that Zae;hlul h•d diver•• rerona project• 
1n mind , ma1nly ~prov$ment 1n education , a~~etration of jue-
t1ce , and taxation. Whether real or imaginary, theae projected 
~form1 were not carr1•c1 out beeau11 ot "Che re11r:nation ot Zagh-
lul •s Cabinet after toe ...,rder or Sir Lee Stack. (;:-0) on the 
wcole, Al• atd 's nrat ~•nuN of' ottice wag cnaracter1zed by a 
st r ong interes t in 1'or~ign affai rs - mostly Egypt ' • rela tions 
•1th Britain - to the detriment ot' any oonst i'\lctive policy for 
intemal reto,.,.,s . 
B• t•••n 1!1''2 and l~Z6 ~an; election• wore nola and oost ot 
t noao in wnich Alwatd participated wore won by Alwatd by an over-
whelming ma jori.ty. ( :5l) '!'ne 19'27 ~arl1ament worked diligently 
un'.!er Zaghlul•s cta1""8n•Up arter abol1a1U~ all lawa wlllch had 
been 1aaued by Royal Decree during the absence ot Parl1""1ent . 
I t t ook v1gorous otepa to cut do·wn to reign serv1oe expenditure . 
Variou• measures ot improvi ng th• •tandard of tne cn1er export -
cotton - &n<1 ra1&1nf it• price, .... Ni paa$ed and an ant1 · z&.lar1a 
ca:::pai~ •a• inaugurated . An atte:pt at lessening Brit i sh con-
{29) l"Or 1nt'ormation about Zaglliul'• Oov •t.,see paragraph 9,Wfult 
FO!lowed the ~ebel!lon , by Abdui .Hallman Arrate •1, pp . B7-ll9 .~ 
(30 and 31) Hlotorical Davs , by A!Dlad Bahn& Ada1n, p . 149. Aleo , 
·.ae l.i ddle Eist in Wvrl d l?t·aira, by IAnczowski , p . 317 - EsYJ>t 
between I\il!i-1936 . 
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trol or the Egypti<L~ army railed . 
( 32) 
Tbe British were clearJ.y .not pt'epared. t.v .Loo.:te11 t.neir gr1p 
untl..L tne CQnclusion 01 Lne treaty . The Brlt1sb aemands were 
a1m1ng at keeping a s tatus quo , especially superv1a1on of the 
t;gyp t lan army, the maintenance 01· Br1-c1 .sb. t'orce:J 1n l:!gypt and 
the contl.nua~1on of Brltlsh fl.llanc1a1 and jud1c1al Adv1sory 1n 
their t~nct1ons . Zaghl ul 1 s deatn on August 2~ , 1~~7 , concludes 
the 1·1rst leader~h.19 of the party and concludes the period ot 
the party ' s g.1.ory and struggle rcr unity o.na ror independence . 
ZagbJ.ul 1 s leadersnlp secured to ..:gyp t t·•o main points: -
(lJ Internal united political front which cut across 
the boundaries or reJ..1gi on and class . 
(~) Tne popuJ.arization of toe patriotic ideal among 
a people wnich nad. h1toerto been almost wholly 
apathetic . 
B . THI! SEJCOND P~!l':OD . LJ:!ADB!ll>!iIP OP AL.'IAl!JIAS 
The passing away of the 1ntransigeant leader brought the 
wheel or Alwat'd'a leaderanip to 1ts secretary , lluatara Alna.hhas , 
and the seeretariai; to Makram Uba1d . Botn were elected , c33> 
'i'ne Br1•i•n hoped that Za.gnluJ.•s deatn wouJ.a bring about 
an agreement with the Egyptians on the basis of dictating the 
Bri~1sh pol1~1cal , m1i1tary and economic demands , but the ne -
gotiations between Sir Austin Chamberlain nnd Tharwat , the 
(32) Hlsi;orical Days, by Abiiiaa aihha Adain , p . 149. Also, The 
l!ida1e J:;ast 1n /or.I.a Art'a1r•, oy Lenczows1e1 , p . 3J.? - egyptoe-
~·ween l'di4-..L9~ . 
(3~) Abuut Alnanna• & Ubaia•s election, see cnap. l, p . 11, vol . 
2, Wnai; Fo1l o1ted the Rebel 11on, by Abdul R!Ulman Arrare •i , 
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Egyptian Prime M1n1ster, came eo a deadlocx because of the 1.m-
possiblLity or th• Brlti•n demands being rat1t~•d 1n tne 
Egyptian Parl1ament . <34 l As a result of the negotiat1on 1s 
raii.ure, 'l'narwat, in March , llf~~, reaiy.ned and n1s p.1.ace was 
taken by Alnallnas . <~S) Alnahbas• government lasted but a short 
time because of a sharpl y- worded exo.b.ange ot notes 'A'i t h Br1 ta1n 
wh1cn brougnt about the pror ogation ot' Parliament for throe years 
by King PUad • 
In 1~29 another e iection was had 1n order that Parliament 
mignt ratify the Br1tl•h auggested treaty, in wnicn Alward 
ga1nea a large majority, and •~ tho beginning of lv3v a wnoliy-
A.Lwa1·d1st govesmmcnt under tile l'res1denc y of Alnahhas was formed . 
Parl16.1"lent met ega1n, but the Government resigned because of 
differences with tho King , and Britain, who laio difficulties in 
Alnahhas' path . The next government adjourned Parl1a.ment inde-
finitely . The 1923 Constitution was restored by Royal Dec ree in 
December, 1935. ttowever, betore the announced election could 
take place, King Fuad died on April 26 , 1936 . 
(36)Tlle elections were hastene!l under olle supervision or Ali 
Mah1r, Alnahhas forming a new Alwafd1st government after the 
party 's victory in tne eieceion. (Y7) '11he Government ' s first 
{34) About negotiation, see tuLI discussion, p . 12, vol . 2, Whit 
Followed the Rebellion , by Abdul Rahman Arrafe•i. ~ 
(55) Atnihhas• Premiersn1p took place Mar . 17,1928 - he was leader 
of majarity House or Deputies . He also neld post vf Ministry ot 
Interior. Same reference as (31) - same chap. Alnahha• was dis-
missed by Fllad despite fact he was maj . leader - it became histori-
cal preceden~ fvr tur~her violation by Ki ng . 
(36) Elec tions held Mar.2,1936,were claimed to be most free Egypt 
ever had •• due t o fact Oov •t . d i dn't interfere . "What Followed Re-
bel.11on••,p .10,vol . 3; a l so p . 151 . 
(37) Parties acting 1n e l ections were Aiwafd, Pl'ee Constitutional, 
The People, tho Union and National Party . 
great acbJ.evement ••• the 1936 treaty. Segot1at1on• were begun 
at th• end ot .?I.tad'• re~SJl and concluded 1n Parouk•• t1me . 
Tno Al•atdlst rule gradua11y tenda4 to bec°"'e d1ctator1al . 
J.'n• •slue ~rts•, a youtb aport:a- organ1tat1on •hich ns 1ntended 
pr1lllar1ly to prevent Al•a.t'diat youth l'rom talu.ng prey to th• 
macb1nat1ona of other part1es, soon became a pol1tlca~ body , ar-
t111ated to Alwafd and ofton used by it to terrorize its opponents . 
i1bon Parliament was prorogued and elections neld early 1n 
lv2e, Alwatd was soundly defeat ed, =•inly beoauee pres8Ure was ap-
plied to the electorate, but al~o becaua• all •ne discontented 
caat ~ce1r vote ror Al•atd 1 • opponent• - thu• a coalicion govern-
ment wae ror::ed . Al•atd wae not in a majoritJ ln the Ch&cl>er ot 
Deputiea . Its opponents now paid Alwatd 1n it• own coin, dis -
banding its "Blue Snirts• organization. 
(~)In April , 1940, Alwatd sent a firml1 -written note to tbe 
Brltlan de=and1ng a =llltary evacuation or E~ypt and a renewal 
or the Sudan nogotlat1ons 1anediatol1 after the end ot the war . 
1rotwithatand1ng this note , the Britiah rightly eone1dered Alward 
the only etrong part1 which •a• not pro-German. A• Alnabha• was 
prepara4 to head only an a1l-Al•&td1at Oovornmont, the Br1t1ah 
lad to fore• tbe King 1nto aereament by a abow 01· al'!!ls . (39) 
(38) ~Nfr&a uf Alwatd contelriid unde1In.ble woi"lds to Br.itafu: 
Alnahnaa 1a1d: •Acnievement ot ~0\1.DtT'J''I independence ..:.~l be b7 
a1gn1ng tr1endly & al!1ance t~at7 w1tb our !r1ond, Br1t1sh ~tate.• (Tnl• tc Parliament) . Some J::s1pt1an elomonta were wondering tow 
our •enemy• eoula be de.scribed aa our • .rr1end•? 
"Th• M1da1e East 1n •orld Affairs•, by Lenczowak1, p . 319, Anglo-
EgJj>tian ·treaty . 
( 39) hb . 4, 11142, Br1 tisn tanka surround9d Palace. F&rouk de-
111\lrrtd, then boY1ad to i nevitabla - didn't rorgive English tor tn1a . 
Par11amont & Parez, by Jacob Landau . 
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(4())FOr tne greater part or the perioa under review, the poli -
t1cal pattern presents an almo3t uninterrupted aeries of crises , 
due either to the intervention of tne King or or Brltain in 
l:.6ypt 1s political and constitutional l ife . The causes i'or these 
conflicts lie chiefly 1n the nature of the three factors of that 
strv.ggle : Alwafd, the King, and Britain. Alwafd, despite its ap-
parently-efficlent organization, could rel y only on popular en-
thus1aa= which was more ertective 1n carrying out a rebe1!1on 
than in the ruling of a country. The King despotically tried 
tilre and again to limit the practical force of constitution 
Which curtailed n1• power . The British shrewdly appreciated 
that these two were the only significant influences in the coun-
try , and openly or covertly tnrew their great weight - based on 
the amed roroea - sometimes to the side of Al..-atd , but more 
often to that of the King . 
Tne con$tG.nt friction with these two forces and their in-
tr1gu.ea, as wel! as the various rel1g1ous and social rivalries 
flitllln itself, enfeebled Alwefd and deprived 1t of important 
melllbera, like Makra~ Uba1d, its secretary , who Joined another 
party . ·1·be new parties were o.ften w1J.11ng - ei t:her because of 
hatred ror Alwatd, or the pers-0nal ambitions ot their leaders , 
or both - to support the King 's arbitrary rule, after the re-
peated prorogation ot Parliament. Through the King, tne smaller 
pa~1es ort:en nelped Britain 1nd1rect1y, a~ the interests of 
these two pol1t1ca.L factors were oteen identical, particularly 
1nsotar as their relat1onah1p •itb Alward was concerned . 
(40) '.l:he liiddle East in Worlct .Aft'aira, pp . 323, 324, 325 
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To the creait of Alwafd •s government must be laid the fact 
that 1t pa1a spec1ai attention to educat100 . It aiao Oid its 
utmost towards tile creation or tne Arab League ( 'll) and the .fur-
therance ot the cause ot co - operation . This 1nd1rectly enb.eneed 
its preat1ge Which nad oeen lessened by seoea~1on of toe party's 
secretary , Uakram U'ba1a, who !'ounded. rtis own bltterly ant1-sr1t1sh 
vwafd1st Bloc . 11 
<42 >At the end or 1944, when the wsr movea rurther &?lay from 
Egypt , tile King 01smissed Alnahhas , after ·•hJ.cll Alwaf'd nela aloof 
from the conduct or the country •a atf'a1rs t·o r some years . 
After tile failure or the S:1dqi -Bev1n negotiation or 1946 , 
and the defeat or ~gypt by the "•raelis (a• a result or the 
Western-israel1's consp1rac1es against the Arabs, through their 
personnel employoa by the Arao States 1n key positions) and ot 
the ttDetect1ve armsn, there were d.emonstrai;1ons and unrest WJ:lich 
toraed the government to resign , but discontent and suspicion had 
reached such a peak that ror tho next tew years a chain of murder& 
ana acts of violence fo11owed . (43) 
Al•a:t'd, ably exp101ting th1s d1sse~isfact1on , obta1ne4 an 
absolut e majority in tne e.lecti ons of January , 1950. Parties 
participating with Alwafd were Sa 'adi Party whicb obtained 28 
seats ; L1b6rals and Constitutionals which obtained 26; Indepen-
dents w.oich obtainea ~ seats ; Nati onals, 6 seats; soc1al1sts l 
(41) Free Riemeneary J:!;Cluca~ion Law , 1942; also Government 1ritro<iuoed 
many usetuJ. laws. see •t•'h.e.t FOllowea tibe RebelJ.1on" , v . 3, p . 47 . Tbe 
achievement s 01· Alnal:lllas • fourtn govemment . ( Nv-rEJ (I disagree 
with tnose who cla1mea th• Arab League idea was""'!Fl't1sn inspiration) . 
(42) "lliddle East 1n >forla At1·a1rs" by Lenczowski , p . 326 . (43) .Ahiliiic. l.tiiher (Prime !l.iniste:r) was murdered Pl!b . 24,11145,& Zaki 
Pasb, Cl11ef Police,Dec . 4, 1948,ana Dec . 2~th ~allmud Fallmi Nokrashi , 
.sue . to Maher ~·as assass1nated; aJ.J. 3 were v1ct1me or Jluslem Brother-
hood organization, Feb .12 , 1949 ,Hassan fil -Banna was Shot and ki1led . 
~ee •What FoJ.iowed Reoe1J.ion1', Lenczowsk1 , p . 328 and p . 202, v. 3 . 
26 
ane Alwa:d obtained 228 aeats, - a tota! ~r 31~ seets . <44 l 
"ne demagogic propaganda ror tne evac11a•ion or .,;gypt and 
it• 11n1on wi th tne S11d•n now boomeranged, l'vr tne peopl e nat11ral-
ly expected Alwat"Cl t<> t'lut'1i 1t-s promises rapidly . Tills the new 
gov•nllll•nt could not do without the Britlah oonsent . !ts rep~-
1ontat1vea repeatedly tried to acn.leve th1• by dlploma~ic meana . 
'llhen au.ch ceans tailed, they reao~ted to violeno1 . Violence was 
eaaent1al to the enhance=ent or Alwatd•a pre1t1ge wnicn bad been 
cons1derebly lee a med by tovori tiS!ll towards edhe~nts and the 
terrorization ot antagonists, botn having oeon carried out on a 
larger scale th1ln hitherto . It managed thi• not only by tighten-
ing ~he rein on tne civi aa.m1~1atrat1on ana aecticn of the army 
forces and the police b11t also by persecuting parliamentary op-
position as well . A• an opposition Alwatd bad enjoyed the affec-
tion ut ~· greater part ot tr-e populace beoauae, ever 31nce lVL8, 
its success nad 11red en• people 's imagination . In ~gypt, a• 
elsewhere , nothing euceeede like suceeas . However, the popular 
de a ire for 1nt.ernal rerurms was frus"Crated v.hen 'Che CO\.intry t .s in-
ternal affai rs were left to sucb conservatives a• PUad Sirej 
Addin 1 sl.D:UJ.taneoual; the Party's Secre;1ry and )'inlster tor the 
.uiter1or, who act11ally bad the 1.nterests ut landowners at heart . (45) 
;'be ca.mpa1gn againat 8rite1n wlllch followed the failure of 
the Anslo- Egyption negotiations was, however, foredoomed . Alward 
(44) M7 1nformatlon ri taken from "Vlhat 111)11owed the Rebellion" , 
v . :i, r.p . 28tj- 3;1 and • tno 1!1ClClle i::ast iri World Affair•*, p . 3:!9 . 
(45) About corruption or Alwata•s adliilni1tratlon and m!s11••• of 
authorit7 and tb• v1olat1on pf princ1plea of Constitution and of juat1cea - see preiv1ou1 rererence to A1watd 1n Power and re~.1t:1p­
tlon or C1ictatorsnlp. "llhat Pl:>llowed th• ·'•t>•111on•, b;r t.bd11l 
t<lnmen Arrate11, ehap . V, p. 295, vol . 3. 
(llJ 1n1'o:rmation ls t11<en rro., 1• . y . "fl.lll••, Apri1 lS, 1951. ) 
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waa obliged to auba1t to eertain 1ntorn11l and external pres-
aurea. In EgJ'Pt 1taelf, the tenor of Alwafd'a election plat-
fonn and the tempart.111ent ot the people precluded an;r poaa1b1-
11ty of eompromiae. In tbe Middle Eaat, J!Sypt - the selt-
profosaed leader of tne Arab llat1on - could not afford to lag 
behind Syria and Lebanon wb1cb had botil rocontlJ' aeh1eved tllll 
1ndepelldonee. Tno Le.bour Govor=ent 1n London, on the other 
band, could not give way either becauae of ito precari oua ma-
jority L~ the Houae ot C011111ona and vaatly-1ncreaaed intluonco 
of the mili tary c1rclea attar the outbreak ot tho Korean War. 
On October 8, 1951, th• Al• afdiat Government abrogated 
the 1936 treaty, which 1t bad been once ao proud of obta1n1ng. 
Alwatd bad no alternati•• but to abrogate t n1& treaty due to 
the faet that when .ucb treaty • •• '""'de it ••• presuaed to 
guarantee Britiah evaeuation. However, aa a reault ot the 
failure of Anglo-Bgyptian negotiation• ot 19&0, Alwafd had, 
aa I have alroady atatod, to abrogate the treaty; otherwise 
it would loae contidance ot tho populace. All parties and 
groups supported it open~ , most ot them Wllole -hearted~. 
Tho powerful llllalem Brathren, a semi- political ro ll.giouo 
organ1&at icn with no parl1aioentsry affiliation, Which had 
plaeed a prca1nent par-t in tbe terroriam of the parties, alao 
joined in the general acela1m, inciting the populace aga1nat 
tho 1nt1rol. The amal l number of ct111111un1ata co-operated, aa 
ia tha1r wont, with nationalistic element• aa long as it waa 
to their bonet1to and used tbe "'2ti-Br1tiah and anti- 1mper1al-
1at alogans to attract recruits tr011 aaongat tho many non-
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attil1ated workera , cbiet~ those or t he t•%tile 1nduat17. 
Tba fascist •soc1aliat Party•, ably led by the lawyer Ahmad 
Huaa1n, joined in t he rerratn. 
'I'bua t he movoment•a Xenopbob1an character wae 1ntenai-
tied, reacbl.ng 1ta pe&k 1n the r1ota d1reoted againat tbe 
foreigners and tbeir poaaeae1one on (Black Saturday) Janua17 
26, 1952 . ( ~S ) Another oharacter1atic ot the movomont waa the 
daring or the part1c1panta. 'fib.er••• tbe !S7'J)tiana h•d pre-
v1ouel7 contented thoaoelTea with demon1trat1ona in Cairo and 
Alexandria, t h1e t lae irregular "Liberation Un1ta• harassed 
and sabotaged the Brit ieh i n the Suez Zone and helped the 
government ento rce the outt ins otf ot al l 1uppliea to them. 
Le1t other partiea outbld it , Alwatd t ried to restrain the 
oxtrem1ste, 1uperv11ed the Li berat i on unit• and l e t tbe 
IS7'J)t1e.n police in the C&D& l Zone co-operate witb tno Br1t1ab. 
Th• preet1go ot Alward naturally auttered and 1t1 opponents -
notably the King - exploited the Black Sat;urday ep1aode towards 
tho dismissa l or t he Alwatd from power. Aa the party wao d1· 
Tided within it1elt and had no etreo t 1vo control or tbe *t'Cl7 
or the police, 1t could not but COiop~ . 
<•7>Tbe political atruggle ag&inst the Bri tiab wae doomed to 
failure becaua• ot the overwhelming power ot the Britiah and 
(i6) There la i naurt!oient evidence that Kina P•roUlC aiid hi1 
men ot conf1danoe ena ineerod the Cairo t i re to give British a 
chance to 1ntervano and have Alwafd Cabinet resign - wher e be 
1ucceedod 1n tbe former and tailed in the latter. 
( • 7) In spite or the tact many Briti1h ottic1ala arrived in 
Cairo as llarabal Slla and llr. Bevin 1tated the 1mpossib111t:r 
ot British withdrawal troa Ca.nal Zone. 
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the -1.scalculation or t.be ~tit.n Govo..,...nt .rblch had 1n-
jud1c1oual;r reckoned on the diplomatic oupport or the United 
States . There waa probabl:r some i ll-rounded hope 1n Egyptian 
orticial circloa that the British would evacuate Egypt 1n the 
lace or violence, but thia, again, waa an under-eatimation 
ot the strategic valuo or the Suez Canal and a !allure to 
t ake into account a poaaible change or gover11Dont in Britia.n!.Sl 
M&n.1 otti cera or the arm•d roreea, Junior a1 well aa senior, 
were exasperat ed b;r tho 1(1ng' • high-banded huahing-up ot the 
"Defective Al'IDs" arraira and the appointment ot his men to 
the highest military poaitlooa . On •ul;r 2Z, 1952, an otticera 1 
group, headed by Kajor-General XUh•mnad Najib, aeized tho key 
poaitions 1n the countl')' with remarkabla etticienc:r and alllloat 
without bloodshed, erreated the King'• ••n 1n the an:ed torcea , 
baniahed the 1(1ng h1:ii1elt, and buckled down ••rioual:r to the 
task or eonsol1dat1ng their rule with the help ot those civil 
elementa known tor their integrity. 
The coup d'etat waa thue d1rec ted not onl:r aga1nat the 
l(1ng and h1a aen ot conrideneo but alao aga1nat corruption and 
tavoritina. 
Tho 1952 order DOant that 1n the future only personae 
gratae to the new rog1llle could take part 1n the political lite. 
The variouo part:r loaders and oeoretar1oa , part1cularly Alwa1'-
diato, sensing thia intention, covertly tried to hinder the 
res en a11ar o yp 
ot the Revolution", p.1016, denied that th• ooup ea waa 
caueid 61 what happened 1n the Paleatine War, becauae ot dotoc-
t1Y• weapon.a. 
purgo . A al.milAr reaction waa evinced by tho Mu•l•m Brethren 
who alao received t he order to reorganize. However # all the 
political partlea, 1nolud1Jla Al•~d and tba llllalem Brethren, 
both ot which rely on popular aupport and b&ve tho a&me ex-
porienoo or underground act1v1t1oa, bad been disbanded , de-
clared illegal and their property b&d boon contlacatod.( 49 ) 
Their prca1nent and aoat reapon1lbl• leaders were tried and 
sentenced. Ono or tho great advantagea or tbe coup d'etat, 
offlcora atato, •&a the tact that they wore not bound to any 
party whatsoever. Thua , they could not only purge aroied fore•• 
but retora polltloal 11!• and aooial oondlt1on1 aa we11. <60 l 
CONCLUSI ON OP THI! DISCUSSION 
Throughout the diecuooion we obaorved that tho national 
Kgypt1an atruagl• a 11umod dU'.feront tor:i>s, aomo pacific and 
some revolutionary. The t1rat •a• baaed on argument and logic, 
giving rise to tormat ion of political parties and tho founding 
ot now•papero and magazines to enlighten public opinion. But 
wbonover the Nation understood that peacetul methods would not 
avail, recourao wao bad to force. So Rgn>t bad to paaa through 
throe revolutions - the Arabi revolution of 1882, the Zaghlul'• 
revolution of 1919, and Naaoar•a revolution ot J\lly, 1952. 
Any revolution llbioh fail• to roalizo its baaic obJectivea 1n-
evit•b17 laya tho •••d• ot a aubaectuent upria1Jla. Tho Egyptian 
national struggle •a• therefore one continual and unrelenting 
battle despite i ntermittent woalcno•aoa. Alwaya there were tho 
(40) !lie United Ration•• Year-Book of l!llliliii Rli!hta f or 106S, 
p. 74"'1llll, No• York) 
(SO) See "Partiea and Parl1&1:1.ont 1n E111Pt", by J. Landau, p. 
178 
31 
t wo groat objective• - to check despotism and make the nat1on 
itaelt the aou.rce or powers and to put an end to toro1gn 1n-
t .arvent1on and the uaurpation ot Bg,Jpt •a re1ourc••· 
In 1936 a treaty provided tor the ending ot Br1t1ah oo-
cupation, but i t •l•o required a permanent agraomant be tween 
Rg)-pt and Br1ta1n - a prov1a1on very l1kol7 to moan permanent 
oocupat1on. Arter 1936 tho Br1t1ah took tho opportunity ot 
party tr1ct1on to renew their 1ntanont1on 1n Es7Pt1an attaira. 
Tho thirat or party loaders &!:tor power was alao ut111•od by 
Ki ng Parouk to realize personal amb1t1ona at tho oxponao ot 
vital interests ot the people . H• clal..sed •x••Ption• trca 
taxat ion and got control ot t hOIUlando ot acroa ot atato proper-
ty and enta iled land . Merit ••• no cr·1ter1on tor rewards .. nor 
was tboro any equality ot opportunity. Priv1log•• were re-
served tor relat1voa and tavori t oa or m1n1atera 1n power. Th• 
reoulta wore nopotiam and corrllption. EgJ"pt had a working con-
at1tut1on but it veiled arbitrary r ule . 
When Al'ab countries fe lt tho onthuaiaam to reacue Pales-
tine, tho BgJ"Ptian Government waa i ll- prepared tor tho taak. 
li1a•nageaont and corruption by tho Xing 1a clique, which in-
cluded trading i n detective arms, rendered truitleas tho bitter 
saor11'1c•• made by tbe Egyptian Army Which would otherwiae have 
aecu.r•d victory. 
Tho war revealed tho ext• nt or ov 11• • t.icb pervaded ti.. 
Court and Government and stirred the Nati on to protest . An at-
tempt waa made to divert tho a ttention of the maaaea to exter-
nal 1aauaa - the k•7 to the abolition or the 1936 treaty. Ita 
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abolition waa c•rta1nl7 coraonant witb nat i onal d•aira a.nd 
would nave been a genu1ne~-national acblevement had the 
Oov•rzment taken the nece11ary mea1ur11 or reform atterwarda. 
It did not . Hence the format i on of "liboration ooawando aquad•"· 
But wbile th••• operated in the Canal Zone , there ca"'" the 
ana.ae l easl7- contrived burning ot Cairo on January 26 , 1952. 
Tbe COl!lll!andoe were paral7zod and the gap between tho Govel'll.lDent 
and tho governed widened. 
Re•ol utioo wae the on~ • a:t out - i t c.,.e 1n 1962, l•d by 
t be al'l:lf and backed by the nation. Tbe revolution bad been 
markedly bloodl••• i n cnaract• r becauoa it wae 1n eaeenco the 
expreaaion or a aentiment long suppraaaed but harbored l.n the 
heart or the nat ion. It ••• purely national wi tb no inter-
national intervention. ConecLoua of t he trend ot events to 
f ollow, it realized it• objectives wi ihin a ahorter time than 
expected. Tbua , i t •as unconditionally imperat ive tb&t the 
revolution obould overthrow the ruling <l,ynast7, r•claiJI> ite 
birthright and r eetore t he loot national prestige. So it de-
poa•d tbe ~onarch, abolieh•d monarc.hJ, and eatabl1ahad the 
EQptian Republic . 
Aa the pre- revolutionary public lire had grown corrupt a.nd 
eft•t• throll8b t11JOpar1ng •1th the conatitution, and as the po-
litical par ti•a bad joined l.n tho deepotic rule contrary to 
the intoreat ot tbe Nation , it was oeoeaaory that ~be revo-
lution ahould auepend the oonatitution , d issolve poli tical par-
tiea and frame a now conatltution with new national aapiratia>e. 
And , because tbe government uch1nory wae corrupt , i t had to be 
cleanaod and retornted . 
CHAPTRR I I 
'l'HE SYRIAN AND LEBANESE P AR'lIES 
Syria and Lebanon rema i ned a part ot t he OttCOl;lln Empire 
till t he end of Vlorld Viar first, where the Turkish yoke wa o 
replaced by t he French. '!'he Arab awakening i n Syria and 
Lebanon joined in th• 1 .. e •Pirit tho awakening of nat i onali .. 
among the aubject1 of TUrke7. Some ot th• 'l'lll'lcish 1ubJecta 
recei•ed the OJ'lllp&th7 of tbe Western nation• (1a Greece and 
Lebanon) and got their national freedo~ aarl1er tban t he othera . 
However, the Ottoman Elllpiro responded to external and internal 
pressure and waa obliged t o announce t ho Constitution of 1876, 
by wh ich a modification to the arbitr&rJ rule waa introduced. ( l) 
It waa 1n that period the Syr1an- Leban110 modern awakening 
1howed up. That aw1lcening was speeded b7 thl •ariouo miooiona 
and by the impact ot l/ooter n democracy , Which the Arab student• 
carried out wi th them, when they obtained their b ig)ler edu-
cation i n Europe. Lebanon, becauae of ita unique political 
1ituat1on, waa to be t ho center tor auch an awakenir.g. After 
186f, there wa1 relative political freedom in that Country. 
12} 
tn 1876 tho fl.rat aoi:U-political organi1ation waa founded 
by five Syrian• in Beirut. Twent7- two m .. bora - r epresenting 
the varioue rel1g1ou1 and aoc~sl eamr.un1ti•• - joined them. 
Very aoon it bad br anchea in Tarahoulua and Damaacua. It prac-
tised secret act1v1t1ee, mainly propaganda againat the Turk1ah 
yoke and cal led the pub lie opinion t o the danger or tbe l!Uropean 
I t l "Partlea tile ID Syria between ll>oe &Dd 1066", by ~'Ul) • ..,.a 
(2) Harb Por&a t , p . 26. "'l'he Areb Awakening", b)" George Anton1ua, p . 79. 
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im~r1al1am . It demanded Arabian bOGie-rula . In a secret 
pu.bl1cat1on 1t atroaaad tour major po1nta :-
1. 'l'be 1ndependenee ot trn1ted S7r1a and Lebanon. 
2 . '!'ha recosn1t1on or Arab1o •• the ott1o1al lan-
guage ot the Country. 
~. Tho abolition or all reatrictions on ~raonal 
exproaaion and on the spread ot education. 
4. 'l'be prohibition ot uains the native mil1tary 
units outoide tbo Cou.ntry . 
The organization did not laat long, but i t laid seeda 
tor .!\trthor Arabian politic&l ao•oEonta . No other political 
organization existed t i ll the announcement or tbo Turki ah 
constitution ot Jul7 23, 1908 . Many Arabian leaders and 
S7riana 1n par ticular, a• earl:; aa 1908, started an ~rtant 
political a~tivit7 1n the nat i ona l field, where many organi-
•ati ona were to c0111e cut t o unite the Arabian people and to 
defend the i r cause. Among t heao organizati ona wore :- (3 ) 
The Arab-OttOll18n Pratern1tt · 
It ••• tow>ded on A~t 2, 1908, 1n Conatant1noplo b7 
Araba and Turka. It was a national orsanization loyal to 
Turke:; and endeavored to pr eaerva tho const itution Jo1ntl:; 
•1th 7oung Turko organi•ation. 
Ita progr am atated tb.at no other national1tiea were to 
be £embora except the Arabs . 'Ibe organizat1on aimed t o de-
velop better underotanding between the Arabs and the Turk• 
(3) S•e N~oe Diddle Eaat In World Irta1ra0 , b7 LOnezowa~l, p. 
4 &. Seo also "::be ~nab Bl-.p1ro" 1200-1924, by 3vor-
aola:; and Chirol. p. ~2 . 
and to detend the Arab 1ntereata 1n Conatant1nople. It waa 
not a secret org1111ization beoauae it published ita prograin 
publicly and practised thia ! r ankly . It rocoived the Arab 
public demonstration. The or4anization achieved a wide propa-
ganda tor the Arab cause, lut it collapsed because of major 
d1tferoncea bet;Yeen 1ta cambers on a:ie hand and then was aup-
preased by tne !'urlciah authorities on tbo other band. Among 
t he Syrian leaders ot this aseooiation wore Shukry Alquowatli, 
Ri7adb Alaulh, Arit Alaulh, said Ao:si, Nouri Alglla&i and Sa• 
adallah AlgaBeri . That Turkish ruptu.-. was a signal tor th• 
Arabs to organi zed various nationalist organizations. 
The L1brarz Club. 
It was tor:oed in 1909 in Conatantinoplo by Abdul Kara1.m 
Alkhalil, Sai! Addin Alkhat1b , Rezk Slloum, Reshoed R1ddha, 
Alzahr&wi, Talib Alnak1b &n1 Aziz Ali Al.aasri. Toe political 
a,.,,s ot the organization were to be covered by cultural aotiv1-
tiea 1n the Turkiah capital. (') The Club rendered an active 
political role . Ita executiYe oOl!Dl.ttee represented the Arab-
ian side to negotiate with the Turkiab govo,.,,..,nt a oort ot 
diaputo regarding the Arabian demands . It participated ac-
tively 1.~ the propaganda tor the extenaion ot the Arabian 
nationaliam. Thouaando or Arabo aupportod the Club and many 
branches wero 1nauguratod 1n I>emascua and 3aglldad. Tho Club 
apread ita pr1nciplea usl.n;; aeoret publicationa and tourist 
••lDl>era . Beirut ••• the conter ot publioat1on. The Voice of 
the Arnba was the organ ot the Club i•sued 1n Con•tant1.nople. 
(4) "Arab AwalCentng•, by Geora• XOtonlu•, p. 117 
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Ott""4n :>eeentral1zat1on Part7 . 
I~ •aa es"1;ab~1sceQ in i~l~ 1n ca11">; car:"led o~t open 
proparandt. l'br 'tnO Arab hoa:e-:r:•Jle . .1 li'&I foundea by "°esneed. 
Roa.Ila , Ab~ul llam1a Alzahraw1, Rat15 an<! r.aqql Aladhwo . '.hla 
orc'.an1zat1on had a ,,;rittoa program but lt nad never been dia -
oiosod . :n1s Party oo-operacoa very cioaoly w1 tn cno Liberty 
and coa!lt1on Party wn!cn haC. advuoacoci tn• same pr1nc1plea 
ot tne former . As a result ot Syrian oo - operatlon many 
branonea were opened. l.D ~yr11 en~ teoanon . By tne aboi1tion 
ot tho Liberty an4 Coa..11~1on Party, the bra.~chea re~ainec at-
tached co ta• ottoman Decencral1zac1on Party 1n Cairo . 1he 
nam• O!' t~e Par-;y lna.1Ca1-e<l loy1lty to ."U.r£:e7, but it re:n.ained 
Arab1L"'l 1n spirit ana 1n puryoee and nai~ no otner i:ie:ibers ex-
cept th~ Araba . *.'no Pany, even thougn 1t wE :s not ort1c1a.1J.y 
per:n1ttea, 'A·as not secret el. ther . J.'n• Party was <11aappo1nte<1 
by tne policy or the Young Tur~• - •ho suppressed ene freedom 
ot nun - •4•urk$ , 1nelud1ng toh• Aroba , and. then oaJ.lec. tor abso-
lute 1ndependenoe ot tne Arat>o from 'J'url<iah ru!e . 1•n1s Party 
cou!d b• cnaracterized as or a hlfn oeandard of d1sc1p!1ne 
because lt contac;:ea !?I.an:; orcantzatiOr.3 •~1 ereet8Q i!.1>erat1cn 
W11ta . It co1 id be sate -1~h ce~ainty tr.at 1t was the larg-
est pol1~1ea~ ~ov~ent in to• ~\l.rld.4n perioa . 
~ne Arab ~~~reren~e 1:n ¥ar1e . 
In l~l~, under the J.eattersh1p or tne ~1r1an nati o aJ.1ats, 
tn• Arab$ he!a a Conferenc• in Par1a . An executive co!.'!!Mlttee 
••• 1·or:neo 01· 01 ·11t people , tour ot wnom •e?"e from the rounders 
ot the Young Arao~ Assoc1at1.on . 'Jnoy were AbauJ. on.a.n1 Ar15 , 
Aw111 Abaul li&C11 , Gam1i blar<!um, anc. J.!unatn."llad Aill1\lbammasan1 . 
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ltany Arab1an repruseneat:1ves from d11·1·erent: parts 01· 'the 
Arab land. attended. tne mee"&!ng~ , b~glnnlng 1·rorn June 18 
and cont1nu1ng tu Ju..~e 24 , 1Yl3. 'l1he meei;ings were pre-
siaed over by Abdul Hamia Al.z&hram1. 1·ne meet1nge were 
conc!udea by a COlllllt\lnique which contained four major points : 
l . Devotion for Arabian nationalism. 
2 . open opposition to the ·1ur1<1sb occupation . 
3 . 'l1he ne.cess1 ey tor llll.:neC11s.te re.forms accord-
ing t:o the prl.nci pLes of hum~-rule . 
4 . Pr•• 1m::l1gration t o and frcm ~yrla . 
Tne decis1ons ot the Conference were very const: ruet1ve(5) 
an~ all t:ne Arao national1s~s , regardless of their local or-
ganizations , abi ded by them. '!'bey had to retrain from any 
co- operation wi th the Turks unless their national demands 
had oeen acceptea . It was reported. that ?ranee tri ed to ex-
ploit tnat Cunfo r ence fo r a certain political purpose but 
tne member s 01 i..nti Cvnt'er ence were c&.ut1ous in th.a"& regard 
and sent a..:-nong t hemselves a delegati on to the Frenc h ;..i1ni3try 
01· l"Or.eign Afra1ra tv expi.a1n to the FI"encb that t he Arabs 
respec t ed the Fr~nch ; that ehey needed tne1r co -opera"&1on 
:for 1ntz·odu c ing domestic refonns ; bu t t hat: they did not want 
them to dic t a t e as supe r i ors . '!1he French pretena.ed to sup-
port tne Arabs outward~y buc , in private , they dec1ded to 
unQennlne them. <6 J 
( 5) 
(6) 
ttAre.b Awal<enirig", by George Antoniu:t , p . lt::S; aiso nArc.und 
tno Arab1an GoveX"!'Unent" , by Atali Darwazo.n , pp . """'11'=35. 
Lecw~es .1.n DeveJ.opmant 01· Are.o1an ?iat1onal 1sm, oy :s11 ttt •a 
Alnasri , pp . 2ol , 2o2 . 
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'l'he Conteronoe 1ucceeded to a large extent, due to 
th.• tact t.ha~ the ~ove~en""& of the Yeung ·iurk• ••nt a 
repreeon~a~ive fro their side 1n Ju.~y, 2~1~, to negotiate 
with in• loaaer• ot tho Conterenco. l'.•dhut ~hukri , the 
secrutAr;' of the Younr. '!'Urk.s, who negotiated with the Con-
ference l~aders, r•t\lnlod to Conetant!nople and anncrJ.nced 
on Aug~at 13, l~l~, the Y~J.Og ? ir"s 1 ecceptance or eost ot 
the Conference doii•nca . ;he Arabo tolorete<I t~.1• a little 
t o llV01d dl.SSidenOo With the !'Urkl . (?) 'il>O Oovernll'ent Of 
tne YO\•n.., _\lrka 1ucceode.Cl later 1n creating a •l'llt e.mon6 
i;:io cce:.bt:;.r3 ot i;. 10 Conference 1 J •:seeped tr01:1 their obl1-
gat1o .1 , simply by t~e appolntme' t ot some of th• Cont'erenoo 
leader• , clliet'ly tne President of tne cont'eroncc, to the 
mezbcr•n-P of th• .ur.Usn Upper Huuae . CS) Nevert~eless, 
th• conference ~lacloaed tj,&_n7 ve&)J.• ~a~tera Ul the relation• 
01· the Arabs ancs. iur:.ca . 
~lqahataniy• Aaaoc1at1on . 
~t ••• create~ 1n 1909 an<! woe headed b ~aJor ~11 
AlJUarL It ••· a oocret pol1t1ct.l a•.cci~tl.on . l.!Wn& 1ta 
:emb~·re were Alzhraw1, :se..-.im. Algatar . PrU;arlly 1t eo:islated 
01' Arab officers ln the c1v1.L and ~1litary ael'v1oes 1n tho 
TUrkien capital . Li.. was incorpora~ed 1.n con1ta.ntinople and. 
in t1vo Otner cent•rs tc.rou&nv .t t~e tl:!;1re en~ advocated 1 
du.el Areb- t'Urk:1ah t-",on1rcby . rhe auccess ot the As.:;Oc1at1on'a 
pol1t1oal act1vit1oo paved tho -ay tor the creation of other 
(7) •Hlatof7 o: ~ra.q1~ Po~1,[ca~ Develop:ient" , 67 u. AliUi'i1"7, 
" · 1 , p . 172 . (8) J.n• :>-.i!.tan Decree of .Jan-uar.; 4 , 1;;14 . 
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pol 1t1cal associations of mil i t ary character to be known as 
'!'he Pl edge . (\l) •Jne Pledge Associ&tion was a replacement to 
~lqahetaniya Association , which had been r~ptured by the iur-
kish aue:>or1t1es . •'he Pleage was formed in 1913 in Constan-
t i nopl e by V.ajor Ali Almaer1 , to serve the same p· r~ose as 1ta 
predecessor - a dual Aro.b - 'J.'Urkisb monarchy . Ali members ;·1ere 
of military rank and no civil members we re adI:Jitted to have 
absolute secrecy of 1 ts poll ti eel activ1t1e.s . Ho1.1e.ver, the 
head ot the Association wa s arrested on ?ebru.ary 9, 1914, in 
Constantinople and \'18.S sentenced to dea'tt: because of high 
treason . 'lhe Court tried. him but had no evidence •::hatsoever 
relating to his active political role in the Pledge Assoc1atlon . 
Nevertheless , 'tlle Young '.:..'urico government characterizea him ae 
the focus point 01· "&he Arab nat1ona.l1s:n in tho 'J.ur1'...1sh Army . 
For this reason alone t ney deci ded to " fin1sh h1m ott• . (lO) 
li1S trial brought a deep resentment among the Arabs towards 
tne l'Urks and Arabian public opinion came to on open conflict 
with tbe 'l'Urks . H1S trial had re1·1ec t eQ sim.ilor resentment 
1n tne !:>J.:ropean Press whi ch brought abou t ~ne int ervention ot 
tb.e 1·ore1gn d.1plomats ln Constant1nople in an endeavor to have 
his life spared. He left for Cairo and re:nained there until 
the outbreak of "ilot•ld war I . In Cairo be founded t ne Arab 
ttevo.1.utionary Assoc1at1on , 'Nnlcll advocated t.ne absol.ute i n-
dependence of hrab1an st;ates . 'l.'nis polie1ce1 organization 
was in 1uil agreement Wl.tb the Deeenerallzati~n Party 1n 
Cs1ro . 
l~) "The Iraqlan PoI1E1cal n-evolopment11 , by 1/ . Alaumary , v . 
l , p . 369 . 
(10) "Parties L11'e in <>yria t'ro:n 19u8-l955", by M. !:!arb 
Ferzat - ••secret. Act1v1 ties" , p . 40 . 
The Young Arabi •z.11·atat• •.xlareb A!t·etet• . 
_t was ror:ned in Paris in lJlJ. amone young educated 
Arabs . (ll) J.ts 1im0<11ate p-:.irpo•e was to advance .i1e Arab-
l&n nation W1tn1n the Orbit of the ·.1.\lt\Kl$n tlt.plre but , arter 
Wor.J.d. war I, lt aavocated non- cond.1.tlon11 1n<!opendenee ot' an 
Arab atate . !'ne "o;,ang 1.rsbs orga.. . 1z.atlon was ot pU.re Arab-
ian ct.araeter. ...t ca.lled ror the este"'.&.11hc:ent or a un1!'1ed 
1ndependent Araoien St.ate. ?~eu:.boran1p ot tho orre.r.1zetion 
was ro.stricteo to tno Arabs , wbethor t.noy were e1\r1J.1ans or 
of m1J.1tary rank . f\lrchennore , 1t wafll not opened ror membor-
et:lp •it.neut ru.rcnor test or peraon&J. reeori iendation by sor:.o 
01· the :ed:>era 01· tb• ostab.11an1nc; co~lttee ot the Young 
Arabe . t:ew me~ors ad.o!tted to the Yo•:.ng Artb~ nad to take 
the oath of loyalty to t~e princ•ples or tn• orpanizot1on 
and. to exert extro:te e.rtort$ t" lr:ed the Anbl&::"J ~.st1on to 
reacn the level 01· i·rcto and advanced. n6.tlona . Cl2 J 
In 1913 tb.• Youn17 Arab organ1z&t1on center T.10vea to 
Beirut and 1n 1~14 to Damascus . 'J.'ne members w•r~ of' sincere 
1·a1tb, cont1nu.uua act!..v1t1es , and of extre:ie secrecy wnlch 
was recr.iirea as a prerequ1s1.te 1·or the aucc•as or sucb • 
aecrot pol1t1c•L ano L&tlona.:. ~v~ent. It ••s so well-
tr.anagoc ana we.a.l - ur,..·an1zoa ~bat the trial• ot 1':115--~16, by 
• m1i1tary court 1n Lebanon - Aiyer. - 1nveatl1 ating the 
oeeret poJ.1c1cal organizations ot ant1-1'Urk1sn pol1t1cai 
cer.dencies, knew nvtnlnF abuut ~he }o ng Arabs ' act~v1t1oe • 
.tsowever, l.Wl&Slael AJ.muhattr.aBr1 a:1d. Abd.U• Onan1 Aris, 1"0\\.nd.er 
(12) · ~~e Arso Xwa~en1:.r•, 07 Geor~e X:nton1u3, p . 12S. 
41 
me?nbers , ana nany otntr ~embers were aentencec to desth 
w1taout their revea~ln an' ot ltS $taiua . 
~·ne Yount Areb• pleyed an 1:oportant ro1e ln the aevelop-
~ent ot the Arab1en ~eatlon . It wa$ thil po!1tlC61 crga.n1-
zat1on wlllch took Prince •'lli•o.J. 01· Aejat into its ne!:>bership 
1n lo:1l4 enc converced tu.:a to tbe Arabian L1b~rat1cn !.!<>vf!':mt . 
Pa1sal's !'ear or t.'UNpean 1&per1aJ.1~ ••• 1n conror:l!.t1 with 
tt:.e rears or t.he Youns Arabs from such 1 per1a113:! W!llCh led 
to a c l ose co -operation . Such co- operation or ;~1sal and tho 
Young ;.rabs lecl to LhO Arabi an l{ovol ut1on against ·rurkey ln 
1916 . ~:he revo1ution was very succeaet\11 1 'but eht re•ard 
01 tne AJ..J.1 e a • •• tn• part11;01on 01· t.ne ~ro:i1aea. ana expected 
Arabian ~tate(l~) wo1cn tn~ Young Arabs we:-e nop1~~ co e&tab-
lisb. . 
T~e pol1t1ca! orean1teelona uneer rov1•w were net pol1-
t1oal part:1es or oven a~1-pol1tic&.J. part1ea ln tne i1'est:om 
aene~ . Tn ey wer• roereiy seerot or d1uc!oaed n~tlOnal pci1t:~ ­
caJ. moveo:ents ut var1vu& t'oms . Secretly man1gea for natlon-
•J. !.lboracion, cne1 oucwardl.;r com. 1ttec themawlvc.;. t:o cert.al.n 
01· them a.J.su nao nv wr1 ct.en program. 1uwever, tney succea&-
l~J.ly ach1evec tn•1r pol1t1eai goal wn1cb waa possibly ex-
pec tod for a P<>ll•lca1 nstional cause under those p ll t ioal 
circumstances . 1"or 1nscenee, between the years l!:iv~-lvl6 , tney 
aeveloped t:he national awakenin~ .troa; tne 11t1st·act:1on ot no~•-
*Tne Arab ,\wa,coninl! • , b ~ ~eurre Antoni·J1, p . I?l. 
·~1ac..:e 1aat 1n WvrJ.o Atra1rs• , 07 Lenc~ows!d., pp. 
lioo, 
75-77 . 
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rule w1t'?l.1n tht ut~o~a.n r.?1re to non-conclt1one. ina~pen­
dence . ~nat ~~rpo~e lla~ b~~n carried uit t~rougn. tne ap-
paratus u1' str.JggJ.e and revoJ.ui.1on aw.r1ng t!"~t per1oc. . It 
anoaia be aam1ttee that tn• po!1t1Cak a3aoc1atio~s 'Wld~r 
revio•, wltn tnelr puor or~anizetlon, did tne1r be~t to 
trano,l"or tne AreD polit1ceJ. 1tatua tr ~ro e certain stage to 
a rtture actvnncect one . At any rate, 11- the result.s ot ttorJ.d 
i"/ar I 'brou,z11c abuut. eontraey cunaequencee to tnc e1·torts 
of tb••• orge.n1zations, lt baa to oe \("-\own that tnese "..Ulde-
a1raoie consequences were, ~o a J.•rg• extent, tne a1etat1on 
01· tl2et pecuJ.1ar i.ntematlona.l pol1t1cei c1rcurnatance •nich 
iapoted on the Arabs tnelr dar~ po.l1t1cal tu~~re . 
J..notner 1oterou ract goea •ltn ""b ._.,._iY.Sl.:t 01 .. thea.e 
pol1~1oa1 ur~an.1zat1~ns, wn1cn 1a to 1 certain degree respons-
ible tvr tne co- operstion nth exeemai pol1tica.1 pressure . 
Tn1• was the part1a1 netional 1w1ken1ns ot cne Arabs . 1;0 
wonder io neoded to reoo8f11Z• the tact thnt tne national 
awo.koning was not sufJ'1c1ent: t.o aup:.;ort the a.bovo mentioned 
pollt1cal urganizatlons in t:ne1r n•t101nL at~Jggle and 
strite 1·or i.ndepundence . ·1ne natior:al ;MJ.bllc op!:.i1ons were 
not un1t1ed to sucn a desr•o as to d•ttr:nine tbe political 
t\lt\lre . .:be.re were so inanr tot1••• 1nvolvea •b.1cb drove 
public op1n1;;i::i into a sort or tunao1! . .ne reJ.1g1v:l..S ele-
••n~• -ore ot t~ria.~b p011i1ca1 t•~dency bocaaao ot ~be re.-
l131ous connection and because there existed ettect1ve pro-
paganda rur Pan - !slar:ii•"' · '.the oelucatod people and the lesd-
ing prominent nat1onal1ats ned felt tno edvorse 1ntent1ona 
behind •he All1es pr->paganda for •he liberation of the people 
under the l'Urk.ian :r-..tie . l'na t fear, nevertheles.J, ea.me as 
exactly as it was expected . 'l1hird elements we:•o 1·or their 
own interest, and ~nc rate ut t.he nat1onai 1u1.uro was nut 
or tbe1r business . Moreover. they possibly never thought 
abuut. t.he danger ot the ·rurldsn yoke or 1.he expected :r.u.ropean 
imperialism. 
·1•.ne policioaJ. e.tmospb.ere 01· t.he ne.t1onaJ. organizations 
under rov1ew '''as beset v11 th ~ne mo.s i; extraurdine.ry d11·1·1cul-
~1es, parcieularly the n8\Y 1:."uropeo.n 1nt·1ue!'lee. Under 'these 
cond1tions tbe political organizations were not able to bring 
about cne un1ted. sn<1 independent Arabian ::>tatt) . Ho,vever, 
they creacea mot,ives toward t;}le rebirth ot' th.& Arabian 
nationalism . But the essence ot che1r pol1t1co.1 str.lgyle 
was the transfer vt the Are.bl.an question 1·rom toe .:.urk:!sh 
orbit to cne lnternat1onai a~mospnere as an independent ques -
eion reJ.ating to a nation looking forward to take her place 
among the respected nati ons . 
Party During Faisal ' s tteign, ~918-1920 . 
Prince FalsaJ. and the Youn11 Arabs estabJ.isned a Syrian 
i;ationeJ. Government in October, 1918 . ilithout waiting for the 
~ence Conter•nce they cailed a ~yrl~n Congres3 reprasent1ng 
Grea•er ~yr1a "lnclud~~s Lebanon end Palestine . <l 4) This 
Congress, tunet1o.>ing as both Legislative Assembly and 
National Convention, eons1dered all matters related to nation-
~14) 11}l1da .Le U3t journaltr; vol . sr,-no:--~;p. 137, Spring, 
1951, and a.Leo uparties Lit'e 1n ~yr1au, by :.4uhan:.mad 
Sbo.rf Ferzot , p . 46 . 
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al a.'1.ci roreltl\ policy as well as to the dr1 ft1ng of a con-
1titut1on . lt neld throe ~a~n sessions oetwoen Juno 3, 
1919, ana Ju!y lJ , l.r.?O. It prepared, dur1n~ its !ast 
seas.ton , a are.1·t conat1tut!.on o~ 148 art!.elee •hlcn, tnough 
no formal !1na1 voie w s tekdn, naa oeen aceep~•C 1n pr1n-
c1p!e . l'tio Con~ress was st1.Ll c.;ins!der1ng in• eeeona read-
1ng wnen tbe cr1e1a wi ~n ""?"e&cn au'tci.>r1t.1ea developed 8.."ld 
it acjourned on JU"Y !9, l~2u , never to meet again . 
1•ne Cunatitut1on of 192u provided tor a. l1m1ted :nonar .. 
chy , a bicameral legislature and a reaponaiole n11n1atry . 
Provisions 1·or c.he eeructure of the centra.1. govern."ZlOnt 
fl,)llo•ect ~be n1.1r:.aJ. pat.tom c.>t• •• esi -mropean constitutional 
:1Cnarc!lios . S7rla wae to be &n 1nd1v1a1ble pollt!ca~ unit 
bat its boundaries •ere left undefl.ned . !'he ~yr1an govern -
meni was ~u be L~ Art:tO Guv~rocent; its capita~, Da:r.ascus ; 
anc! its r eligion Islam. The constitutlon 1ncludeC1 a Bill of 
Right s guarantee1no 01Vl! liber tiea •nCI freedom Of thOUji'.llt 
a :d rol1g1on . Tne monarchy was to be veated 1n the Eash1m1 
taml.ly , witn ~~1aa! tbe rirs~ Kil1g . Both the Upper nou•e 
(Senate) and the ~uuse of .,e.;iut1es (Lower HouaeJ •ere to be 
elected bodies , tne deputies oy secret ballot l.n 'we degrees 
and th«J senatura oy ~no Cna::nber ot OttV'Jt..1.•I vr .,acn p~vJ.nce . 
'&·ne adm1n.lstra't1vn uf ~htt country was to be on a "aecentr a -
l 1zed" bas1a - eacn province was to nave .l~a own !Ocel ad -
ministration •1th a s1n~le legislative body collec the Cha::oer 
ot Deputies . ·ine ju~1c1ary wes to be l.ndeptndent, •1= a High 
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Court appointed by tno K1ng as •n• ouprem• Jua1c1a1 oreon. · 101 
'l'lll.4 ae:noorat.1C pattern of' govomm&nt a11a tha1; liberal 
type or eonstitut1on were tne 11:1rr.od1ote aoir.enas ana the sroet 
desires or tne par~1ea exi!G~ns aur1n chat ~hort r~ign . In 
fact, the work Qf tho ~yr1an Congress waa a C1o tat1on of the 
par-cies' des1rea . ·.rn•o• ?ar"t;ies we:•o : -
i . .1.:ne AraCl&n 1naopende::ce i-ar .. y . 
2 . 'J.·.c.e t"lua_ge ~ .... ,, . 
3 . ·J:nt: :,yr1an \Inion .tie.rt:7 . 
4 . 'l'ne .>yr1an Tiat1ono.1 J;arty . 
Toe Arao1an tnaopenaence ~arty . 
'.rne Yo-J.D_; A1""4bl rt:ie1nec a aecret pol1t.lee! or;e.n1~at1on 
ant!.1 ~oruar 5, l'ill'll, (lSJ 1'ben tho ~eotrel Cotc1ttee or the 
organization declared. its open polit1ca~ actlV1t1os under the 
name ut th~ Arabl&n I1•dtpencience ~art.y . 'in a Party had tbe 
OL~e lo&ders , members anc program &3 had tne ru1:ng Arabs . 
Alng 1'1a1SaJ. not onJ.y roekoneel 'A'1tn tne party .leaders ' adv1ee 
but a.1.so 1nv 1 tea ~h•:t to 1·onn the first gov,r:1:nent under the 
pre:.n1er3.h.1p ot Haan1a Alac~ssi . ·1·ne Young Arab.s, Who pro-
cla1med ~he:r pol1t1ca1 viblLc act1v1t1ea, we~• ltrgel: re1 -
pon~~ng to tb• aupport of public op1n1un to sue~ 1 aegree 
thac; tney no longer cv•.ild be an undergro...na. organ1 za"&1on . A 
large nul!lber of the newly -ao.mltted membero , und. t.ne ne"' branches 
al~ ove~ tne Arablan CO\l?\tr1es , ma~e lt 1mpoas10.le to keep 1ta 
popularity .secretl }' private rorover . "r-ne :l'l(,):t1ent nad arrlvtJd 
{15) a !ne Great Arab ':vv.1.tm , oy Xiiin ::.1a•Ia. (Cairo 19!54), vol . 
2 I pp• ~·~-26U • 
{161 •.ne Arab ~-a~en1n • , oy G . .A..~tcn1~1,p . ~22 . 
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comtt out !..cto t:::.e open with • aort 01• a pop-J:lar natl.ona.a. 
:ovocient . ~owever, tee or1g1n•L o~an1zat1on of tne Young 
Al'$bl ro:.a1ned ~•;>arate4 1n cany aspects trom tne ne•ly-
dl.sc101eel l'ar;y . A com:n1ttoe 01 the olc t't,,n.inders eJ.ected 
the roaponaibie central CO::t. 1ttee, - ~no ucec~tive ~O!?t"!!1ttee . 
Among 1 ts :ue:nbor.s '"'ere the ~eneral secrutary, Azat DGrwazah, 
Snukr1 Alquowatl1 , :>a ' 1<> Hal.Cler and Ah.'!lad "urude . ·rhe 
central comr.i1ttee was changed many times to meet tne wb!~ 
of p b!1c opinion an<> to xeep a<ronger u,1ty 1n tno notion . 
,110 !ndependonce Arab~an l'ar<y .-aa toundect t ret'lect the 
Young Arab•' po11t!ce! actlvlt1e1 l.n a 1arger scale and to 
enabJ.e them t1,,. tnel~.:.de tne 1ncreaaed nu.::1bor 0.1 ~•t10:1a~1sts . 
a11p;»ort.ers cc. e:;:petn1zera . 11'ne P• rt; 1n practice nad two 
inner exec-.it1ve co:ro1ttees , tee exee~t1ve co:t'l ttee of 'the 
Party being under tne superv1s1on uf tho old oxecu~ive coo-
mit:teo 01· t.no Young Arabs . •roe Party nad int.ema.1.. r-eguls.tiona 
rogercting tho Protocol of ad.lll.1tt1n new nombers , per1od1cal 
meetings and co~~un1cat1on witn 1ta branone, , clubs and con-
e;rosaea &l.i over Arabi an cerricor1e1 . ·1·ne onthus1as:ri ot its 
membor.a ana ~ne spit"i t u1· 1'ne timea cvn"rlb\1 e tv the popu-
larlt7 ot tne Par:7 to a degr.e that some Lraq1an! resortea 
tu ua• its PQ•1t1ce. 1!"..fl~ence to obc11n c~o Iraq1an national 
1:idt;>ender.ce . 
'lne Art01$.."'!: lnaepenaenc.e Yarty part1c1plt0d. 1n the f ru1t-
tul oroac1vo •Or:tc: 01· tne Syrian 1;ac1onal Congress , defended 
tno ~yr1Mn nac1cna1 q~estion before tho ~merleen Internacional 
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Comm1ss1.on t'or 1nv&st11gat1on and estabi1Snttod. t1ne Arabian 
Ciub wh1Ch became a nationai, poi1~1cal and educational 
club, frBquented by a mass or various elet:1ents which stood 
for tne unity and independence of ~yrla . King Pnisal de-
livered manJ' 01· his speecnes. 1n tne Club , and the Syrian 
liationa.L Congress neld many conferences there . 
Tno Pledse Party. 
It wae an extension of the Pledge secret organ1ZOt1on 
in •ne 'l\1rk1sn l'eriod . DUr1.ng Fa1sal 1s •her• re1gn, it .... 
c0ntered ln Damascus and then 1t was split into two ma1n 
centers . 'J.1he !raq1an center 1n Beg.l:ldad \fas to deal with 
Iraqlan nationalists in regard to the Iraql~~ 1n~ependence , 
and ~ne Damascus center was to d.eaJ. 'ltlth ::;yrie.n natiO!!;Ollsts 
1.n ree;ora t o •he :!yl'1an independence end 'butn were l1nkea 'by 
tne Arabian queo:i:tio~ . ?\o doubt le .-as the u.n1que pol1 t1ca..1. 
circumstance wh1ch brought about tne ~pi1t to have each 
center func t ion l.ndependently . :tv•11ever, they co ... oporated 
to a degree as 1!' th"Y nad nv .spl.1t because many Iraq1a."\s 
were 'Y1ork1ng t·or tne1r nat1oneJ. cause 1n Damascu::i, and Holeb 
under tbe orientation of tb.e Damasc·.is center . 
Kost of the Party'~ oom.bers were Arab nationalists Who 
served 1n the 1urk1$h military a.~d c1v11 services and were 
aerv1nu in the snort- 11ved Syrian national govern~ent . Among 
the prominent members v1erc: l:i\1Sn1 AJ.beraz i and Hassan Alhaklm. 
Its intemaJ. <.>rgan1za•ion ?1as not d1rt'erent from th<> Areo1an 
Indepena.ence Party . B<.>tn part i es Y1e.re 1n .f'ull agreement re-
garding the national domands, but the Pledge was i nclined to 
co-operate with France. Many ot the Party'• ~embora advised 
K1ng Paisal to reach an agreement with France. Tho Party was 
solved by the downfall of Faioal 1 s reign. 
The Syrian Union Party. 
It was foundod by an association of intellectual Syrians. 
Among them were Abdul Rohman Shabander , Faouazi Albakri, 
Shi•kh Kamil Algaoeah, !<halil Alhakim, Uukhotar Alaulh and 
Hassan Hamada. In 1918 this g~oup presented a memorandum to 
the British !l!inister of War by which they questioned the Bri-
tish Government about the political frontiers of tho Arabian 
terrltorloo and the British stand on Arab independence. The 
group who sent the memorandum ~xpresaed ite desire to have de-
centralization or the goverlltllent system within tt1e united 
Arabian state . It emphasized ~ts confidonco in Britain and 
its willingneso to support Britain, and so~t her support of 
King Huaaoin or Hojaz . It urged Britain to be co-operative 
with tho Arabs by keeping her promises of tho early days or 
the war . 
On June 16, l9l8,(l7 ) Britain, through her Anglo-Arabic 
lntormation Director 1n Cairo, anawarod the memorandum asaur-
1na the group that Britain would support the Arabian hopes 
for 11berat1on and independence. That anawer was to be known 
as tho "British Pledge to the Syrians . " Prom a political and 
h i otorical point of view it was an extremely valuable declar-
ation . Ita 1.mportence, as an ott1c1al documet1t, elar1.t'1od the 
(17) "Th& Ar abian Great Revolution• , b~ Anin Sai 1d, v. 2, pp . 
38-46 . Also, "The Arab Awakenina , by Goorgo Antonius, 
p . 299 . 
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vague British policy to••arcls ti\e Arab1ar. Revolt as a rene•nal 
of the previous Or1t1ar. assurances . Its sign1.£1canco lay in 
tne fact t hat it was issued after ~be Balf our Declaration 
(Novei;;.be r 2, 1917), and after tao Anglo- Frencn secret agree -
ment of Sycb- Picot (May 16, 1916) . The British Pledge was of 
great signir~cance in that 1~ was freo rrom any terr1tor1al 
exception or regional preservation. (18) 
It was that Br itish offi cial documont that inspired the 
int ellectual group to establi sh the Syrian Union Party which 
represented various political elements in Syria. The four teen 
articles of tt1e Party's program aimed at tile establishment of 
a united Syrian State within .1to national and physical bounda-
ries - from Tau~~• mountains in the north to the Alaqabah and 
the S1nya desert 1n the south , and from the Euphrates and the 
desert in the east to the Mediterranean 1n tho west . (19) The 
pr ogr am s t r •••ed that the S~ato should be i ndepondent , demo-
crati c and have a oonst1tut1onal governmont . The head of the 
government wasnot menti oned . For this reason it was not clear 
whether the Party was preferr~d to a monarchy system or a re-
publican system. In spi t e of tho fact thct the Party'• stand 
toward the head of the State wa3 rather vague , it was sur e 
that the leader of the Party , i n a apeeeb delivered 1n tho A~a­
b1an Club 1n Damascus, be advocat ed ao co- operati ve with the 
Syrian Arabian Independence Party Which aupported and elected 
Faiaal as head of a Syri an constitutional monarchy . The Par-
ty olected Amir (Prince) 
( 16) "The Arabian Great Revolution" , by Ariin Sa ' id , pp . 38- 42 , 
v . 2 . 
(19) "Parties Lite 1n Syr ia" , by I.! . H. Ferzat , p . 70 . 
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Michael Lutfallah, trom Lebanon, for the presidency of the 
Party. De. Shabander and Rasheed Ridba were elected for tbe 
vico-pros1dency and Selim Sorkees for the secretariat. The 
Program made it quite clear that Syria was a part an! parcel 
of the Arabian Nation, but it preferred the decentral ization 
eystem of government . That is an indication of the fact that 
the Syrian Union Party was an extension of the Turkish Decen-
t ralization Party which was established in Cairo (p . 40) . 
The center of the Party was 1n Cairo, too, and had branehea 
in Damascus as well as in Be i rut . T'ne main linea of the Par-
ty ' s policy were in conformity with general national aap1-
rations as it had been reflected by the accomplishment ot the 
Syrian National Congress and the format ion of the short- lived 
Syrian National Govermnent . Th.ere was not a clear economic 
pol icy , a l t hough tbe party referred to the country 's need for 
ag ricul tural and 1nduntrial deve l opment , duo to tho fact t hat 
t ho Party did not suggest any particular plan to be tollowod. 
Tho Party emphasized the unity of greater Syria i ncl uding Pales-
tine, suggested Damascus to bs tho summer capital and Beirut 
to be the winter capital. The Party did omphaaize the unity 
Of education and economic plana tor future dovolopr.ient . 
Tho Party, though, was not strong enough because it ad-
vocated the principle of decentralization, which was not de-
sirable to public opinion, and therefore it was not aupported 
by the majority of tho Arab nationalist leaders . Also tho 
Party•• policy in regard to tne ach ievomeot or the Arabian 
unity was not acceptable to pu.blic opinion. The Party wanted 
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every individual territory to gain ai>d guarantee ito own in-
dependence first and then approach to the general unity. The 
public opinions •ore tor the accomplishment of the Arabian 
unity and Arabian aoveroignty as one 1asuo . 'l'be Party parti-
oipated i n the Syrl.&n National Consr••• and contributed to 
the democratic conatitution through it• own repreoentativoo 
1n Congress . Also the Part1 played an effective role in de-
fending the Syrl.&n queat1on before tho A;..erlcan International 
COllll>isaion tor 1nveat1gation. However, the Party dld not laat 
longer than the two yeara of K1ng Faiaal • o ro1gn because tho 
advent of tho French authorit iea waa the atart of a rupture 
ot nat i onal lat portiea and the national apir1t . In any event, 
the Party was diaaolYed, only to be ccmb1ned •1th another po-
litical party to continue the national atruul• tor indepen-
dence against the Franch mandate llhicb bad boen 1.apoaed by 
force . 
The Syrian National Party. 
The Syrian llational Party waa formed 1n Damaecua , on 
January 25, 1920, to un1to many political fronta and varioua 
national leader• • bo ••r• not included. in the sentioned poli-
tical parties, or who were membera 1n one of the., but could 
not agree upon tho1r policies, or beeauoe or personal or in-
ternal conflict . V.any party me:mbera wero obliged to leave 
tho Party i n every one or tho part i oo under reviow and , 1n 
particular, from tho Syrian-Arabian Indapendonoe Porty and 
the Syrian Union Party. 'l'be conflict could take place among 
members of any political group. However, that •a• a conflict 
between ooneervat1ve1 al>d liberala , between men ot advanced 
ttducation and people ot ael!-intereat. Thia Party came to be 
known aa the Party ot tho elite . I t waa canpoaed ot elementa 
of extreme waaltb, personal preatige, and 1ocial intluence . <20 > 
J!a~ HieJazian noblemen were abaorbed 1.n thi1 Party and also 
ll\lhammad Alshraifi, the 1eoretary ot the Young Araba , was at-
Ciliated rttb it• momberahip. 
Th• Party bad a well-organized program. It• leadership 
waa entrusted to an adininistrativo adv11ory oommittee . The 
advisor y committee wa1 oompoeod of twenty-five mombora elected 
by the general Party'• annual convention. The Party's poli ti-
cal atand waa 1.n conformity •1th the S7rUn Onion 1n regard to 
the establ1ebaent or a greater Syrian State, but it endeavor..t 
to etrongthen th• 1piritual and moral connection between the 
Arabian people. <21 > Also the Party'• program 1tated that the 
intention of the party was to s upport the civil liberties and 
tho f reedom of thought and of rol1g1on. Also , tho Party 
promised to assure political acd economic equality a~ong the 
Syrians, regardleas ot their faith or race . The Party sup-
ported the cons titutional goverll:ent under Pai1al 1 a reign and 
al10 participated 1.n dratting the 1920 con1titution, aa well 
a1 taking part 1n th• Syrian Yat1onal Congre11 . King Faisal 
sought tho Party's aupport tor roaching an agroemont with 
France and relied on ite coneultat i on 1n that matter . It ia 
very interesting t o !1"4 out that thie Party al10 advocated 
(20) 
(21) 
•The Defense Paper*, no . 15, Januar1 27, 1920 {lasu~d ill 
Damascus) . 
"Around the Arabian Movement•, ~ - l, p. 78, bJ Asat 
Darwazoh. 
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aocial and econo:ic ratorma and to""""lated certain plans . 
The Partz participated in the establialui;ent ot co-operative 
aaaociations and labor trade unions . The Partz lasted until 
tbe French authoritioa announced the illesalitz or political 
parties and national or•anizat1ons . Tb• mtnbers of the Party 
••re to participate in rorm1D.f" another party during the French 
mandate. 
Character or Partz Under Review. 
A cloae examinati on of the Party•a, or Parti•a•, orgAn.1-
zation program and propaganda indicated that they •era not 
parties in the real mean1ng of the word . Although toe S7r1o.ne 
and Arabs referred to them and discua••d them aa political par-
tiea, they ••re sligbtlz different from the aaaoc1at1ona which 
caae into e~atenc• during the 'i'urkiab period. However, their 
aignit1cance cannot be minillized due to the tact that tbez tried 
to approach to the democratic way or lite. Wa can aee ho• t hez 
approached tho Queetion by adopting the multiple-party system. 
These parties were OJ1i'aged in a fruitless political argument 
at a ti~• •hen the country •aa paasing tllrough a dangerous tran-
aitional period and lacked t he unitz o! all n•tional el•=•nta 
regardless or their political cootroveraiea. The multiple •z•-
tem waa a aari oua problem but tbez never thought about it . Yet 
1t w~a ono of Lhe prl.2iC1ploa ot democracy . 
Another problem or th••• Partie• WQO the lozaltz or ita 
members . No Party bad a tixad membership, due to tbe fact that 
acme mombo ra bolong•d to tho Party becaua• of adlliration tor a 
political leeder or b•cauo• the Partz'• progr&A was aatiatactorz 
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to tnem. But when tno ~arty praot1oen pr1nc1pleo contra17 
to 1ta written progre&, or •hen tbat a<l•lrod pol1t1o1an left 
the Part7, those woo bed becoc;..e ~•abers tor that particular 
reason had to leave the pnrt7 too. The problem was not the 
lo7alty ot members, but th• loyalty of the part7 to ite 
pr1nc1plea and th• lo7alt7 o! 1ta leaders to the Part7. Pur-
tbel'Jlore, the meaning or part7 wae a matter or a group gather-
ing without any particular aim or definite object . Parties 
initiated Western democracy in tbelr organization• but !ailed 
to put it into practice. Other partie• •blob approached demo-
crac7 did not acccmpl11b much and did not gain aatiaractory 
support . Partie1 cannot be bl.a.med tor eucb failures becauae 
the society was not prepared !or that taak. A pnrt of such 
unpreparedness waa due to lack or education which the partiea 
never carried out ertectlvely or du• to ine!tecti•• propaganda 
which characterized the democratic partioa . ~an7 ,ortios had 
pape1•0, o~ Aldefa (<lornnso) , tho Syrian Uni on Organ , and Aau-
teed, organ ot the Syrian-Arabian Independence Party. 
Although all parties agreed upon one 1aaue, - that or co-
operation to achieve independence and unity, tbey never agreed 
upon the method . The major parties wore either driving to 
acb1eve the ~~1ty ot greate r Syria, aa the Syria~ Union and 
the S1rlan National Parties, or to achieve ""'Jor national 
Arabian unity, •• the Pl•dge and the Syrian- Arabian Indepen-
dence Porties. 
In conclusion, all partiaa C&IM to !allure by the end or 
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the per~od durir.g wblch none o: ~hea cond.ucted a constructi ve 
policy to ilelp oitf_1,er Syria or the Arab nation aa a wr.ole 
when they had to f'ace tho dir ect Anglo-French 1Jllposod mandate . 
llevortho l ess they dJ.d turnish tho pol itical background f'or 
tbe continuation or th• political struggle tor national 
aovere1gnty . 
Parties During the Prench »and&te, 1920- 19~6 . 
Accord1ng to San Re~o Cont'erence ot April 24, 1920!22> 
Franco was given the mandate over Syria and Lebanon . The 
French t r oops soon clashed wit h the Syrian Notional Army in 
tbo f*">ous battle ct Mayealun on July 24, 1920, and soon 
General Gouraud entered Dt.c;aaeua as a victor . 
It was very eaay tor General Oouraud t o defeat the poorly-
or8&ni•ed and equipped Syrian National /i:nt:f1 but it • •• al.moat 
impossib l e to r ecove the national spirit . The great Syrian 
losses in the Yayealun Battle proved to tho French that tbe 
Arab nationalists would accept nothing losa than complete in-
dependence . The failure ot Oouraud to put an end to the S7rian 
national oppoait1on t o ~roneb •rl>itrary rule brought about a 
new hign C""""1oaion1r - ~ . Ponaet - after a bloody ,..volt • bieb 
laated al.moat two yeara (1925- 27) and caire to be known as tbe 
Syrian Revolution . In the tall ot 1926 tour ma;or parties eub-
m1tted to the new Fr ench High Commissioner a memorandum i n 
wbi<>h tbey asked leave to bold an elset1on tor a Constituent 
Aeae~b~ and promulgate a Conot1tution to replace tbe a~spended 
{l!i ) "ulddle E&ot Journal* , vol. 5, pp. 137, 130, 140 Sprlig 
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56 
constitution; to achieve Syrian Unity; to organize a national 
army; to conclude a treaty of alliance between Syr1a and France 
which would replace the mandate; and to admit Syria to the 
membership of the League of Nationa . <23> The French policy 
tended to follow the constitutional pattern which developed 
in Lebanon and in 1928 the Fr ench nigh Commissioner directed 
t he convocation of a Syrian Constituent Asse1r.bly . Election 
to the Asoembly resulted 1n the emergence of s. powerful nation-
al Party to be known as "KUtla" - the National Bloc - founded 
by a national leader ani professional politician, Ihrchim 
Hananu. The National Bloc included mostly a majority of the 
leaders of the part1es in the short-lived Faisal reign, such 
as HaahlJn Alatas1, Jan:il Merdwn, Sa 1ad Allah Algaberi and Paris 
Alkhuri . The Independence Party - Aleatiglal - was next to 
the National Bloc 1n the Asse~.bly, ~hich advocated non-condi-
tional independence o! Syria . Shukri Alquowatli headed this 
Party and included Emir Adil Arsalan and a Lebanese nationalist, 
Riyadh Alsulh . The National Bloc did not secure a majority ot 
seats but being more detel'lr.ined and disciplined than other 
political groups it played a r ole out of proporti on to its 
members and soon began to dominate Syrian politics . Its mem-
bers were elected to the moat important positions in the Assem-
bly . 
The National Asse!!!bly dro•· up a constitution •llich, 1n 
aome important aspects, was unacceptable to France . The French 
{23) "Par ties Life in Syria11 , by M.H. Ferzat, p. 168: ilso "The 
l!i ddle East in Vlorld Affairs", by Lonczowski, p. ll3l>. 
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High Commiaaioner, after unsuccessful attempts to amend tbe 
new constitution 1n favor of the French direct eoncosoion, 
suspended the National Aaaombly and then dissolved it alto-
gether . 
Parties as well ao all politiea l grcupa and organizations 
wore inclined to reach a treaty of alliance with Prance in 
tho same pattern ot tho Anglo-Iraqian Troaty of 1930. Till 
October 22, 1936, the Syrian Parties and the Syrian nation-
alists strove to reach such political agreement without giv-
ing France any firtn political or military concession. Tho 
National Bloe was clearly inclined to eo-oporate with Franeo 
on the basis of negotiating a treaty to replace tbe mandate. 
A Syrian delegation composed or six members witb representa-
tives of both extreme nationalists and moderates went to Paris 
and tbero on September 9, 1936, concluded a treaty . The treaty 
was reached on tho basis of full indepondoneo of a united 
Syrian state excluding Lebanon and Palestine . France was to 
receive certain rights regarding its military position• 1n 
Syria. Tho two countries were to consult each other in all 
matters or foreign policy affecting their common interests . 
Tbo troaty waa to laot for twenty-five years and t o come into 
tore• whe n Syria waa admitted to membership in tbe League of 
Nations as an independent state . 
Tho treaty was signed by Hashim Alatasi, Chief Syrian 
delegate and Vionot, French Uader- Secrotary of Foreign Affa1ra{24) 
{24) "Tbo l.l!ddle East in World Affairs", by Lenezcwsk1, pp. 236, 
237. Alao, Tho 1>1ddle East Journal, vol. 5, p . 146, Spring 
1951, arid "The Great Revolt", by Ariin Sa•1d, vol . 3, p. 543. 
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Parties in Parliament. 
Election tor a new Parliament, which was t o ratify the 
treat)', waa bold 1n Nove~ber , 1936, and reaulted 1n an over-
wbela11>8 majority tor th• National Bloc Party, one or the 
major parties in the period under review. 
The National Bloc - Kutla Party. 
The National Bloc ' s leadera bold tho1r first meotl..ng in 
September, 1927 , under the presidency or Haeh1m Alatnai 1n 
Beirut . Tho Conference n1med to protest tho Freneb rligb Com-
mieo1oner' a statement of July, 1926, in wh1cb be disclosed 
the Preneb intention to carry out tbe mandate aa it waa ••-
11.gned to France. Tb• National Bloc rejected tbe French 1n-
tentio1 a and cad• it clear tbat tne Party would oppo1e the 
Prencn policy of divi ding Syr1.a into independent territorie1, 
1uppreea1ng the national political act1vitieo and encouraging 
boatilit1ea amon;: Syr1ana. It u rged France t o abow a spirit 
ot toleration and understanding, and to provo a thorough co-
operation. 
Tho National Bl oc participated in the election of tbe 
lfational Aaoembly on April 14 , 1928, to drnw up the Consti-
tution . The great success 1n th• election waa a source ot 
worry to tne Prench authorities . It could be 1aJd with tull 
confidence tbat the leaders of tne National Bloc drew up the 
Conati tution througt> the Nat i onal Aaaesbly . !be draft con-
atitution ""'Y be regarded aa e.xpre111113 tho tree wil l or the 
Syrian people but Prance - aa had previoual7 been aeen - aua -
pon4ac1 tbe National Assembly and then d1aaolved the Parli aaent 
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by a decree issued on Februa ry 5 , 1929. France'• objection to 
articles 73 , 74, 75, 110 and 112 was because, as she claimed, 
they contradicted he r international obligations as a Mandatory 
Power. ( 26 ) 
As soon as Fr anco dissolved the Parliament the National 
Bloc took over t ho leadership of the Syri an national movement 
f or struggle against the continuation of the Fr ench mandate . 
The National Bloc pr otested the French arbitrary rule t hrough 
peaceful demonstrations . Although t he Nationa l Bloc was or 
national popularity, it was not an autborized Party 1n the legal 
sense al though it was recognized as such . Also , it had no cer-
tain leader . I t had many popuha r leaders, such as Hashim Ala-
taai , A.brahim Hanau , Fari s Alkhuri. Fur the rmox•e, it had no 
written Program, but, as was aeen, the Conatitution of 1928 ill 
practice was its work and could be considered its own platform. 
The National Bloc participated 1n elections of Karch ~O, 1932, 
which resulted 1n a victory for the moderate parties rather 
than for the Nationa l Bloc Par t y. Hashim Alatas1 , one of the 
National Bloc 's popular leaders, was a candidate tor the Repub-
lican Preol.dency, but received only 17 votes . The National 
Bloc decided to withdraw from Parliament if any of the govern-
ment candidates for Presidenc~ (Subhi Barakat or Hoqqi Aladhum) 
was elected , but a compromise was reached by ele cting M\lhamm.ad 
Al i Alabid , a neutralist politician . Hoqq1 Aladh\lll\ formed t he 
government and t wo members of tho National Bloc ( Jamil Mardum 
and Muthher Re.slam) participated 1n the government ot 1933, but 
t 25) For text of these articles, seo "The Middle East Journal11 , 
vol. 5, p . 143, Spring of 1961. 
so 
withdrew because of France 1 a failure to attempt to me et tbe 
national aspirations. 
The National Bloc activel~ propagated tor Syria abroad 
and set up a worki ng machinery i n Syria to collect tunda for 
this pur pose . It irged t he Sr.rian people to buy Syrian pro-
ducts and boycott foreign good.a . 
The leadership council of the Kati on.a l Bloc was compoeed 
of twenty- seven ~embers representing the Syrian towns . Among 
the prominent representatives were HasblJa Alatasi , Faris 
Alkhuri, Jamil Mardum, Riyadh Alsulh , Shukri Alquowatli and 
Fakhri Albaroudi . 
In 1933 the French authorities 1n Syria closed tho infor-
mation centers of the National Bloc and arrested many of its 
leaders . That action brought about a Syrian national uprising 
and resulted 1n bloodshed 1n ms.ny Syrian towns . A negative 
boycott took place for two months, which brought about the 
approach to th• 1936 treaty. ln November, 1936, a new parlia-
mentary election waa held and rosulted in the l\ational Bloc's 
majority. Tha Parliamont elected Hashim Alatasi, llho became 
the National Bloc ' s leader . President of the Republic , J&J:lil 
Nardum, another prominect lead•r, formed the government o! 
the National Bloc ' • cabinet , and Faris Alkhuri, also a National 
Bloc member, was elected to the Parliament chairmanship . The 
National Bloc 's gove rnment carried out the responsibility 
without submitting any pr ogrrun to Parliamont. <26) The now 
Syri an- elected Parliament of National Bl oc ' s majority ratified 
(26) "Parties Lile In Syria", by M. H· Ferzat , p . 154 
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the Franco- Syrian treaty ot alliance , 
Very soon many problema confronted the Bloc's govern-
mont , ouch as the hesitation of Prance to ratify the treaty. 
Prance encouraged internal dissidence and granted the Sanjok 
of Al exandretta to Turkey , all to create inconvenience for 
the Hat1onal Bloc's go\'ernment . 
The French retu•al to ratify the treaty or 1936, the 
granting of Alexandretta to Turkey, and putting more and more 
ditficultieo and intrigue• before the llat1onal Bloc ' • govern-
ment brought about a split among the National Bloc's Party 
and a strong opposit i on from different parties 1n the Parlia-
ment to the i dea of co- operat1on •1th Prance which the National 
Bloc advocated . The National Bloc's popularity ouffered se-
verely for being unable to oblige France to ratify the treaty. 
Furthermore , she could not do anything but protest in an ef-
fort to keep Alex.andretta for Syria. Nevertheless, cabinet 
crises followed each other in rapid succession, leading to a 
virtual stalemate in government activities . I n 1938 , Jamil 
Mnrt1um tendered his resignation which was followed by that of 
President Hashim AlatasL Th& F1•ench H1gh Commissioner, 
Gabt 1el Pueaux, then suspended Parliament . (27 ) Gabrie l Pueaux 
appointed a non- poli tical council of directors to govern the 
country under his direct rule .. The new administrat ion curbed 
the various political movements, including nat1onal1ats and 
communists . That French direct rule lasted till the outbreak 
ot llorld rlar II. 
(27) "Th• Middle Eaot !ii Wor ld Affairs" , by Linczowski , p. 240. !!.!£, The Middle Journal, vol . 5, p. 147, Spring, 1951. 
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The National United Pront Part7. 
Thi• Pa.rt1 waa founded b7 Abdul Rolu:an Alahabandor on 
September 22 , 1935. The Part: wa• compoaed ot pol i tical 
elemen~• which did not att1l~ate •1th the National Bloc or 
other political grouping. Alsnabander presided over the Ex-
ecutive Committee a• tho secretal')'-general ot t.le Partz. iho 
3xecut1ve C=ittoo 11 an elective bod7. Its l2 moabers ware 
elected by the Party'• Convention directly from among those 
of broad oduoation and national roputat1on. Unitod indepen-
dent Arabian States waa the najor •lo0an ot too partz. Al-
though tao Party advocated the prupaganda for tho unity of all 
Arab territories under one Arabian banner, i t accepted a 
treaty wi th France which guaranteed tho Syrian independent 
and united state. 
Altho~" t:>e Party rejected an:y f orm of tore1;m 1.nl'luonoe, 
it avoided any act of v1olonoo which aight bring an1 har.i: to 
the Arabian public interests. Novortholoss, the Nat1o"8l 
Front Party warned ita adboronta agaU.at participat ing 1n any 
electioa ha:d IUl4er French control or any participation 1n 
any government pro-Prench or torm•d undor tho Prench aupor-
viaion. No member or this Party could accept o.ny poet 1n tho 
goverOlllont unlo•• permitted to do 10 by tho Eltecutivo Coa:mitt•• 
ot tn• Party . i'"n• ?i&tlonal Un1.te.:1 Front roce1ved aapporters 
from Damascu• , Beirut and many other to,.:ia . Through ita organ, 
"Tho Struggle-f\lk1fah" , i t raised ita voice 1n tho major 
national i•auoa aa in tho caae Of the treaty Of alliance Witb 
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Prance and the queation ot annexation ot Alexaodretta to Tur-
ko7. In those i1suo1, •• well ao in man; othora, it led tho 
opposition 1n Parliament as •ell as 1n tho Preas during tho 
three 7ears of National Bloc •a government . Tho National Front 
waa not r epresented 1n the S7rian delegation whicn negotiated 
tne 1936 tr~aty •1tn France. For that reaeon it waa very 
critical of tho Syrian negotiators aD4 later toulc advaneage 
ot the French policy ot procrastination 1n regard to the rati-
ficat i on of the treat7. 
Befor e tho outbroalc ot 'tl or ld War II , the United National 
Pront Part7 was roplaoed b7 tne People ' s Part7 which carri ed 
toe some slogan and ••• under tho 08"'0 leaderah1p. "'l'ho 
St~.ig_~le Papor•, iaauod 1n 1939 1n Daoo.a1cu1, re:i;ained tho 
Party'• organ . Botn tile Nat i onal Un1te1 Front 1n oppooition 
oad the ~ational Bloo 1n P""•r could not 1ntluence the ?roneh 
Oover""1ont'• attitude towards tho treaty'• ratitication. on 
the contrsr7, Franco was very •uccosstv.l 1n bringina the t wo 
major partiee into open host111t1ee . Neitnor ono was able to 
realize the aims ot Franco and improve tho unique political 
oituation witn Prance. llor did either recosnize tho involve-
ment ot the other until tho declaration ot tao .1ar and the 
do•nt•ll ot France solved the proble~ relatively. 
The National League Act Party. 
It •as founded in 1933 by a group ot intellectuals ai:oong 
• hom ••r• Sahri Al&aal1, Abdul Hazog Aldondsn1, Pahmi AlmhaU-1, 
?ar id Za1n Add1n and Zaei Alrsouz1 . De.J:ulscus ••• the conter 
of its 1ntormation ottlc• wi th mt.n1 br anches in greater Syria. 
Tho Party aimed to aorvo political liberation 1n both Syria 
and Lebanon, and to unite the collapsed or dieorganized politi-
cal partiea tor better ochiove~ont . ~any intellectual youth• 
held a oontorence in Lebanon tor this pur pose . Tho National 
Leaguo wao trying to Ou1.ld 1ta platl'oro.u on the basis ot st~­
ing the tund•montal problo113 ot tne Arabian nation; studying 
tho major points ot strength; repr11ent1ng point• or wealcnea1oa 
i n tho agenda ot ~1e Conterenoe - thoao were questions ot the 
Arabian individualism, sel!-interoat, tho inactive role of the 
Arabian •o,..n, and nomadiam. Tho unitJ of language, or glorioua 
hi1to17 and co==on interests 1n a country of magnificent econo-
mi c abilit i es were aymbols of str ength po1nta . The Conference 
made a thorough study into the Arabian domeatic affairs i n re-
lation to the ambition• of foreign 1ntoreata . Tho Conference 
came to tne conclue1on that the foreign 1ntervont1on was baaed 
on tundl.l1lental economic interesta. Foreign 1.~toreata had 
brought about the foreign influence and explo1t•tion of theae 
point• or •e&knes sea, aa •ell aa others, 1n th• Arabian dOCle e-
ti<: affairs . The Part1 called up0n all partiea to close ranlca, 
to stand•• • atrona maas against tho Fronch tall&oieo , !alee 
prom11e1 and other patterns of sopb1striea . 
Tb• program of the Jat1onal League bad eapbas1ted two 11&jor 
pol1t1cal quest1on1 : <28 l 
l . '!'he absolute 1nc1opendonce of A.rab1o-apeak1ns 
countr1oa . 
2 . The non-oond1t1onal unity of tho Arab1an torr1-
tor1.ea . 
Toe Party, alao ll.J:o tho 11at1onal Cn1ted Pront Part7 , 
followed a pol1c)' ot non- co- operation '01 tll !'NilCh author1t1oa 
or any government co-operating •1th them. Tb• League Part1 
had rog1storod a real program because it rognl'ded tho Arabian 
na t ion not only a pol1t1ca1 un1t but <1100 an eoo11om1c unit . 
On that basis tho League Party drew plane to roa1at tho foreign 
1nvoet•ont Which loada to ti1"!11 1Dpor1al1am, and reudalia~ •h1ch 
leade to extrese povert1. The leadera kn•• that they should 
lean on tho Arab1an nat1onalisz polic1cally, and par~~cular)J 
on tli.e popu lace movement. To that end, tho Part7 aot up an 
organization or national movement supported bJ an ove...,helm1ng 
majority of tho maaa ot the people. Tho OOW\try'• soc1al , 
economic and political circums~ances were roa~~ed, wn1!e ~ao 
Part)' dealt •1th 1nd1v1dual torritoriea. 
Duo to tho tact t.hat tho !lat1onal Bloc oo-oporatod •1th 
Prance to a corta1n degree, the League PartJ did not recognize 
the National Bloc '• roign, did not co-operate With 1~ , and did 
not acknow!o<l.ge ita legislations dur1n;; the national parliamen-
tary seeaion. Po1nta ot weakness could bo eoon in both this 
party and the previous one. None of the• ••re a ro•ll)'- organJ.zed 
(28) Seo 1 Part!oa tlr• Iii S7ria 1908- tOoo, bJ V. H. Porzat, pp. 
138 and 188-19 l . 
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Party, and wore not of a maJo~ity support. It was true that 
both parties obta ined wcll-odu.catod adhe r ents but t ho public 
oplnions were not ready to accept such a program . However , 
the Party's opposit i on to tho treaty of 1936 brought about a 
split among tho pr ominent loaders . Saberi Alasli, tho general 
secretary, was obl1god to leav e t ho Party ann and to become a 
mombor of t he National Block where ho had a chance to be elected 
tor Parliament. The political activities woro very clear re-
gardtna tho oppos1t1on ot tho annexation ot Aloxandretta t o 
Turkey, and also rogardtna the Franco- Syrian Troaty ot Alliance 
of 1936 . Tho League Party led, w1th othor par t i es, a tremon-
doua demonstration 1n 1937 when tho Interna t ional Col!ll1!1ss1on 
arrived at Syr1a . It called to the attention of the World 
public opini on tnat Alexandretta province was a part ar.d par-
cel of tho Syrian Republic. Tho League Party hold the National 
Bloc•s government reepons1bl e , to a largo extent , tor that ter-
ritorial l oss . The French, Tu:rk• and National Bloc were hos-
tile to tho National League Act and 1t could not s t and for a 
long tlJ>:o . In 1954, the National League roaumod its pol1t1cal 
activi ties on tho basis of Arab indopondenco and un1ty. 
Tho Syrian Nat ional Socia list Party. 
It was estnblish•d secretly by a Chri•tian philosopher 
known &3 "Anton Sa 1ada" on November 16 , 1932 , and took Beirut 
as 1ts center. Although Sa •ada started spread ing tho principle• 
o! h1s party some time prior t o the mentioned date, the official 
contact began •1th six students 1n the American University of 
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Beirut i n 1932, when sa•acta•as a professor 1n thAt University . 
Professor Sa•ada ••• teaching the German lanauage tbere . Th• 
aeoret establishment ot tha Party, accordina to sa•ada, waa a 
great neceoait7 tor tbo protection of the movement from ele· 
menta Which did not want to see it exist. In 1935, 1n the 
eocond congress ot th• Part7, Sa'ada for th• first time ~&de 
bia Party•a principle• public. These principle• were socohow 
now ph1loaophy to tho Arabian mind. In the prev1oue discuaa1nn 
we did not aee any Party tbat dared t o exclude the Arabian 
na t1onalism from tho progr am o.f the Party. We noted some par-
tiee which advocated the principle of decentralization within 
a federal Arabian state. At ~rate, Proto1oor Sa 1ada came 
out •it'1 the principle or den71'lg the Arab nationalis:i and 
brought tortn tne philosophy or the Syrian nationalism, or the 
philosophy of toe Fertile Crescent national11m. <29 l Sa•ada 
aaid "he found the Party a means for an end." - Syrian for the 
Syrians, and the Syrians are only one nation. He charaeter-
1:ed thia idea as the unification or all princi ple• or national-
ism 1n one . The pbiloeopher or the Part; believed that be dia-
covered the desire or his nation and then d•e•d hl.Juelf the 
best guide tor a modern awaken:1.ng,<30 l Sa'•d•'• pbiloaophy 1• 
eaoent1all7 different from a.ny o1'her political party's regard 
to nationaliam, aocialiam and pol1t1co . H1a method 1n managing 
the Party atta iro made h1a a unique leader . His ability to 
develop the Party' a career froca nothing to a major political 
{29) 
(30) 
8Polltica1 Partiea in SYlla", by Dir lrrouad publication, 
~P · 65 , 127. 
Part1ea Lite 1n Syr1a, 1908-1~55", by K. ff . Per&at, p.143. 
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bod7 capable or challenging tne government •a1 u.azl.ng . Tbe 
aucceas of the Part7 waa due to the broad education or it• 
leader and hia extraordinary ability. Sa 1ada waa choracter-
1••d as a fearleaa orator and eloquent apeakor . Hi• teachinga 
were essentia l..1:1 tho program of the Part7 which waa divided 
1nto two maln principlea z-
1. The baaic principle which is tho extrece faith 
1n tho Portil• Creacent nationaliam. 
2 . Pr1.nc1plea or aocial , econoc.ic and rollgioua 
re.form. 
In rogard to tho tirot princi ple, Profeooor Sa 'ada waa 
1ncl1no<I to aeparate Syria (grea•er S7rla) entirely from the 
Arab nation, but ho never aucceeded 1n convincing hl.Jll.solf that 
bia doctrine would go through without extreme opposition. Ho•-
•••r, 1n tho early da) I of tl:e Part)' he thOU/'ht that the Part7 
would defeat tho oppoa1t1on and survive •1th an ovaMFhelming 
majority . Tho Part7 loader attacked Arabiam and depicted it 
as nomadiam, reactionary and Islamiam. Tho reaction to that 
attack qu1ckl7 followed ard many • r i tera, political groups and 
•••n governments atood. against tae Part1 and tried to deatrOT 
it co:opleto~ . Tho toot Sa 1e.da had o:ade indicated that ho waa 
on the wrong path and ho bad to soften hia language 1n regard 
to Arab1am. In a apeoch delivered ~arch l , 1938, he stated 
"Tho Sy-rians ore a oomploto nation even if tho Syrians are an 
Arabian nation . " That does not contradict tho .fact that Sy-ria 
ia a complete notion , haa ita ~•n 1over•ignt7 within its ph)'ai-
cal boundariea, and hao it• own national independent question . 
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This philosophy excluded throe- fourths ot tho Arabian nation 
1n tbe Arebian Penineula, in tne llile ' •alley and in llortll 
.ttrica. Aleo it excluded the Jews and tno Arsonians because 
of their national aapirat1ons . The contrad1ctiona1n his state-
ment could be seen very clearly and 1n turthor otatocento hia 
opposition to Arabi•~ was dic1niohed . He 1dont1f1ed S)'l"ia bJ 
ito ph7eical construction, •hareao tne S)'l"ian Nation grew up 
from tho Taurus Mountain• 1n the north (a part of tno Turkish 
Republic now) to the Suez Canal includins the S1nya Pen1noula 
and tho Oult of Aqaba . Prom cho K•diterranean in the •est to 
the desert 1n th• eaot sa•ada gave 1&portanco to the geographi-
cal factor tor keep1:ig the Syrian nation alive reg•rdleso ot 
the oucceao1ve wavoa of invaders during the different ages . 
Sa'ad•'• ideology regarding the S7rian nRtionalism and hia 
repeated contradictions a1n1&1zad the importance ot his pr1n-
c1Pl•• · In a statement ho :r.ado , he said: ·~· are the Araba 
and wo are the protectors ot Arabiam. Our opponents are the 
enemi•• ot l .. rabiam . " sa 1ada, explaining t.he practical aima 
of the Part1 , indicated another contradiction. Ho ••id the 
Party aimed to create a strong national awakeninf to guarantee 
national 1ndepend.onoe . That would be t11e succoas of the Part7 11 
principle• which would lead to tbo eatabli•l-ent ot an Arabian 
tront. 
Tae SJrian nationalism waa a new theory which the Syrian 
National Socialist Party used , not to aorve a temporary pol1-
tioal purpo11, but to perpetuate the Party to eorve the tunda-
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Rental intoreat ot gr•ater Syria. To have hia principle ot 
nationalic tar rtaching, Sa 'ada wrote atveral books on thio 
subject . In 1935 ho wrote "The Evolution ct Nati onali om" i n 
which he diacuaoed the evolution ot nations and tho correct 
definition ot the nation. However, hie conclution or tho 
diacuaaion waa 1ubJect to prolonged controvtr•i•• · NobodJ 
could determine mo tber hi• thoughts could Met the logica l 
acceptance or not . Sa'ad• wrote another book in which ho 
discussed the Syrian nationalism but the dratt ot tho work 
was , untortunatolJ , confiscated by the Frtnoh outhoritloa. 
In his book "The l.>Volution ot Nations" sa•ada gave the 
priority, in tho dtflnition of the nation, to the unity ct 
tho national and geographic•~ envlronaent . He oaid : "A 
lil!litod territor7 ot a nation lo a seltl.ng-pot where a group 
ot people ml.x, and no nation lo witnout definite l.&nd, with-
out drawn !rontiora. • Ho denied tile language as being a 
factor i n tne nation'• evol ution. Altnough he minimized the 
importance ot tho langunge as a factor he retorrod to 1ts 
importance as a meano to an end. ~lacy S:yr1ana were to attack 
his philoooph; tor m1n1mizJ.ns the c:.o1t important factor 1n 
toe Arabic nationalism. 
As tar as the principle of re!orci. was concerned, Sa'ada 
attacked tho religion severely e.nd blamed both Cbr1stl..an1ty 
and Islam tor boing roaponsible to a largo dogroo tor creat-
ing a split 1n the S1rian nation. Roalit1ng the gravity or 
this apl1t, the Part7 advocated tho aoparation or the spiritual 
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and politi cal !actors as a nocessnry atop tor tho unity and 
strength or the S;rrian l!ation which is the iMor and .llllme-
di.ate object or tne Part;r . Sa 'ada frankly eallej tor the 
separation o! tho religion from th• state . The political 
and epiritual rolationailip was a chronic problo111 1n tho 
v i ew o! Sa 1ada beoauao it contradicted tne 1LIL1n pr1nciplo 
of ni.a i deolo0y and then le.paired the relat1onahip or h ia 
party members . He was extremely concerned a out the el1a1-
nation of tno spiritual taetor from tho political scone . To 
roach that target ho prohib i ted the rel1e;ioua elements trom 
1ntervon1no 1n tho national , political and judici.al affairs . 
Tho Syrian Kational Socialist Party also attacked the 
diaoaeo o! tho Arabian nation at hoart by joining other 
parties 1n regard to t!>o laod 1y1tom. The d11tribution o! 
propert;r, 1n a way, to secure better production and to in-
sure justice was of great lJaPortance . It advocated tho 
idea or regulating tho nati onal economy on the basis of 
aolvine the problom of feud11lie111 . On the baeia o! produc-
tion and to protoct tne 1ntareeta o! both tho atato anj. the 
laborer, it advocated socialist principles thro~h which it 
trioJ to regulate and allocate production regard ing the 1n-
torosts o! tho Nation . In this econonic policy it rece i ved 
a majority support . 
Tho Partx'• Organicat1oo. 
In a epooch dol1vero~ by Sa'ada 1n Juno , 1935, ho aaid : 
"Toe i.yrian llational Soci alist Party is a atato baaed on 
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rour prillary principles - libert7, dut7, organ1zat1on and 
atrengtb. The organization or the Syrian National Soc1al-
1et Party la Paacist or Nazl at, but a pure S7rian organi-
sation.• However , Dl&n:J' events proved close resemblance wita 
mentioned •1stome . Tho leadership or tho military (with 
gray suit and particular salute and recognized •Y1'11>ols) and 
other dictatorial matters rolat1~ to tho non-conditional 
obod1enosa aro characteris tic ot loyalty and sincerity to 
Syrian nationalism aa 1t bad been explained by Sa'ada. 
Members ot the Party are reapone1ble tor porsuadtna their 
houeenolde to bel1e•t<• 1n that raltb. Sa 1a:1a was 1n favor 
or aeeing nationaliaa grow at b.,... f1ret , tben to spread 
out trom there . The Party's aembera were not partoitted to 
participate 1n any for~ of atr1kee or demonstrations . Tbe 
Council of Broadcasting and Publication was responsible tor 
tho taak or propagation, accordtna to tho plan promulgated 
by tho loader to meet the poli tical and social c1rcumatnnoea. 
Tbo Party'• loader wo.s tried many times 1n Lebanon. In the 
trial ot 19~6, while defending hilulolt botoro the m1Xed 
Court, he propagated for hie Party opanly and became a good 
example to hi• adherento . Too Party aent a delegation to 
too S7rian Coast Cont'oren<>e but none or 1ta delegation's 
1uggeations wore given an7 ccna1derat1on. 
In JUno, 1938, Sa•a:1a left tor South .l::er1ca and did 
not return until June , 1947. During his abaonco tho Party '• 
leadership was entrusted to a truateoah1p Council . Tbe 
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Part7 loot strength boc•uao of • aplit among the trustee · 
ship council •hicb led the Lebaneao Govero:;,ent 1n 1939 to 
solve the P&rt7 on tho groun:I. that it wae 01tabl ioo8'1 
secretly and waa not logall7 authorized . Moroovor, tho 
Govornmont claimed that tho Part7' a ailD contradicted the 
• P'.iblic order and tho socuri~y ot the Count7. When Sa•ada 
returnod ho:o.e the Party regained it• atren;;th an l rea1.ll:ed 
ita activities 1n Syria. »a.n7 adjuotmenta, rotorma and 11D-
provementa wore introduced in tho Party ' s program to moat 
tho political and aoc1al change . Man7 ablo membora, as 
Fay1rz-Sa71gj>, the Director or Broadcaatine, were diamissed 
from tho Party. $a 1ada also rovi1od cis book "The Evolution 
ot Nations" to meet the adjuatmonta introduced. 
In Juno, 1949 , ta• Lebe:neae Government again dissolved 
the Party aa a reault or a conflict bot-.oen Party's notion-
o.l principle and tu• Jlarounite Unite 1n Lebanon. '7oe 
Lebanoao Govoromont planned the destruction or the Syrian 
National Socialist Party . Th• Party's loader was contidont 
ot th• 1trongth ot bis Party•• tore•• · A cla1h v1rtuall7 
took place on Ju y 4, 1949, with tho Govorlll:>tDt forces and 
a Lobs.nose and a member of t no Party's unit woro killed. 
Tho olaoh took tho torm of an armed rovolution but it tailed 
because the Syrian Govarni::ent turned tho l•ad•r of tho Part7 
(•no had taken refuge in Syr1a) over to the tebanoae Govern-
ment and he was tried and executed on July 8 , 1949 . On 
July 16th, a:any member• ot tho Party wore tri•d. (31) Six 
(31) S.• 1Middlo i>aat Journal", • · 4, p. ll, 19So. 
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were sentenced to death and were executed. Tho reot were 
imprisonod for different periods. Although t he Party has 
no legal existence in Lebanon today, it has practical ex-
istence . In Syria , the Party was not pot'm1tted and bad no 
parliamentary repre3entation. However, during the regime 
of Husni Alzaim (March 30, 19 49) , the Party renewed ita po-
litical activities and participated in t he National Assembly 
e l ection of April, 1949, and gained two aeata in the Parlia-
ment . That gain was attribu ted to the support or Damescus 
and Tablua, which sympathized with t oe Party after the Party's 
leader and many members bad been executed. Durins the elec-
tion campaign the Party greatly axploited that peculiar is-
aue to influence the voters . That relative success 1n the 
1949 parliamentary election brought a bout an expaneion in 
the Party• s political activities i n Syria. llevertheleso, 
that relative success was encountered by a stiff oppooition 
to the Party's main theory of a Syrian nat1onal1am, because 
of th• Syrian citizen•a innate fooling of the Arabian national-
ism. 
The Syrian National Socialist Party supported tho Army 
move on December 14, 1949, led by Colonel Adib Shishakl1, 
•bo 11suod decree 47 perm~tt1ng the formation or pol1t1eal 
parties within the right of the government to check on ttie1r 
financia l and administrative composition. During Ashishakli's 
reign , t.h• Party's stand was ratnor contused. Althoug)l it 
supported the military ruler , hoping to get more opportuni-
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t1es 1n tho election of October 9, 1953 , but tho Party •• 
cano.1datoa' fa1luro br(>.lght opposition to b ia reign and 
it accused eu thorities 1n power of influencing tho reoulta 
of elections 1n favor ot their candidate s . 
The downtall of Aah1shakli 1 s dictatorsn1p brougnt abou~ 
another free election. The Party exerted greater effor t• to 
gain seats 1n the Parliament. A revision of the old polic7 
of the Party was made on the following bas1s:-
l . The Party acknowledged the lack of rollg1ous 
education and religious morality and rovoraod 
t heir belief that the basis for human evolution 
was purely materialistic. 
2 . Capital ism •as int.roduced as a runa.o.ment.al eco-
nomic ground . The capitalist enjoyed the pr o-
tection and t ne support of tbe Party . Foreign 
capital was invited to develop the Country 's 
major projects . 
3 . Tho main principle or t he Party ' s program - "The 
Syrian National1sm"-was emphasized and , further-
more, the Party declared tha t it was the responsi-
bility of the Syrian Republic to lead the Country 
in the matter of accomp.1.1sh1ng both the liberation 
and tho unity of the Syrian llation. 
4 . The Arab League reorganization was auggoated to 
meet the Syr1an-Iraq1an unity aa 1t had been pro-
posed by Dr . Padn11 Algamal1, Irnqian represen-
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tative to the Arab Laague political committeo . 
The Party 's other arrangement could meet the 
Arab doma!Xls except tho unity of tbe Fertile 
Craacent . Besides , a close co-oper~tion With 
the i1est 'i'as suggested on the basis of alli-
ance and the recognition of the mutual interest . 
Albonna newspaper (constructi on), the Party ' s 
organ, openly supported t hat policy even. it it 
would croate a hostili ty with tho Eastern Camp. 
I n spite ot the fact tha t t he 1953 election waa rela-
tivol;r free the Syrian National Socialist Party gained only 
one seat in the S;rrian Parliament . A!tbough the Syrians 
sympathized •1th the Party 1n regard to the execution of its 
leader, it did not mean they we re tor the Party polic;r ot 
separating Syria from the o~oar Arab coantr1e~ . Th6 Syrtan 
I~at1ona.11sc theory received more anthuaiasm i n Lebanon be-
cause of tho peculiar composition of the population nnd tho 
re l igion. That applies to Lebanon does not app!y to Syria. 
Arabiam and Is l amism are !irtr. in Syria. No wonder , then , 
to find that opposition to pure Syrian Nationali sm i s firm, 
too . Furthermore, the policy of terrorism and assass ination, 
to •hich tho Party resorted 1n 1950 (aaaaooination ot Rujadh 
Alaulh Prince, Prime Minister ot Lebanon, in Junman Jordan) 
as a reprisal for toe Party's leader ' s oxoeut1on , brought 
about a r•sontmont 1n S1ria and Lebanon. On April 24 , 1955, 
a member or the Party assassinated Adnan Alamal1k1 (Major 
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Geoera1) . Thia er1.:011nal at t. !.~.l'.ie J.ad tl:~ S7,.lllr\ Ji;.ver~:.:..O:lt 
to dissolve the Party. George Abdul Ga•s1eh, leader ot the 
Party and se 1 ada•1 successor, fled •1th many top members out-
e1de the Country . The Syrian author1tiea conf1aoatod ~nny 
important secret docuaents and publ1cat1one, regarding the 
tuture policy of t1.1 Party, but they were not revealed . 
Part1's Stand. from Claaaies . 
Principle five or tbe Pa~ty•a progrem wae set up to deal 
with the Nation ae a social CCl!!ll!Wlity. Tho principle of re-
form regarded production as the cornoratono ot Syri an Naticaal 
econOll!J' . Working 11 a natural right of every Syrian c1t1zon. 
!t 1s roro than a r1!1ht 1 1t is a duty or tho 1nd1v1dual to 
exert errort to ra1ao the total national production. Social 
and economic equality muat be observed. Productive ~e~bers 
ot tho society should be treated on tho afJ:le tooting •1th 
non-productive membera . Ho economic tneory was favored 1n 
tno program, but tho proh1b1t1on was obv1oue i n regard to 
tho ind1v1dual arbitrary right or using tho capital against 
the 1ntorosts or tho Nation . The capital1at ia free to deal 
• 1th h1s cap1t~l under tho protection of the atate. ~· 
Party opposes aasoc1at1ons, or unions, defending or struggli ng 
to defend tho~ r1~hta on the gr ound that tho national econo-
mio •:rstem muot be 1 0 •ell -organized that no problem would 
occur . Aasooiat1ons a1.m1n~ a t tile growth or the eoc1al wel-
taro wore perm1tt•d · Str1lces . riota and demonatratlons were 
not allowed becau1e thooe brins da=age to n.ational production. 
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In general , the policy ot the Party, a• far as the national 
economy wae concerned, was very similar t o the socialist par-
ties which advocated the nat~onal interest and entrusted 
that to the auporv1s1on of tbe State. 
Party's Stand on Re ligion. 
Principle five or the Party's progr am, in conformity with 
the theory of SyrLan nationalisn , called upon the •oparation 
of roligion tran the s~ate. Sa 1ada accused both Is lam and 
Christianity ot drawing sharp barriers between the Syrian 
nationals . Religion encouraged loyalty to authoriti•• out-
side the country , such as t he Pope or the Kahlifa 1n the 
Christian and Ialaml.c worlds. The rel1s1ous distinction con-
tradicts the pb1losophy ot the Party. Although the Party 
attacked Isl.am mainly and exaggerated tho ata.toment that 
Arab nae1onal1am is closely tied to Islam, that is not true 
duo to the fact that Arabs were Arabs boforo tney became 
Muslems, dnd Isla~ does not encourage nat1onnl1sm and ration-
aliam. It that is true of Christianity, it is not true ot 
Islam. Tbe question of religion was exploited to a large 
degroe by tne foreign !mperialiam, whether it was TUrkish 
or European, and the Party tried to ol!m1nata tbat exploit-
ation by el!minatins the main source wbicb turnished tbe 
foreign interference (d ividina the Nation into Muslem and 
Christian '.'lorlds) . 
Party's Stand on Palestine Q!!estions . 
Tbe Palestine question was troated within the theory 
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ot the SJ1'1&n Nationalism and the unity or Oroeter Syria. 
Profess er Sa' ada note an article 1n .L931 in ; .. o Alt !la 
Paper ot Damaacua answering Lloyd Geors•'• speech in t he 
Zionist Asoociation 1n London aupportins the Zionist hopes 
1.n Palestine . Sa•ada criticized tile Balfour ~claration 
and announced that Pal11t1ne is a part and parcel o! Syria 
and that SJTi•n territory cannot be partitioned. That an-
nouncecent roru&1nod the stand of the Party. 
Party ' • Stand on the Fr ench ~andate . 
The Party waa founded during tho ruandato. Sa 0adn stated 
that he eatabliahed the Party not beoauae or tho existence 
or the llOAU>date but to unite ~he Syrian Nation to have •elt-
dote~tion. Ho thouaht the mandate •a• a t ... pora!"J' po-
litical ayater ana or 1econd&ry 1.loportance to the Party. Aa 
tar as the treaty ot lOU •as concerned, tt.e Party did not 
regard ita articles 1utficient to moot tho national aspirations . 
For that stato~ent the Party was the tarset ot a violent at-
tack by the Nationol Bloc•• eupportera in Damaacua. In a 
speech delivored by S•'ada 1n 1936 he 1xpre1aed nis regret 
becauae or non- political co-operation between tile National 
Bloc and hi• Party t o obtain a better political de•l from 
France which woul4 naturally reoult had there been ouch unity 
between the nat1on ' e strongest partiea . 
In r egard to tho relationship with foreign nation• Sa'ada 
1n a apeoch delivered in 1935 warned the Syrian nation about 
German and Italian propaganda. Altho~h he ravored a friendly 
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rela tionshi p with foreign countries on tho baeia or respect, 
equali ty and mutual lntereots, still he warnod them. 
Tne C....,..,Ulilt Part7. 
It la very difficult to !ind out the exact atarting 
point ot tho Syrian political parties and t he racta about 
their aotivitiea . The historical baclcgrcund or the Syria.n 
Cot:!"unl•t Party ha• proven more d11'rlcult to ••certain. 
However, it ia our• that ito political activity o&llll on the 
political acene aa early as the atar t of tho Syrian national 
movement during the French mandate. It cculd be • •id, with 
confidence, that it waa very popular between 1938- 1939 . To-
d.ay it 11 , at leaet, 25 7ear.s old . It becai?:e ver)• popular, 
and gained more adherents, when Khalid Beckdaah, a Syri an 
citizen, bee•~• a rAnber •ho -very aoon rose to tbb leader-
a.:iJ.p. (32) 
Becla1ash waa born in Damaacua 1n 1912, aon or an Army 
officer in tho Turki sh period. He received a bll!h school 
education. The French mili tary authorities interrupted bia 
law education becauae ot b is political ac tivities in the 
national atruggle . Being convicted, he !led to Europe and 
via1tod North Africa, Spain, France and Rus•ia, and returned 
ho~• 1n 1937. In Prance he rendered a tremondoua effort for 
t he Syrian question during U:e Pranco-~yrian negotiations ot 
1936. He act&d as a mediator bot•een tho French lott1sta in 
tho French llational Aaaembly who were very influontlal 1n tba 
Froncb Popular Front, and the Syrian delegation 1n Paris . 
(32) See Partle• In srrla 1908-IOSS, by R.H. Porzat, pp. !it-
204 and 24~-245 . 
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In spite ot tb.o fact that the Party was anti-Fascist 
and anti-Nazism dur1n8 tbe war, the French Authorities dis-
solved the Party and closed its information center, sup-
pressed its paper 1 11The Voice1 of th.e People" , and Be ekdash 
disappeared; but ho managed the Party secretly under the 
French rule of terrorism. In 1942, tne Party started new 
public lite . It& organ , t1Tl1a Voi ce of the Peoplett , came out 
again with increased publication and continued until the end 
of 1949 when it was again suppressed by the military coup ot 
Husni Arzaim. In 194?, Beckdasb no~inated himsolt tor the 
parliamentary election of that year . His election was se-
cured had it taken place without government intervention. 
Sucb intervention •as admitted lately . tater in 1954 , a tree 
election was held in Syria and Khalid Boekdaah was elected 
to P&rliament . Becla1asb •as the first acknowledged Communist 
to hold office in an Ar&b cowitry . <33J The cur~nt interven-
tion of the French autboritiea during the mandate , and the 
Syrian government during tho national reign , strengthened 
tbe Party and gave the leadership a chance to eliminate in-
sincere and undesirable elements . In Lebanon the Commun1st 
Party 1a illegal, and theoretically haa no conter and no 
pnper . In pr~ctice, i t has a center of i nformati on , an 
office 1n every home and many national papers, all of which 
afford every opportunity for the Party'• loaders and members 
to carr1 out their political activitJ . (34) 
(33) See Life Magazine , vol . 42, no . 14, April 8 , 1957, p . 135. 
(34) Seo Political Parties in Syria , by Oar Arro•ad publi ea-
tion, pp. 253-263 
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By tbe collapae o! the dictatorial rule ot Ad1h Asbieh-
akli at tbe en4 ot 1954, the political &tmoapbere in Syria 
became more convenient to tbe co.,.,,uniot activity. Beckdash 
returned to Syria &nd 1n Damascus received a war~ welcoc:.e 
in a reception attended b7 more than ten tt:.oueand in the 
ll'.urda Quarter . be period ot 1949-1954 wa a a cri t i cal one 
1n the lite o! the Party. It •aa a bard teat tor the ability 
and patience o! the melCbers who had au!"tered physical and 
psychological torture . Thoae wh o endured auch torture re-
mained as reliable Communists . Those who toiled to endure 
the torture and revealed informati on to the concerned au-
thori ties were expelled. <35) 
::n tbe 191>4 election the Party launched a very • ell-
organized carpa1gn, and only its leader • •• elected tor tbe 
Parl1.al:.ent . rlowover, t.be other cand1d&tea receivad satle-
tactory votea, but not enaugli t o reach the desired number . 
The Party•a Aims . 
The Co1:1.'10Ulliat Party 1n Syria, l11<e all Communiat Par-
ties in the world, advocated Xa.rxi aa, Len1n1am and Stal1n1am. 
In otc.er words, the inner a im ia to deatroy capitalism and 
to eoc:::unize tbe production according to the principle& ot 
••tiat;ing your need• •ithin the limit or your production 
and leaving the reat tor the con:mon interoat. The Communist 
thoory or Marx and Lenin is not a aolid ono, but it is very 
flexible . The Cocu:ur1at Porty 1nterprota it aa the inter-
pretation of knowledge ot aocial evolution, t~e laborer moYe -
(SS) See Par ti.ea t1fe in Syr1a, 1006-1966, b7 ~ . H. ?er~at . 
mont and knowledge ot tr.e revolution of th• proletariat and 
lcnowlodge of the eonetruetion of tho Com:W11et eoll:!!;Urlity. 
Thia knowl edge enriched itaolt dur1.ng ita evolution by gain-
ing new experiences and by obtaining new knowledge . The 
theory of Cot:lltUlliem ie changeable, partially to lllOet the re-
quirements of tr.e time, and to suit tl.e political and his-
torical cirCU111atancea . 
It is the flexibility of the Coao:uniat Party •bicb .,.de 
it capable of d1roct1ng its political activity 1n every stage 
of its history , and according to a convenient atrat•SY 1n 
cortain tactioa . The Syrian Corm:uniat Party, a1nc• its es-
tabliabJ:lent, et>deavorad to aupport a Syrian constitutional 
republican rogi.ale, froo from eapitaliatic 1.ntluence. In 
other worda, the Party at th• present ti&e ia not aeeld.ng the 
eatablisbloent or a COl!¢lUJliat state in Syria . On tbe contrary, 
it is supportl.no every movement leading to tho doop formula-
tion of democratic rule . More l iberty, llJnited hours tor 
workers , and the abolition or feudaliom are tho main domanda 
ot tho Como:uniata 1n Syria. Tao Co,,_-uniota bolie,·e that such 
demanda could be carried out tbrouo;h a ca 'italiat bourgeoia 
rule . Thoy alwaya believe tl::.&t wben a capitaliat bourgeoia 
1a 1n power that will lead the proletariat to orr,anl.ze tb.em-
aelvea and obtain practical oxporience in rognrd to pol itical 
londer•bip of tbe maeaee . Thus , tho bourgooia revolut ion 
will be eaay to convert into ~ocialiat revolution. Perteet 
political freedom an... democratic republic aooner or later 
brings about aoo1al1aa. 
The Commun1at Party, however, bel1evoe that no poaaible 
v1otory tor the proletarian revolt can occur without crush-
ing the bourgeois revolt which functions amor>f the laborera. 
The v1ctory ot the proletariat depends, largely, upon the 
destruction ot tho laborer un1.ty. 
The Part1•1 Organ1&at1on. 
The CoJ:ll:lWl1at Party has two major charactere : -
l. It haa a very elastic ph1losoph1cal doctrine . 
2. It ia a very well-aet-up organ1iation. 
Lenin said: "The proletariat hae no we apon w1th which 
to atr\lgjlle to obtain power except the weapon ot organi:a-
tion ." ir·oe Party r•preeenta tbe awakened laborer class, 
the uaetul organ1zod group. It 1a a ... , party wbich en-
deavors to obtain the aupi·ort of the labortrt . L1ke all 
communiat1c partieo centralized on tho baeia ot aboolute 
majority election troD aub- oommitteoa• cand1dateo, the 
Party is compoetd ot two main categorie11-
1. The exporlonced profeso i onal group - liaited 
1n nll.lllber . Thia gro~p is devoted to the Party, 
well-provided •1th the noceaaary abil1ty tor 
political controveray . They can be cl1araeteri• od 
as example• tor rovolution~ry ocmrr.uniat1 . 
2 . Tho m&ea mombera . Ordinary membera who should 
have at leaat three cond1tiona, - recognition 
ot the Party'• proeram, support tho party ..a-
teriall7, and attil!.at1on with ono ot 1ts cob-
mittoea. 
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The Party consistently watches its mecbers . Uembers 
who misuse the Party's policy or plans, or who are useless, 
have no room, and have to be expelled from the Party's 
membership . The polio; of self- criticism is one or tho 
best methods of communism to correct its own errors and 
to keep selt- ex1sting. 
The Communist Party 1n Syria, like any other political 
party, whether it is communist or non-communist, looks for-
ward to being 1n power . To that end tho Cocmunists direct 
masa political agitation and, furthormore , lead armed revo-
lution when an opportunity occurs . Also they co-operate 
with nationalists and parties with leftist political ten-
dencies. 
Tho Party's Activity. 
The role of tho Communist Party was very tang i ble in 
tho Syrian political life as early as the 1936 Fr anco-Syrian 
negotiations and ccntinuod since that time . Tho Communists 
influenced the Frener. Govornmont to roach an agreement With 
Syria to formulate t he Franco- Syrian rolationsn1p. Khalid 
Bookdash , leader of the Syri.an Communist Party , took tho 
r ole oi' a mediator between the Syrian delegation and the 
French Communists . Bec l:dash was very successful . The Syrian 
Co~.rrunists participated witb tbe International Comounieta in 
the opposition t o Fascism and i:azism during l"loi:l d War II and 
the period of p>:opaganda preced1ne the war . On J<ay 6 and 7, 
1939, tho Com.'llUnista and their supporters held a conference 
in Beirut t o organize a campaign to meet the flow of Fascis t 
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and Naz1 propa.ganda. The Co:tference, 1n a una.n1mo.._a de-
c1a1on, supported and stood with tho domocratic caop. The 
Conference • s Communiquo called upon Syria ond Frnnce to 
rat1£y the Franco-Syrian treaty nnd regulate their relation-
ahip on the baaie ot realistic understanding or tne A..-ab 
rigbts 1n their countriaa and in Palestine 1n particular. <36> 
Becla1esh outlined t~e progrtA ot fl&Otine Faaciam and ~a4isa 
1n a speech ad.dreeaed to ~he Conference, atr•••l.n& the follow-
ing poi nts •-
1 . Fir m Franco-Syrian alliance to st•bilize and 
normalize th• political 11.fe 1n that area . 
A French recognition of the S;r1an national 
aspiration •• a guarantee of the nationa l 
r1g.hta . 
2 . The unit:r ,f all national fronts (with a aug-
gostod national teder4tion) . 
3 . Firm co-operQt ion of united Araba with the 
democratic people to encounter tho danger of 
Fasciaa and Naziam 1n the Arab East. 
4 . Firm stru.g. le tor iltprovin<; the atandard of 
living, for tl.gliting mi.sery, povort:r and il-
litorao:r 1n tho villages, and tor raiaing 
the lovol or domocrat1c liberty 1n the towns . 
Beckdash hold tho agents or Berlin and Koce responsible 
tor t~• delay or tho 1936 Troat:r ratlf 1cat1on. Ha accused 
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those agents of diverting the attention of public opini on 
to Berlin and Romo inatoad of Paris . Also he held tno 
Fronch reactionary elements ~hich were influenced by the 
Fasc13t and Nazist propaganda responsible for that delay . 
The Party •evorely attacked a certain ~yrian element 
Which advocated t'1e partition of Syri a into small urri-
torieo , such aa Ashsham , Durourz, Lebanon, Palestine , and 
Algazirsh . Those elements were not of Arabian origin and 
were ready to welcome any fo r e i gn power influence as far 
as their interests were presor vcd . Bockdash advised both 
Syria and Franco to ratify the Tr eaty as early as possib l e 
boeause tno 1nternae1onal s1.tuat1on was a warning of an 
outbreak of a cajor conflict . .rnen the mentioned war broke 
out , the Communist Party supported tao a.easuros taken by 
the French authorities in Syr ia to keop order and security 
in the country. That f irm co- oper ation betwoon the Com-
an.mists and the French authorities did not prevent the 
lat ter from auspending and then sol ving tho former on 
September 29 , 1938, in both ~yria and Lebanon. 
The Com.u.~ist Party, after being solvod, seized evory 
available opportuni~y to express its own political v1ew-
potnt in the current pol itical 1a3ues . On ovory occas i on 
the Colll!l!Un1ots denounced tha policy of lm!tual alliance 
with the u'est and co- operated vrlth a."'l.t1-~1iest non- coonunists 
1n order to br ing about a failure of ouch projects as the 
mutual defense of the Mi ddl8 East , and the Ei senhower eco-
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noD17 and military doctrine . Dictatorsb1 1• OJposod by ~~e 
Communist under any condition, 1n conformity •1th their fun-
damental policy of 11v1ng, and growing in a deoocratic nt-
moaphere . In their uncountable publication they tried very 
hard to divert public opinion to the Soviet nion, tne country 
Of 80c1alism, peace, and the only big friend ot t~o Arabs . 
Sowevor, toe Party h1a forgotten that th• Arab na~1ona11ata 
are not naive an4 t11e:r know that the Soviot Uni on ls as 
guilty as Britain, Fr~noe and the United States in regard to 
the establi•hmont, rooogn1t1on and armament ot Iaraol . The 
Arab nat1onal1ata will never forgive tho US~H and her bloc 
1n the JN General Aaselably tor voting for the Zionists 1n 
that concern. 
T"ne CO;m;Un1at Party 1a ODO of ti>• rev ~art1ea Which 
cress the boundarioa of oiyr1a to the ne1gnbor1np Arab coun-
tries with acceptable ideology. Commin1am entered tne Arab 
countries as a pol1t1oal and economic doctrine . It is 
corr1ed out by tile 1ntellactWll Araba who went to Europe tor 
a higher education. The Arabs bolievod that Coaaun1o::i la a 
European ideology b•cauae l!uasia ia a ~urorean country. Co:-
ar.i.niac 1a acceptabl• to a mass or people, not because it 1a 
better than capitali1m, but because co .1tali1m oroated a 
shnrp gap between a ma11 of paopl o living in extre~e poverty 
and n few people l1V1l>;\ 1n extr eme proapor1ty . 
Althoueh Commun1am 1n practice ia another pattern or l.Jr.-
perlaliac, it did not do any direct harm to tho Arabs auch a1 
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was tho oaee with Br1t1• 1l arxl French 1m~rlalio10 which tore 
the Arab countries i nt<> SOlall pol1L1cal territories and d1-
v1dod ~iea into rival royal .faa111ee t<J keep t. .. ea weU, to 
be v1ct1m4 tor ~1on1•m or any otner foreign impor1al1•m, 
oucn ae Colllll!UDiem. It 1s ·•or•o a:ent1on1ng that COllllllllnism 
1n tne Arab l ands 1n!1ltrated peacefully - no torce was 
uaed nor was any form or pressur• exerted. Purt~ermore , the 
Cownw11at movemant 1n that part of the ·aorld la not as strong 
a• i t is in France or Italy. However, the Arab oountriea 
could be tho beot aoi l tor Commun~am, due to their hiotor1-
cal back:oround, u.e 1r gr1avaneea with the ueat , and t.b.e un-
balanced d1otr1but1on ot wealtn, plus corrupted iOvornments . 
For those reaoons and •1m1lar onoa the Communist Party l..o 
leaditlf' tne Co....un1et movooer.t 1n tno Arab countries general~ 
and 1n Syria particularly. Co- operation bet•eon tr.o Co"""1Il-
1at1, Soc1o.liat•, a:oderates, and extreme nat10nftlists will 
br1ns success to Communism. No detsnoe project such as tho 
Baghdad Paet, or economic aid, ouch aa tho E111nho•or Doc-
trine, •ill be eutt1e1ent to curb ma•• •upport to Co:::i::un19.111 . 
No other way could cur b Commun1am except g1V1nfl way to the 
extreme Arab nat i onalists who coul d put an end to Communism 
i£ tnoy receive unconditional military and economic aid t r om 
tn• 1\'eat . 
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The Present Part1eo in Syria 
Kowa4ays t!lo Syrian Republic is tr.o o~ly Arabian Coun-
try •o1cb pract1••• tr.o dococrat1c rule . Nw::i•~oua active 
political partiee are in exiotenc• today . All of them are 
repreoented in Parlirunent . Nine political parties are 
re~i•torod in tho record of the kin~stry or Interior as legal 
part1••· ':'neso political parties repre3ent the ourront po-
l itical, socia l and religions olemonto i n the Country. Fail-
ure or auccooaivo military coups and a poriod or dictatorabip 
brought about th••• numerous political or8aniz~tio~• as the 
onl7 &••n• tor political stabilit7 and tor obtaining satia-
tac~1on of every political, social and religious group. A 
carotul study or the programs of the f ollo•ing nine political 
groupa showed tnat tne1 could b• olass11'i...t into tour a:ajor 
political group1 accord1r~ to their political alaa and lean-
ing. 
A. Arab Nationalist Partiea 
1. Arab Resurrectioniat Part7 (Alba•ath) 
2 . Th• Socialist Co-operative Party 
3 . Th• National League Act 
4 . The Na tiona t Party 
r. . The People Party 
&. The Arab Liberati on uovement 
8 . The Comminiata 
7 . The Syrian Communist Party 
c. Tho l!Uslem Brothers 
8 . The Kuelem Brothers Organization 
D. Tbe Syr1an ~•tional Socialist Partz 
9 . Tbe Syrian National Sociali•t Party. 
Partios in group A represent the Arab nation•listo, a 
majority ot the Syrian populat i on, dominating both the Sy-
rian Parll&::!ent and the Al'my . '!hey have the 11me national, 
econor.1e, aocial, 1nduatr1al, agricultural and cultural 
policies. ~ut they dltter 1n h<M' to apply tnen. 7he detl-
nitlon ot tho Arab Nation, tho boundario1 ot ~~e Arab coun-
tries, and the unity ot tho Arabs are the outstanding ques-
tions they never d11puted . Res is tina ·~ kind ot fore ign 
imperialis= ls another question upon Wbloh all th• partieo 
agreed . In general, group A have pure Arab learning and 
believe sincerely tbat no at•bility axi1ta 1n the Arab coun-
trlea without em1rgonc1 of a united and 1ndependent Arabian 
1tate. All present dltferences botwoon the Arabian people 
ars artificial and could be easily removed by tno awakening 
of the Arabs . No party ot this group donled tho principle• 
or democracy . They unanimously entruotod the powors of the 
Nation to an elective body which muot represent the Nation 
to carry out leg1alat1on and to call the govern:iont to account 
waonovor it m1suaea ita authority . All Pcrties, 1n a roup A, 
recognize tho Arab un1t7 as a fact, the reform 1n the differ• 
ent aspects of the lite ao a groat necoss1ty, but they differ 
in tho lMtbod and in the peri.od . Some ot tl11m, 8UCh as the 
Arab Resurrect1on1at P•rty L~d the Arab L1berat1on Movement, 
are revolutionary . Tho7 do not have ti;I patience to wait 
lonser . Othero, aucn aa the Pooplo Part7, are rather re-
luctant to uae toroo. The rest of thia grO\lp are moderate . 
The1 support either a14o . Most partioa in group A wore 
formed after \Yorld 110.r I or shortly boforo it. Revolution-
ary part1ea reproaont the ~e• educate~ gor.eration led b7 
1ouns educated pol1t1c1ana and the7 sanitoat discontent 
because or the corrupted go•ernmento• saoa ignorance againat 
distribution ot the wealth and, above all, tho unoa17 foreign 
intervention in tho Arab states internal atfaira. 
Aa a typical example or the modern pertioa in Syrin, it 
ia uaotul to discus• the Arab Rosurroctioniat Part7 to con-
elude t~• parties under review . 
"he Arab rtoaurrectionist Pa.rty(3~) Alba•ath - •as forc~d 
as earl7 as 1940 bJ two nationalists, Kichaol Atlak and Sal.ah 
Addive Albaitar, •ho reali~ed the Nation•• need tor bruahl.ng 
up the Arab na tionaliam and to have 1 t come into practice 
rather than to be just a theory . Both Atlnk and Albaiear 
were school teachoro in Damascus till 1942. Their activitJ 
1n tlle Arabian nationalism goes back to their participation 
1n tl.e Iraq1an Liberation Government 1n 1~41 and tno political 
ovonta cf 1942 in Syria and Lebanon. The Roaurrectioni.at 
Part7 believed that support should be prcv14ed tor any liboral 
movement that 11i~bt take placo in the Arab world . llaticnaliom 
muat cut ott local ti•• and c.roas the border to lead maas move-
ment to achieve •14er ~utual national 1ntoroet . In 1945, the 
(39) Soe a apoclal issue (llel'Wah) about ParElea In ehe Arab 
Countries by Dar Arrowad, pp. 56-57. 
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Party participated, with ma.n:;r other political parties , in a 
national movement in Damascus aimed to oppose any alliance 
with France, or signing any treaty which might impair tho 
Syrian and Lebanese independence . Attar tho Allies evacu-
ated Syria, tho Party was s trong enough to publish its organ 
(Alba•ath) . In 1947, the first convention was held in Damas-
cus ; the Party's program was published . I t expressed extreme 
opposition to any law that might euppross freedoms or speech 
and proaa. It voted against the ro- election ot President 
Shukri Alquowatli tor the pr esidency. Salab .l\tldin Albaltar , 
a prominent leader , was arrested tor publ ishing a pamphlet 
urgi ng people to retrain from electing him. His arrest was 
discussed in the House of Reproaentatives twice . Somo repre -
sentatives demanded his release because of the illegality of 
bis arrost or exile by the executive a.tthority order alono . <40 l 
In 1947, the government opposed tho Party's candidates for 
tho election of that year and suppreosed its organ. 
Principles and Aims of tho Party. 
The Party endeavors to accomplish l iberty , aoc1al 1sm and 
Arab unity . The slogan of tho Party is always "Ono Arabian 
Nation haa a pe.,,,anent civil1Z&d mission. " It is the firm 
boliot of tho Party that t he Arabian nation bas a live and 
renewal personality. Tho civilized mission of tho Arab Nation 
is alive and could be renewed and developad to moot the re-
quirements of the modern tl.m$S. Tho main purpose of the Party 
(40) See tho memorandum of the House of Roprosontutlves of 
February 28 and April 4 , 1945. 
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is to make it clear that the Arabian nationalism is an undis -
puted faet . The decisive will of the Arabian people to liber-
ate themaolvos and to be given a chance to present their 
nation ' s personality to the international socie ty is proof ot 
that nat1onal 1sm.C4l) 
Artiela 6 of tho Party's program of t ho "gene r a l princi-
ples" identified the Arab territory as that land where the 
Arab nation lives •hich stretches from Touru.as and Peshtckoh 
uountains north down to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, 
South and from the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, 
nor th, down to the Ethiopian Mountains in the South. The 1916 
Arab revolution banner became tho forma l banner of the Party. 
The Arabian is tao person who l ives 1n the Arab land, or 
hoped to live t here ; speaks Arabic ; and believes that Arab 
nationalism is the strongest 8Jl!Ong tho nation. 
As for religion - tho Par ty d1d not distinguish between 
rol1g1ona . They are all equal and. are respected, but Islam , 
as a spiritual movement , affected the h ist ory, the civiliza-
tion and the education of tho Arabs and has a speci al priority 
i n r ogord to tho Arabian nat i onalism and its elassics and re-
birth. SUeh pr i ority cannot bo imposed. However, i t could 
be created as a consequence ot the freedom and may result from 
the strong spirit and tho close connection among the Al-abs . 
It is the sincere belief of tho Party that the people 
must rule fo r thernsolvos through a democratic principle . The 
minority should recognize tho rule of tho maj ority and the 
latter must not take advantage of that privilege to do any 
(41) Sie tho Constitution or the Arab Resurreetionist Party 
(main princ i ples 1,2,3, ) The Political Parties in Syria -
.... _ •-.- -. . ... A -··'lo.l•- .. ~4,.._.,. .,. OAI'\ 
harm t o the tol'ller . Hevertheleao, until 1949 t he Party'• 
acti•ity •aa roatr 1cted to oducated people and college atu• 
den ta. 
Social1em 1• another pr1nciple tho Party adv0<>atad h1gh· 
l y . Social1aa 1a a graat necessity • h i ch sprung trom t he 
Arabian nationalism. It ia believed that 10<>1al ie• alone 
brina guarantee tor th• accOIJlpliahlllent or t ho County •a oco-
no~ie abilitiea. T"aero ia a aharp d1at1neti on bet•oen the 
Arab Resurroctioniat soc1al1aa and the Coc::uni•t• ' aoeiali••· 
In Jllno 1944 Atlak and Albaitar - leaders of tho Par~ - pub-
l lahed a pamphlet by which th.oy explained the atalld of Arab 
nationalism troa colClNJlism, to pro•• that taota relating to 
t he exiatence ot nationa and nationalism cannot be linked to 
economic t actora • hen they are interpreted. Th• two loader• 
denied the conflict aaong cl••••• as a principle and t hey 
made 1t clear that the bia£eat miatake llarx over udo waa 1&· 
norlna the atrongth of nationalism. C4Z) In plain language , 
they aaid Communism is a atrange philoaophy every Arabian baa 
nothing t o do •1th becauae it contradicts t ho m11slon ot Ar&b 
nationalism and , furthermore , lt contradicts the Arab modern 
awakening. Tho Party call• tor a certlln Arabian •Ocial ian1 
taken rroc 1oeial needs and •Pirit ot t he Arabs to moot their 
m.od•rn awakenina . A reaaonablo aoc1•11aa restricted to create 
a justly economic system which avo1de the society eoltiahne11, 
greediness and domestic diasact . Th• purpose or IOoiali•m 1• 
to aerve the Arab nationaliam and to be an important tactor 
or 1ta re-birth and ita tlour1sb1ng. 
( i2) See Atlak and Albaitar •Arab HaElonalisa 
Coc:::!Wli,.• - Se;t. 1951. 2nd edition. 
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Pl.nall.7 , tno Party could bo characterized ao a rovolu-
tionary moveaent . A gradual reror:: and slow development tor 
the corrupted nat i onal , aoc1al, pol1t1cal and economic ineti -
tutions ia acceptable to tho Party. A strusgle tor a bard 
and bloody revolution ia tho object through a vehicle ot 
patriots who be l ieve 1n the nocoas1ty ot sacrifice to preserve 
the 1.nter eata ot the people, not to prolong the lnt•reat or 
the ruling elocento . C 43) 
~.10 Intern.al Or,ganUation . 
All members are invited to attend annuAl Convont1orui to 
diacu.oa tile Party ' a progr ..,., a ct1v1ty and propaganda, and 
also to e l ec t the active ooaunitteoo and oft1cera . Normally 
the Party baa tile following or ganizaticns :-
1. Gonora l Co'""'1 ttoo 
2. Party '• Council : legialat1ve organ 
3. Executive COllllll.ttee 
• · Secretary general s Salo.h Add1n Alba1tar 
5. Leader: ld1cbaol Atlak. 
Tho Party ' s Council membor• aro elected by tile General 
Cca:dttee Which u elected during the annw:;l conver:tlon. The 
Genoral Co111111ttoe baa a;any br ancho• and aub-comm1ttoea . Tho 
Part7'1 Oounc1l f'unct1ona a1 ~ legialat~v• organ anc. aelecta 
the members ot the Ex.ecut1ve Cocmlttee which eODdueta and auper-
viaos the policy, activity and propaganda ot tho Party. Alao , 
tlla Executive Coll:lillttee electa tho cbiet t.dminiatrators . 
(43) Partioa t!/o In Syr ia, 1908-1955, by U. H. Perzat, p. 
232 . 
• 
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No Party candidate ..... elected to Parliament until 
the election of 1949 - 113 candidate• were elected" - - -. 
However, the Party had 1.ntluonced tbe Countrf ' • general 
policy through its influence on the public opinion becau•e 
of its wide- spread growth al:lcng students and educated per-
sons . The Party's organ (Alba•ath) Which courageously ex-
pressed the policy of tne Party and criticized the Govern-
ment was suppressed several timea . Its editors were tried 
and jailed again and again . In 1945, after the foreign 
troops' evacuation, elements in power were not 1n favor of 
seeing opposition parties, but "Alba •ath11 , the organ of the 
Party made it clear tbat opposition has to be the character 
ot the new national era . The leader ot the Party wrote in 
August, 1946, and I quote :- "It is the security of our land, 
the big)l. morality of our Nation, and the future of our gene-
ration that are tbe =ost importont to us, not the caution 
for the regime dignity and t bo ruling element•' prestige 
and eomfort.•<44) Also, another article stated on the oc-
casion of the annual memor d.al of the election of the presi-
dent of the Republic on August 18, 1946, - again I quote : -
"The Arabs ot Syria, the enlightened elements t.nd those 
a1ncore to the Arabian spir~t, Who understand the conditions 
for the modern awakening , consider the republican system aa 
tho most convon1ont to meet the spirit of the Arabian nntion 
1n the future and to racili~ato the creation ot tbe nation'• 
abilities . Thi• system as 1t 1a applied in ~yrio has many 
(44) See Albalath Poper: no . 13, aated July 21, l946; aild 
no . 27, August 9 , 1946. 
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aevere contradiction• which tt.reate• th• exiatenca ot tbe 
system as it doea no~ give ~ore care and cona1der~t1on to 
treed om. ( 46 ) 
Party ' • Foreien Policy. 
T"ne Arab Reaurrect1on1at ?art'J' demanded a tori:t,tion o! 
• liberal Arabian f oreign policJ . In 1948, Atlak, loader or 
tbe Part;, expla1n11ll the at:.nd ot tt.o Arab a ta tea between 
tl:e Eastern and Ilea tern CU!ps aaid : - "It the Arabs did not 
suffer frcm imperialism, occupation and partition and wanted 
t o take a liberal atand on tbe cold war ot tho east and •eat 
that could be to their national interoat , they abould ata.nd 
•1th deaocratic nations , not •1th the dictatorial nat1ona . 
T'ae Arabs can recogni~• tae 1ncocplete democrac7 ot tb.e ~eat, 
and the pro~rese an· advance::ont or tne Laat . .ievertheleas , 
the Araba should be Id-Ven tho rroedoa ot choice , which is 
th• oaoenco or their lite and the baaia ot their paat civi-
lization, and should be oo 1n the tuturo . However, tho po-
litical situation in the Arab countries, the atand or tho 
#eatern Bloe on that 11tuat1on, and the • .s.s.R. policy 
towards the Pale1t1nian question gave tho Arabi no choice 
except to align tt.o::aelvoa with the l';eaterr. ca.-p in that 
1trv.g;;le, and 1n tact it waa 1n the Arab interest • ... • • 
Tho neutral policy between the two camps became inevitable 
in tho Party'• viowpoint . (46) 
"Tb• moat 1oriou1 problem in the Arab National life ia 
(45) Seo Alba•atb P·per, no. SS; dated lugwiE 18, 1946 . 
(46) See Alba•atb Paper, no . 217 , dated :an. 2 , 1948. 
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the queetion ot Paleetine . The Partr med• 1t verr clear 
that the 11berat1on ot that Arabian territory •ill be 
aol.1eved by tr.o people , not b:; government• . The leader or 
the Party (Atlak) obaraoter1zed the danger ot tho Zionist 
invasion as not merely a pol itical and eoonoo.ic invasion 
but also as a religicua invasion al.lU.lar to th• Cnristien 
tweltth centt:.rr Cruoeder1 • • • He urged tc.e Arab government• 
and. tt.eir leai;ue •to • rove t.nat theee ~.ovemmente are not 
exieting to serve toro1gnors and to act according to their 
orientation by placin/< all posoible r.anclicapa before tho 
peopl e des irous for ~ilitanoy.• ( 47 ) The Party ' s strug~l• 
went tor beyond apeeehea and criticism to aending a di-
vlaicn or volunteers to participate in tile liberation ot 
Palestine, but the Arab gove:r=onte Wlder ti.a 1ntluence ot 
the •••t betrared tt.e peopl e . '!'ha raeponaibil1ty of the 
groat loss 1n Paleet1no talla prl.Jtarily on the perty 1n 
power (Tho National Party) . (-4S) The l/ational Party had boon 
accueed of m1aua1ne tho constitutional rule by concentrating 
all authorities in the hands of tho few people representing 
tho feud.al fAlliliee . Tho Arab hesurrect1oniat Party exerted 
many pol i tical effort• to remove the National Party from 
power . '!'he PartJ'• resistance to deer•• No . 50 , •bicb aimed 
to suppreee public traecloma , waa the outetancline movement 
which influenced the country's political li.te . Aleo a simi-
lar movement waa the oppoeition to amend the conatitution 
(47) Albalath Paper, No. 24, dated Augu1t 6 , 1946. 
(-48) See Political Part1ae 1m Syria, D&r Arrouad P\lbl1c&t1on, 
p. 231. ~ !!! Party•a Life in Syr a, 1908-1955, by 
¥ . H. Per&at, pp. 240- 241. 
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tor re- electin€ Sbukri Alquowatli tor prea1d•nt . Kore 
ettorts were exert•d to bring about the 41r•ct election. 
These movementa depended to ~ large extent upon atudenta ' 
deconatrati ons and upon t he publication of the party . It 
wa a reported that the 1949 ail1tary coup (ll'usni Azza 1 1.ml 
was inspired by the intluence or the Arab R•aurrectiordat 
Party. It 11 ..... ,.int to find out that ti:• party encoure.ses 
and supports the aro:y tor aeizing power and very shortly 
thereafter they turn out -sa1nat their author1tiea, accusing 
thee either ot being prejudiced agaJ.nat c•rtain political 
groups or under a dictatorship. The Party encouraged and 
aupported all Arrz11 aovec•nts 'Which took place between Jr:ay 
20 , 1949 , and February 19, 1954, and oppoaed all or thee tor 
the 1az.e reason. To oppoa• dictatorabip and terrorism during 
the last lll111tary rul• or Colonel Adib Aab1abakl1, tho PArty 
amalgamated with the Arab Soc ialist Party , llhich bad the • ..,.. 
political, s ocial and ecc-noi:ii·c pr ogr am . Party 1 1 leade r a 
(Akram 1Houram1, Al'lak •nd Albaitar), under tl•• pol itical 
pressure ot Asb1ahakli1 a rule, fled to Lebanon and then to 
Italy becau.ae or t b•1r atrong opposition anc! danger ous plot . 
\hen a ll convicted political ~igurea ••r• gi v•n toe.tr pard.ona , 
they returned bo~e on J· ly 11, 1953, and continued their op-
poaition. In 1953, they signed ~1th tho National Party, the 
People'• Party and oomo independent Home• Pledge t o stand 
against dictatorabip corruption, not only i n Syria but 1n all 
Arab countries . Very aoon they organized riots and deQonstra-
tiona against Colonel Aabiabakli until their atrugi:-le intluenced 
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tho Army, which roapondod to their appeal and ousted 
A1bi1bakli and nor=ali•ed the S7rian democratic lite. The 
conclusion ot that mutual atru&al• was that the llational 
Part7, tho People's Party &nd 1ome 1ndopondent1 fori:ied a 
government . Tho Arab Reaurrootioniat Party, being let't out , 
accused the mentioned Part1ea 01 being reactionary element• 
which w&ntad to re1w:.o the old corrupted policy. '!'ho Part7 , 
co- operating •1th other political tl.Jn1res, auggeated that a 
neutral government conduct t he country during the oloction 
and th&t decision wa a made by Parties •hich sl. nod Ho:oe 
Pledge. A neutral gOYerm:ent , neaded b7 Said Algharti, wa1 
foni:od and a tree election took place 1n September and 
October , 1954. All Partieo and political groups partici-
pated and tho Arab Roeurroctioni1t Party gained 16 aoata. 
A coolition governiHnt, ca:opo1ed ot the National PartJ 
(beaded by Sabri Alaaali) , tho Democratic Bloc and tbe Arab 
Ro1urrccti oniet Part7, agreed upon a foreign policy to keep 
Syr1en neutrality between tho E•atorn and Weatorn Campa and 
to oppeae tt!e policy or alliance and to aup·,ort Arabian in-
dependent national policy. 
The Muslom Brothers . 
Although the ~ualec Brother• have a r•ll.aioue leaning, 
the7 did , however, influence the Syr1e.n hi1torical political 
lite. Their role cannot be ignored. 
In 1928 Haaoan Al bann •a and bie associates formed th• 
fir1t organization tor the ~:uel•m Brothers in Egypt and 
spread t ho influence to a major Party or tho Glaai population 
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1n tte Arab world . 
It 1• a pure Ielaml.e organization trying to bring the 
prineiplee ot Islam eloeer to being praoti~•d ae major rule• 
tor the Isl.,.!c •Oeietiee (article 12 of the organization pro-
gran) . <49) It i• the V.uale. Brotllera• viewpoint that Islamic 
prineiplea are rich enough to regulate a U aapecta af our po-
litical, ooci•l and eeon~ ie atfaira. It ia the firm belief 
ot that group that the Ial.,.1c principle• aro elaatie and 
could be interpreted to meet the roqu1remonta of the modorn 
century . 
Alas ot the Orsani~ation . 
The ~'Uale~ Brothora' organization haa canr objeotivea, 
ouch as the otudiea or cturan, the knowledge of 1ta interpre-
tations, knowl edge of Juri aprudence, and all Arabic classica . 
It ia tho Quran and it1 knowledge , an<1 t~• Arabie elaaaioa 
that kept eloae connection and underetanding between the 
component parts or the Arabian nation througbout her vaat 
territoriee during the paat fourteen centurie1. Islamic 
aources or legialation, according to th• principles ot th• 
.._'llnn, Precept (what the Prophet llui>•-•d had aaid or done 
in h~• 11to), Precedent and t!:e t;n&n1mitJ (ti.e unanl.Jtoua de -
cision or tho Ialamic juriaprudonts on a certain solution) . 
Political aims , auoh aa to bring the ditterent Islamic groupe , 
aecte and elaasea together and remove whatever diasonts they 
have to oake a strong and aol1d Ialaaic nation on the bas1a 
ot firm faith in IalU11 Econo:Uc &J.aa, auch as tne growth or 
140) Seo tEo program or clie lfua1e"' flrot:i'.ora, published 61 the 
Halab branch . 
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the national wealth and raia1ng tho standard ot living: 
National and political aims, such as to rsoist imperl.aliam, 
to liberate t he Is lamic nation from the foro1gn influence 
and to conduct to Islam unity and support aince inter-
national co-operation waa nocesse ry to ontablish a good 
state which would carry out practical Islamic principles and 
Islamic teachings and to participate in ths establishment of 
international peace and un1vorsal c1v111zat1on on the basis 
of human understanding and human spirit . C5o) These aims 
could be reached through bringing a generation to the firm 
faith that Islam is a religion and a state . 
In 19~7 these principles began to move from Egypt to 
all Arab countries generally and to Syria particularly . C5l) 
Many branches were opened under different names in Damascus , -
Hanna, Homa and Halah . T*oese branchea were united under ono 
name, "Muhammad Youtba . " In 194-4 , tho Jluslo~ Brothers 1n 
Syria bold a convention in Damascus . A Central Committeo was 
elected to be cantered in th$ Damascus permanent office and 
to be conducted by tho general guide, "Alshiekh Jrustafa 
Asseba'1" , and they called themselves "The Yuslem Brothors . " 
This organization is united with the Nua lem Brothers in 
Egypt both i n naz;;o and 1n purpose . 
The Organization Activity. 
Shortly after its organization tho Wuslem Brothers en-
gaged in a wide scope ot socll.al activit1ea. T"oe Arab Insti-
tute was established 1n D<unaseus to provide elementary and 
(56) See the ~ualam Brothers a g roat Islamic Uovement, by br . 
I .r~ . Alhusaini . Also oes Th• Muslom Brothers• Program, 
~Our _~im•. ol: our ~ririciple~", .!'~!? · .by llalah office . . . 
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n1gn sc~ool educa~1on . A hc~s~ ror p~b.&.1cat1cn was estab-
1i ~ned and a n&wsp•r r be~an to eppear u.nder tr-e na:e "Ala=-
ne r ", the cnl1 £.btenmont . Al au a textile compar.y was 1·ound.ed. 
in Halnh . ~!any suu - co111. .. 1 t tees were ror:ned tc. de•i with tno 
ooelal , pol1t1col and cultural afft1rs . 
:n the slxt~ cenrerence the l"uslem Brcthtrs h&l4 1n 
Y•brood 1n ... yria 1n l•4G, th&y brleted tne p"bl~e op1n10n ot 
t::e!r ;roEX'9.l:a a.s roJ..&.O•S : - 11 Liberet1c:: and unity ot the 
Nation . ~a1nta1nln~ lts faith on tno boaia ot Islam!c oocial 
re1·orm . • 
\Vitll tne co- operation 01· ~1fferent groups they exerted 
every i:oos1bl6 errort to oppose and reolat 1m~or1ollsl!l and 
riyit sect dissent• and rellglouo d!•;Nt•s . f'lnai:y a call 
ror retcr:::.ng tt.e ~orni.ptec fOVe!'":l.%enta1 macb.inery b>• en-
rorce:::ent .... 1 t1.e la• .-1tnout pl"•!udlce to ar.yone, ree:5rdless 
01· bl.a rel1e1on, sect and nationality , came t·orth . 
On tnc bt>.•1• ot those aol1d Ia1m:11c p1•1nc1pleo the uuslem 
Brotnera partlc1pated, 1·or tne t1rat time , in the ca,1pai~ ot 
t~e 1~47 e~ec~ion ana r.any eand1detes •ere electett for Da~as-
cue • 
... n~ ur::e .• 1:at1on 's .>tand. on tn S'J.c~es•1ve oov1n"..::.ents . 
l' .e .~usJ..u:.s .t)l:"u~n ra tire l1ke ali utt.er pcl1t1co.t -.:er~1ea , -
d1Sl6~1$f1ed. \'11th tno reJ.uctant and. he9!.tant poa1t1on ot· the 
oucce.ss1ve ::>yr"-an governmen1,,a 1n rer.ard tu tne :r.ejor poll.tical , 
aoclal and economic 11au.oa . ·.i.h.ey were keeping an open eye and 
•atch~n~ w-1.th eb101ute Clspleasure. .he M 1lem Brut~ers used 
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tbe1r 1n1'luence in tn& society and part!.c1pated w1 th the 
other pol1t1col groups to stir tno pooplo•s anger ond to 
create ag1tot1on against tho ~alinr elements . !he grestest 
issue thst broUfftt about tt.e Y.uslem Brothers• an8er was the 
reluctant Stana or enc ~yrian gov~rnment on tne quest1on of 
tJale0:>t1ne . 'i'be t.tuslem Broch.ers sent & d1v1s1on or volun-
teers t o portic1pete 1n the l1oerat1on . 
Flna.lly, the !:u.slec Brot.ners participeted in the elec-
t.ion or J..~4.\1 end gs.ined t\'i'V a ea ta . .;.'hey formed, with two 
representatives in t.Oo l'8rJ.1ament, a bloc 'Nh1Ch was kr.own os 
"'l'nt: ls.Lamie ::$0c1a11st Front. . " In tnc liat1onsJ. Assembly ot 
1~4~ th~ MUsiem Brothers demanded that i•l•m must oe included 
in the Condt1tat.1on as "tn.e oJ:'.t1c1a.L r~ligi~n ot' i...ce state, 
but lete.1.y tney nave acct:ptec an amendmen~ of' that tenn a."\d 
agreed t~ nave tne religion ot tne scate 1 s head .slem nnd to 
have Islam as tfi6 main so~ree of legislation . une of their 
representatives (~!Unammad Aimubark) ha• part1c1pated ln many 
3uceesa1ve cabinets end g1ven tnem a w1oe popularlty . 
lu6 
CuNCUJ!:il~N 
Pare1e• Aceivltles (l\14~-l\IS~J 
t'art.ies i11·e pas~ed tt1ruugh two main eras in the period. 
under rev1e'' . 
l . Prom th• mi11oary coup of 8r1gecier Genorsl 
Husni Azza1m, V.ay :3v , l~4~ , up to the aign-
1ng of the Ho;i>e Pl8<1ge ot' :;eptember, l \lo3, 
by most 01 en~ pol1t1ca~ Parties to resist 
any Kind or dlctetorship. 
2 . From the date of s1gn1ng the mentioned Pleage 
eo the o.ecJ.e:ratlon 01' ~ne Con$t1eu&iona.1. rule 
or OCtObtt1·, 1~&4 . 
of poll.tico..1 awakening among 1..c.t1 mass of pvpuJ.a\.1on wh1cn 
brvugnt. about trlt:i o.oc1arat:1uo ot tbe 1950 COn3tieu~ion and. 
ttne !,a\.1onaJ. l"ledgu ur l~o>.:> oec.we~n r"arc.1es tv st.a."lo againut. 
nun- ovndt.l. tul..1011al rule . 
un },{ay ;x> , l\#49 , ($4:!J Br1gad1er GcnersJ. Husn1 Azzaim 
se1zeQ po-.·1er in ."::tyr1a end. o:J..1;:11;ed i'resid.eni; Shukr1 P.lquowatli 
a:'ld. n.1~ goven\ment . Azzaim 1nv1teo a1.l pol1tlcn.L part:ies to 
part1c1po.te ln a nai;ione.1. govornmen't 1·orma~ion bu't the par .. 
t i es d1d not respond to that 1nv1eet1011, which led Azza1m ~o 
cond.\;.Ct the government himsei.1· and. to fol.Lov1 a policy of 
terrorism ageinst partles 1 op;osltlon . '1he A~ab Resurrec -
tion1st ~arty, whicn we~ in oppoS1't1on auring A.q~owatli•s 
reign , could not agree •111th Azza1m. The leaders of 'the 
(52J S!1daJ.e East Jvuma1, v . 3, N'o . 3,' Julyl~4~, p . 327, and 
also 31.ldole .t:ast Jou:me.l , v . 4, no . 1 , Jan~.lary 1950 , p . l . 
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l\ational Partj"' could not. co-operate wit!l h1m e1ther . .rhe 
Arab nesurrect10n1at Party, which supportea th~ m11itary 
eoup a •etat ln tne earlier days of ene coup and wnich hoped 
tn&t tnia couy wu·1ld bring about e. re1\.1rm, 9'.lve poJ.1"t1csl 
11'bort:,• 0..91Q o-.:st tho eorr.ipted elements in the OJ.O reg1::ne, 
we.a a1s.appo1nted that nothing as sue.b W$S i.ntrociueed. . 'J..b.e 
P"rt:,· sent t:o tne Army a. leader (AzzqimJ \'litn rr.any rto-ees 
sugge3elng that a neutra.L government be 1·urmea t:o cvna.uct 
a 1·ree election . Also h.e :>arty repreaent.ed ma~y suggestions 
to solve the e~rrent pol1t1ce1, soc:al and economic problems 
but Azzalm could not give tnm any cons10.erae1on. 'l'ne :'-.... ;;tlem 
Brothers urganizat.ion, s1m1.Larly , submitted a ~e~orandum de-
mana.1ng tne rise of tne nat10~ 1 s moraJ.1ty , faith anc sp1r1t . 
A trial or respons1bJ.ti t1J.emo11t.:j ln tht: past .t'ttg1me was also 
demanded nna. a fomation 01· a consultive r-11e ws:s G.:!!pnas1zed . 
Azza1~ , rol1owing h1S personal aea1re fur dictatorsnlp , 
svon solvea pol1vical l"ort1es and 1mposec. atrlCt ce11sorsh1p 
to set r1a of •h~1r opposition . He was not sat1&f1ed wi"h 
~ant but went mu.Ch tUrtrter, arre$ted many part1esr leaders, 
tor'turec. trtem severe!:;, such as ;;ne leader o 1· ;;nc Arab ~esu r­
rect1onis~ Party, ano treated others b&dly , sucn ss ?aisal 
Alaso.11 , .Leader of tne ~ciaJ.iat Cv -operat1ve Party . ?7ore .. 
over, ne hanaea ovor Anton ~e 1 ada, leader of tne Syrian Nation -
al ~c10.J. ~arty , tv ine Leoanese government for exec~tion efcer 
he had promised aim t.lO suppcrt 01· nle revo1ut1on.&ry mov~ent . 
Commun1s~s haQ no better luck than tne otner parties . Tnis 
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pol1ey of terror11-: meant to 11q~ica~• pe:.·t1es' act;1v1tle3 . 
vn hugust l~, l~4w, tne =1!\tary coup led by ~olone! ;;a~1 
Her;n1aw1 took plsoe and parties ro3umed their pO!it1cal ac-
t1vit1es . 
Ve'!'T :aocn Ha:in1am AJ..atas1 .!'ore.ea a n&tior.e .. govem:rie:lt(S.!i) 
1·ro:: tee Peo;le Part.y, the .. .:at1onal Part7, tne A:oab Resarree-
tion1st ?ar;7 ~nd ~~ i~depenaencs . lr.~or t;ne auporv1s1on 
ot th1.s rove:nment • natlc!'lal eJ.ectlc·r1 ror eaae::bly too4 
place, anc: i·ur tn• 1·1rst t;lme tht S7r1Gn wol!!en par&1eipaced 
1n ttJ.e o.J.ectlon . •J.•.ne Peopl e 1 s Party • a1ned 4~ seats out 01· 
i..t.6 seats . :;ell t'ert1ea ent:ereci Par.l1ar.i~nt, aucrt as the .Arab 
.-<ea;J.rrttction!..st Part/, wr:.icn i:;ainee tnre eeecs, anc:. t?:le 
Syria:: :;ac1onal :.lOC!.el Par:.7, •h1c~ einecl t.wo seats . ln 
?ar ... 1a:en-c a new blc.>O ••a l'oMed or ro~r me:Ders klO'«n as 
" l'te I:J.a::n1c .>:lic1ai.i.1St Fr ... nt . • ·:t.e :a\.lona.1 Party qu1-c tne 
eJ.ect.1on ot1·1c1.a.L..1.j ou" .so:ne membtr3 of tne Pt.rt7 part1c1-
patocl in tne election on tneir own ana aome ot th,.,,, we t"e 
elected, ouL ttLey nad no ten,::1'o.1.t: role in tt'le Parliament . 
lne ~oc1ai1~t ~o-uioretive Party was repr 1ented by one mem-
ber !..n tt:.e !.at1onai A••~biy . ":'!:.e Co::iunlata 'ttere :i.ot recog-
n1zea L~a tee aec~r!t: autn~ri~!ee were er~er tnen . 
Dur1.ng tne pe:r1od unc.._,r rev1e (1;1 .. a-.1. 1.05J .&nj" cr:..t!cs.1 
~-.iulltlce..1. even a took place in ~j·r1a, '11th1cn 1noluded tne po-
l1t1cal tendeno1ea, ouch aa i;ne existence or tne 1;:ris.n ttepub · 
.Ll.c , the .fate 01· i.nt:t NatiO"":.e.J. Asse:nbJ.y 'no tne Con:st1 c.u t.1un . 
~o~ever, parties act1vlt1es recained v...~der tne control of tbe 
( 53) ~·e ''!au!• FA.., .. f, J"'..o.r.'lAT, v. 3, !lC . 41, p . -;r~·r.------
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police . Furtn6rmore, par&ies in thtt !ia t1ona1 :..sseZ1bly 
per..:.oc. ·11ere divided into two factions , - one 'Knl.eh supported 
"Che present s1tua't1on and t.he ot.her \Vh1ch endeavored. to re-
sume the AJ.C\UO\'/&. cJ.1 reg1me . \Yn1l& 'tne l.Ja:c 1onaJ. A~semb.t.y YJ&.8 
working on tne Constitution, a i·ront wDs t·ormed 01· the Nstion-
u Party , tnc .>eclaJ.is't> :o-operatlve 1"a1•ty , the H.~pub.Liean 
Yerty, ana cne xepubl1ca.n Democratic Ysrty(~~) wn1cn, on J~~e 
l~, 19!:>v, 1ssueo a joint necLnrat1on 1n wh~cn they ettacked 
tbe i-:at1onaJ. As~embJ.y and. con~l.dered t.r:& ola. Co!"lst.ltu.t1on as 
l egel an~ a.Lao de~s.nded the reswnrtlon vf tne Parliament. which 
hsC been solved by ~usnl Azzaim. From tnat Parlia~ent a 
roverrunent sl1oul d be formed or a plebesc1te or new e1ect1on 
crust be taken under tr.:t:i $Uporv1sion of a neutral government, 
accordinf to th.e prov1.s1ons o!' t;nu olc. t:vn$t1 tut ion . ·1·ne 
leadors u1· the nent1oneci P&re1es on Au.t,'"USt 24 , lY5v, .Led a 
de~onstrat;1on to the Republican Palace to subc1t their demands, 
bu t no att;ent 1on was paid to them. 
J.'llC tlat1onal Pa~T;Y 's po.LlC~' 1~ this concern was meent to 
disturb the success of cne ll&tionnl Assemb l y but no delay or 
dOJ:l8ge resulted from qu1tt1n& the election . Anoeh•r election 
m1 -',tlt give a enance to tne l'e re:i t<; re tum to pc.vier . In re -
gal"d tCJ ,;ne i dea of caJ.J.in~· .ri.lquov.a,;11 ge.cr: to pO\ier, the 
Ps1•t.y ,,·as divided on 'th&.'& question . f, part 01· the me:nburs 
\'1ere for h1m. I'le\•ertneles:.; , the l'a.rty 1 s efforts brour,ht no 
results due t o tne i·act that on September 5 , l95u, tne new 
l 54) 'lnl• Republican Party w• • eaeab11sned 1n :1.me, "TS-SO, and 
lnc.iuded :r.any ot• Alquowe tl1 1 s supportera . 
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Cc;..r.ot1tut1on we.s an!lc-.mced and t::.e J:•t1on&.-. A1:.e'l:lbly ws.s 
c:Canc:ed l.lltO Par.L1a:.\tmt. and tno !'arty re::.&!.~ec OU't or pc•er . 
;·no fo!'ty t'1nelly 1gnored. tho ner.atlvo pol1c7 or co- oper&t1on 
w1t.h other ;l0.1.11,..lc&J. part1e" and. i:·art1c1pai.tea 1n succe3s1ve 
toven1:i.ents -..?::cc cs. e 1nte ;xiwer e!tet' Culot.ol ;..sn1thakl1 
had been ousted . 
hltnouF,n tee leader of the ~uc1i11a~ ~o-op6re't1ve Party 
( FaisaJ. 1\losal1) re:n&1ned under arrest, aJ'ter t:he s econd w.111-
eary c~up (AU@'~•t 14, lJ49J , a "'lltacy c.it.rt tried h1,r, and 
relee.aed :um r1>r e '-h!le . l't>r that reason n1s fartJ $1ded 
•1th tbo l"atic~&: ?sr-:y aga!.nst. th• People'• ?a!"&1 ,gove'r'"".....;:ient 
L~c s..:pport.ea '!.!'.t: .!oya!t..y ot 1..n~ rto;rub!l.c&r. afbt~ . ..:r. J:;eco:-
ber 19, l94g, the t~lrc. ~111tary coup d'etat took plece u:~er 
Colvnol Ash1sr...akl : 1 s lead.erslUp wr.1ch abo.!.1shed ~he J:atto:-:.e.l 
Aaae:-.bly ar.a abcc.oned tn C-0nstl tut1on . A.Lasal.1 , le&der or 
t.h• ..:o-o,.oral;!ve ?ari. , J.01·t the CO\m~l""'.l fur two y6&.rs and 
rGtumed home v:be;. PrG31d.·~nt Aah1.,r.akl1 prvr.i_sed to bring 
aovut ae10ocrat1c per11ar1ontar:' 111'• · ·"&1••1 Aiasal1 exchen~ed 
vlewa V.'ltc As!lishskl1 \Ytl.1ch resulted in tr.e t'ormer recognizing 
tho rJlO of tne l&tter ar.~ aecldlne to •upyort ti~ . he a~­
~o•J.C'C to the pe"~le to c!cse ranks a •• d to be more realistic 
1.n r•D~1ng tee ns~1cna1 l~tern~J. and exterT1eJ. ;1'.;ble~s beceuse 
or tn• roedtness o~ t~o present £0VCr :.mont ~v .:enc.;,;.ct rreo 
eleotio~s an~ to bring about e eon4t1tut1ona! eoverru:1ent . 
Altnous,o that Ashi&af..l.1 ree1•• eona1 cted an election on Sep~em­
b•r v, 1¥!;)~, no re.rt:;- cv- Cl~br&ted , l.11elud1ng t.he .soc1al1.st 
Cu-vpera r.1 ve Po.rt~ . ·4·ne }:u.1..1 \.10¥.J. a1 tiJa ti.on remained. as it 
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cei..- ano wv::. t'l'Q seatc, '"'::.e or t..b.e:a bel.n~ :·vr Fa!.se.1. AJ.asal1, 
tr:e rert:-'s .i.oader. (fS) .r.e Rep\:l.bl1can Democr•t1c : arty prac -
tiseCl tompcrsry act1V1t1es C!u.r1ng the re:nal.nd.or 01' tn" por1od. 
o~ tt.o Xatio:l&.1. Asae:tbJ.:y but coula r.ot aurv~v1 wne:i Po.Llt.lcal 
part1ea regained tno1r po~1t1ca1 treedva . Tocay lt 1s CQr.-
sider•ed 1n the Stl.\;ue ot non - ex1atence as • Party Out not by 
of r1e10.J. e-... tno r-1 t.1. "'" • .Lt: ''s s rneroJ.y .s el x·- :,ulut1on . As J'or 
par~1•a that were repreeented in che ~ationel Assembly and 
r;y, tr.o k\l3.1.G .(!rot.: .. r , r;:ne Arab K•~urrect1on1 a t tarty and 
the .;XJC1ai1~t Co- oporktive ~arty . 
Tto People•s Party u. tll ~ay .3CJ , 1~4~ , ••• 1n tne oppo11-
t1on wnicl ,•rt1c1 ated le t:ce n1tio~a1 go\.·ern:e:.t ro:ii:.eo or. 
Aus~at 14, 1954 , oy n~vn~~ Alst.a11 •~0 t~e l••d•r 01 the Farty 
{f{U..unc.1 Al.ie1kn,ya) ''••-=- t:l.Vt:9n line pva\. <>1 l.n\.or1u.r •?1.1S\.&r . tte 
pis.yea \rtlc Jl'l&lll t•o.1.u J.n i..c.a't uovcr:'mltn\., S\.1.ovd. ageins\. 1\0.ta po-
l1 t.1C&.L vppune::-:.ta a:1c. ce1·endea \.!le taax. ul t.llO !'atione_ Aa .. e:-
bly , PJr\rnoriore, n~ calied rur ••~·uus sction t ~ brL~g a~uut 
Arabian union . As an lnd1cat.ion of ~:ood will, tne i>art)~ en-
Ceavoroa to br1n~ abo~t a series of ecuoom1e, cu!ture.1., mili -
tary and pol1c!cei treac~es 8$ aoon &3 ;>oas1bla between the 
evor, t.hc t art; au1·rcr0Cl polii:.lcal pre.s ... uro oeg1nn1ng trom 
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octcbor 2u , 1~49 , •~e~ Colonel A1h1ena~l1 se1~ed po•er and 
ellm1netec Sam!. ;.J..n!..r..::asi. anc n1• aaaoc1!1ites t-!"C= t.o.e A'r""::Y . 
'Jnere waa cot any a~reez:.ent or co-operation oe:;we-en the .rar· 
t}· ar~o ~u.lvnuJ. Ashisz:ak.11 . T.h•1 r d1J terences resu: ted rrom 
tho current. lnterferenc e of' Asn1shakl1 1n tne 1·ormstion of 
tn• Cabinet ena the a.is c ~ibut1on or poses arnonp p,ovbn'l.ment 
n1n!.3t.Or3 . Aan1sne..u1 CJ.aimed t' o.t t.htt .-iepuoi.LC 's ex1st -
enct1 ••• \.n1~e£tcneo &.:10. 1·01· tna1.. pa?'tl.CJJ.ar rea!ton he was 
Ju~t.11·1ea ln nls lntervont1on in t.r.e tlOtter . .ne cajor1ty 
the\. 1upportee t:.e People's tari.y (411 01· 1!6J l:'l t::o Xat1on! l 
ri11e:ibly were g1ve3 a e=.anee to cl1r1:'y tne ?a~Ly 1 a ttoa~re 
to 1ntJ.uence t~le ~·e tio:ie.L Aaae:biy to br1ng: abo1 t .o. ~y:'lQl\ -
.r1.n1...r. u.~10 ~EJ:11 Al..c.in:.a•1, ex- ch1et ot stat:, a..~d t~e 
fe~;l• ' • tart, ere 1~ co~p1eie usr•u:ent in tnet re~ard . 
But the e.i.11.1.netion of' Al!linnaw1 enc. ni.a 1!1..1,pp.orters !'rom the 
Ar.ey brou :nt in !1ew of.ricor~ who oeJ.1ove t~t Syr1s should 
ro~n•1n an 1ndep.;;ndent ttopubJ. ic . 'J:ne Cu.ionel, Ashtshakl1 , 
and n1s n~w Starr· of ot'ficera 1\>unded a parlia.centary bloc, 
aap,ortea tne Aro.y and oppo30o t ne Peup!0 1 ~ Party majcr1ty . 
All parl1uicntf!r; a1s::.is3lt.Jr>S ln tnat regard voere upened 
ano carried ou< <o <ne p.;blie e~1n1on bJ' <lie p,..11 . ;.shl.•ak-
1~ de1on~o~ ~-:self by ;ne ?r-esa ana b1 a 1orle~ o: spe~c~t~ 
b• delivered. in ;t.e Q1..:.!tar;.~ OCC(ISlcns an~ '!r.sls.ted "~a: the 
X1n1ttrj~ o! I>etense cus.t re=ain 1 ~ne nones 01· & :n1l. itary 
man , F'awz1 .:;olu 
'1·11• ct~isis oeeame .:..eriou.s 1!", l'd5v when a representative, 
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!0:u."l1r Alage.Lar;1 , was arrested on ~up-:.e!rlt>er 'l!.7 , l'd!N, and Y1as 
tri ed beturo o c1xed (mll1tery a.~d e1v111an officers) Court 
for n.1gb. treason . ~n ~~ptem~er 29 , l~SV, a search wa~ =ade 
by the m1J.~ta~J autnor1t1es of some representat1ves 1 homee 
who s~p~orted the ~yrlan~Iraqien union . on vc~ober 12, 195v, 
Ashlshakli 1 s l ife was tried by Huea1n !'oun1g '"ho was 1n:sp1red 
03· the People ' .:i. Pe rty . 
!lq govem:nenc. au.ring cne per1oa unaer rev1e;1 succeeded 
in 3tay1ng 1n pOt'•Gr lcng because ot tne uneasy intemeJ. c1r-
Cum3ta.nce3 . On !iovember <?~ , l\l~J. , tne e.r.ny arrested the 
l eaders of tfl;e t'eopl e 1 :; Pa r ty v:i th .sorr.e inaependents . ASh1sn-
akl1 accused t hem of unaerm1n1ng the exi s t ence uf cne ~~ate . 
Tnac act ion "' as taken b ecause tne Pe-0ple 1 s Party t '1rmly d.e -
tem1ned. to e~.;:ineer a revolution agn1ns t e govorn:nent !'onned 
by Dr. ~aar<>uf Aavwalioi ~,d nad ma!cr ne~1onal support . 
~iever\.heles~ , tne People 1 a Pert:,• remained 1n pcuer i·rvm 
June 6, l\ISu, to )Jay b , l~~i.,. unaer 'tt:.e pre::n1er3o1p of 1"r . 
~iadhum AlG.u adso . !t v1as 1n "W.1s period that the Conbt1tut10n 
o!' September 5 , 1~50 , was a.ii~ouncea . 'l.'he Const1t.ut.10J) had 
A1•ab1an na t ional.. c narac"Cer &;.. wel l a.s a rr.octerate aoe1aJ.13 t 
cnareeter . Or . Ai quodso pre:iented n1s p:"o j ec t to tl1e pol1 -
t1caJ. CO?mlittee of tne Arab :>tates League to reac~ any 1·orm 
of i-·ederst1on a:non~ these states . Also , ne ciec1aroo tne 
~yr1an neutrel1t y oel;wet:n tne us t ern and ,1estern camps . 
Ptany aa.m1nistrar.1ve ro.t'oms were introduc ed a:'ld roany toro1gn 
CQ:npanie.s v:ere na t 1ona11zea1 sueh as ::.a.lab and Damascus 
e1ectricicy co=pan11a . 
i'ne l~<>l cll1t•M coup <Petet led by A•n1•r.ai<l1 .... di-
rected againet tn• Peup~u ' ~ Yercy. Ho~ev~r, tne ~ast eiec-
tlun p.r"OVt.tCl tnat lt had los't pop<J..lar1'!i ••t:~ou"",n lt st1..1.l 
ce1d a propor:10~11 p1r11ament ary major1ty . 
'f:ie l!ualc:i U1'.ltner~ ~t=-~1c1peteu 1n t • 1;1t1on1.o. ~3se.::­
bly , f&~ed t~O Sllta, ar.a orwe~, irith t•O re,resontat.1vea, 
t.':.e Iala:nlc O>UC11J.1at .?Nnt . Tnev Qeronaed the!.r PN£ra!r:S 
a.,o particlpat.ed 1n :r.ar;y cabin ets and £&1ned ne o:'l&J. ,,upport 
and w1d!e popu 1a r1 ty . Although the l!uslom Jlrothers orran1zn-
t1<1n was n1soolved dur1nr A•h1 s~kl1 ' • rei~n en Janu•r:r 17, 
1~!:>2 , it resumed aet~v1t1es when tne conat1tut1onal i1fe waa 
rete !..ned . it:o)• c1l.d n~t per'tic!.~a te 1n tne olec tlon b::.t they 
tn.lppor~ec. otnere wl".o rei'!'. sent.ea t..c.c ano 1:,-::po tr.!.zed ~th 
tno:ia . 
J:ne Arab tcr:a- rr11etionis~ Part: 1 &1 tor tr.c.i cownt'ail of 
ttusn1 Azza1m 1 s re1gn 1 partici pat ed 1n th~ nationpl rovernment 
ot' ha.s.nim A.lat.a .. 1 e ,ct coJ¥1pai gneci tvr t.r..b .,1eot1vn a:-.o won 
tnroe s~a~a . ln lV50, repr~sentat1v~ Akrt.~ howran1 r~::::.ed 
tnc A.rob :-soe:.c.l1st P1?"ty w-!.tn r.r..e lllm v1· at1mulet.1:'1J. tne 
J.rao1a...,, Na't1on by ret""rn!:-.e- t:o l;be or1F:ln1l ep1r1 t o~ a united 
3overC!E'J'l nation anc by streng~ne~ir.6 th.c.t :cvere1znty tnrcur~ 
e :-.o:Jtroi. ~ttnd bet•••~' tr:ie t.ast. and ti:e 1eat . -rn1$ partj• 
spreed 1n fGMG pr-ovince .. Alno111·r5n1 ' a nor.i.e tu1n1 - tr.:.en expand .. 
ed to tno viJ.la(eJ ot ro()zr.e , Al!'!ls 1 ar'8.h one Ha.1.ob . •_-no person-
ality u~ nlnowrbn1 •l~ost ere&~ed t~e Fert7 •na r.is po~icr 
regitra~ne ~~c •bvl1t1on ~1 ~c.~ fE~da! •7•te= e..na ~he preeer· 
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v1ticn or t.be rey.::..b:!ce'l re1sn •r• res ons1ble .rol' h!s 
Aan1an,kl1 lro r0£8 rd to the :a1n 11.nea ur tno J.rPblan 
nat1on6! pol1cy but they disagreed after tno letter•s 
m1J.1 tar:" cuup d' ets.t to resi&t Asn1an,l-tll '3 01ctatorsn1p. 
A.1.nuwrani D.JOl.Lg&matec. nil;i l>arty to the Are.b i!!'~urroct1on1st 
Party ma kin; " The Arab ~-birth .;.;oc1a.L1at Part:. . 11 ·rn1.s 
a.;nalgamt.t1an was an 1~portace pcl1t1c1! evtnt , probably one 
or ene c~ st u:po:-ta"t s~ce l\149 . ~110 A:-ab .l>-t>1rth ::.oc1al-
11t -.·ari.1 nad resi.st.ed tne reign 01· .Aah11n11kll by evocy 
6v11J.IO.ie ac:an:t, !...-.e!uc.~:i.c .seer•t pub11c•tior:s , J.eac!lns 
c!ollcna tra t!.or:s &.!!.d e::courag1ni; a r:icd revol ·J t 1o:t . ;.:!l! sb.akli, 
tO coot ~hct &t!iavion, !::!prisoned ~o...~y Cl tr.e ~arty 1 : ~~p-
por~ers , ospec1aiiy studen~s and teachers, and tne three 
!ooclora (A!nowrsn1 , i.t!a.t anc:I llloa1t•r) l'loa out31de tho 
c<.>u.ntry . l'ney roi;urned ho:ne on ,T\l.Ly lJ. , J.q$J , 'Ahen tl'l& 
COnHtltut1on w*s aruiounced and pol1,1cal l1bert1es ~ere re-
eumed . Tn• Pe:ot· pereic1~Bted 1n 11omo ~J.edzo Y•ith otter 
p1r;1es but 01C. ~er:; ps.ri;:..cipate in tnu cvcrn:ient !"crced 
after Uio rev ... lt or i;he Army- enc t.ne p~oplu O:'l !-'eox-...:.sl"".! 25, 
or lo ntutreJ. F'CVe?T.m.ent; -:0 QOnduet I t'Or.:n&t!.on, Of !ree elee-
t1on where t~o ~&r~y ~ecur~~ sixteen soat1 1~ t~u present 
!'• rl1er1ont . <56l ::.n tho l'erty ' • ruro1en pcl1cr t"-e ::oa1n feature 
( 5(1)' 'Fvii •l••~ Part I es L1 r~ 1n ..,yria-;' 1'1ivB-19SS;" °-" l>!.H . 
1'\Jrzut , p . 2tiv- 262 . 
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is the neutrality between the Ea1t and the West and the 
liberation ot tne Arab countriea fr'-1 a11;1 tona ot foreign 
lnperialiaa. 'l'he ..ain feature ot itl d°"'ost1C policy 1a 
the enactment ot legialation to guarantee tho right• or 
Carmer• and laborers and to r alae the standard• ot livi.ng 
to a rea1onable l evel . C57 l 
Tne ~yrian National Socl.&l Party had reawoed act1v1t1e1 
wnen l!Uln1 Azzas.. waa removed from power . Also it partici-
pated 1n tne National Asaeably election and won t wo soata . 
That gain wae attributed to t.b• •:rmpethy or toe people after 
th• Part7'1 leader ••• executed 1n Lebanon . Th• execution 
of the Party'• leader was exploited tor propaganda during 
the eloot1on cempaign. AlthO'Ugh the Party'• activity 1n 
Syria expanded arter the exocut10< ot its leader, the cain 
principle ot tne Party's prograa (tho Syrian nationaliSl:l) 
met with incredible resistance because of tne citizens• in-
born deep feeli ng ot their Arabian Nationalism. It waa that 
incredibl e oppo11tion that obliged th• Party to play •1th 
word• to modify that har sh atand against the Arab nat i onaliam 
and uae the ter.11 "Arab Front• to include tne Arabs within the 
principles of tno Syrian notionaliam. '!'be recent interpre-
tation oaid , "Th• nations or th• Arab world a re brother 
na~1ona a.nd have their special characters •blcb are d i tterent 
trom th• cbaractera or other nationa in the world . Syri a baa 
(57) Political Partie1 Life 1n Syria, l908- l9Sti, by It . H. 
Perzat, p . 260- 262· 
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a =isa1o~ to tne Areb woria ana ta respons1~1e tor awaken-
1.ng the::.. (SS) !twt. t. 11 p:i~oso;i:.y dee:: e.ct ~ot tne ;.reb~tn 
nal;ional tren ... 1:1 S)·rla . 
Tne Arab L10era~1on ~ovement also supported ~sh:s~akli 
ataln .oi:-~ tne .i..atior perl!.l.t.t.e~ pclitical pert1oa to ~ct1on 
:mder tt.• $Upts:-v1s1.on or 't!?.e ttOVCrt.mmt . C5$J Hoa:ever, the 
failure of t~e rariyta car.d1datee in ~n~ eloctlon o~ uctober 
Y , lvb~, led tne Part" to attack Ash1snakl1 1a pyvemment and 
accu1e lt ur con•luet1n. a false election . ID t:1fl! J.oJ54 elec-
tion 'tbO Perey orc•nlzect. a succe1.-tul cupa..:.e;n arter 1.."ltro-
ciucl.ns c:a.n:t &::lend.:ienta c.o its main pr1nc1plea to ineot the 
oppoa1t1or. ot th• etubOOl"':\ Arab1en netlo~ai1am ond to soften 
~ne resent:ont 1.Jl' t!le !s.Lem:..c ma.jvri'-¥ · .a."'l''-1 P&rt., canaidate1 
wei~ eioc~ed b~t vn• 01 ~ne::i ~•• 1•~~:1 a1a~1aaed rrc~ Perl1e-
:ent bee• .ae ~l proven cnt:.rges •t•l.nst n1m cur1ns tne eiect1on . 
Tuday tho Party naa only one repre;entat1vo . It 1• the doc-
trine ut ~yrlan nat1o~elis~ that cor.tracicts tne AreD1e.n 
natlo"'.&11.s:a an-1 the 1nternaJ. orc;&:l1zae1o~ tr.st cor.t:-ao1cta tho 
ce=ocratic pr1nc1plee accordec it. auch a cool ruc~pt1on that lt 
ls unT1e..1.comod. on ~yr1tLn soil . 
~·110 Col!r!un1•t Porty was illegally operac1ng l'IUOt or its 
?ebr~1r1 2~, -~S.-., encountere~ t.ne c~at erlticai period 1n ita 
l1te. :ii:nt. ;· ar-ey 1 s prol.!linenc -=tnMO•rs su1 fe1-eci 1everel:.· in Ja 11 
end th• top leader• tlec ab Doad . ln spite ur th•t critical 
{:;;it;J /... ~ecturc., h1.. . .:., L"l ~.st!onei ~clai .uvc~rlno l.l.r.c.er °'he 
t1t..a.e «>!' •T~.c ::>yrlan l•&tiona.1. ~vc1~ .i. Arao!aci• Oj ;.s!'U Abm11yr1, 
t1ay .L~~4. 
(!;.~) Alo.Lona. ta Pavu1· tiu • .::J...)1 oal.eCI ~dpt.lfmoar J.4, l'do.3 . 
118 
situation the Cocmun11ta remained active . Tbe7 opposed d1c-
tatorehip. The7 ro1iatod the alliance a!U de!onae projeot1 
w1tb the flest . The oO-OP<tratod • itb Uhiahakli When he re-
jected tne proposed Middle Saat alliance and participated 
in the election of 1963 but no gain wae noted because the 
elec t ion was not t r ••· In the 1954 election the Coc:mwllat1 
organi&•d their Gampa1gn and nominated several candidatee 
from ditr•rent part• ot the Countrr but no one wa1 elected 
to Parliament except the Part7 1 e leader (Beclcdash) . T"no 
other candidates received a large number ot votee but not 
enough to enaur. th•= a oeat in Parl1-ent. That was the 
first tree election Syria ever bad and in 1pit1 or tne poli-
tical pressure on Syria from abroad tho relll l t or that elec-
tion 1nowed that the Cocmunlsts have supportera among the 
people an.l th• nezt election th•ir e:a1o ..ay b• doubled or 
tri;>led . 
The Communiata in their oleotion campaign advocated the 
establi1hment of a national front and propagated tor the oppo-
aition ot western ailitarr all1ancoa. ~1nall7, the7 aupported 
a parliamentary republic s7sten anj democratic troed0t1 . Fur-
ther:.ore, the7 called tor !'undamentol rerorme to include the 
intereete of farmera a!U laborere. tinally , the Arab Liber-
ation Movement Party wa1 tor.ned by Colonel Adib Aehiahakli in 
1~52 . A1hishakli wa1 a chiot ot 1tatr in t ho Syrian Arizry. 
In 1961 he eei&ed power with his supporters. Booauao of ex-
treme oppoa1tion t o hie rule by mostly all of the oxisti"8 
political parties, be eolved tnem on Aprtl 6 , 1952. It • • • 
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doubly noooasary tor nin to t"orm a party wit.1 pop~lar "'"P" 
port to o:alco his reign acceptable to public op1ll1on. To 
t!lat end, Aahilhakli co-oporat•4 •itll the laadero or the 
Arab Netional Party "established in 1947" which waa a local 
party, aaall in nWllber and non-1nr!uent1al . 
Altnough the Arab Liberation Movement waa ton:oed to sup-
port tne current regime, it• leaders did not give it any po-
litical character such ae a political Party. In practice 
thia oreanization waa tho only active group at the time . 
Othar political partiaa were forbidden tllat privilage. Thia 
Kovamant was eDf,aged in political activitiaa openly and au1>-
ported Aahishakli'• regime , using the govornmont•s 1n.tluence . 
Tho Arab Liberation Vovemont hae nothing new in its 
platrora. ':he Ar<>b nationaliem waa the main feature of ita 
progr&IO and the protection or tte republican eyet•• was th• 
outetand1ng aim or th• milita.ry coup d'etat led by Ashishakli 
and his eupportora in the Ar:ny 1n 1950. It waa promised that 
social ju1tice would be implemented, economic retorm would be 
introduced and •rib•• would be aettled. Theeco11C11ic policy 
emphaeized tte iaproveaent of the atate's abilities to br1ng 
about growth of tho no.t 1ona 1 weal t~l and to increase the 
national revenue . The state's uncultivated land••• to be 
distributed to farmers with encouraging co-operative QOYe ... nt• 
to aecur• auccess 1n agrieul tur• . 
Aa tor tbe foreign polio~, it was announced tbAt the Arab 
liberation in tbs Arab countr~•• had tne 1.laedi•t• priority 
and the ell.lr.1::iat1on or any foMD of foreign iaperiali&IO wa1 or 
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vit<ll 1aportance to tbo Vovem•nt . Certain attention waa 
given to the A""'1 by allocatJ.na a large part or th• budget 
'tO Clesenae . Jal1tar1 eervice beco.J c ... it...,nilaor1 ....._ ~ ... 
nll'.llbor uf .1-it•t7 unlta wore at loaat tripled and equipped 
with modern arms . 
On October 9 , 1953, Aahiabakli called tb• public and in-
vited all political parties to Join 1n an election. Aahi•b-
akli prepared h1a Party tor that election tar 1n advance or 
holdJ.na it. H• campaigned h1m1elt by viating all tho Syrian 
towna, del1vor!Jl8 epeocbos and propegatJ.na tor bi• Party, 
uaJ.ne tho lntluenc• ot the Govorment 1ncludint tbo nation.al 
radi eyotom. !lo Party participated 1n that election except 
hia Party which oocurod 60 aeata out or 70. Neither th• 
Collmlllli•t• nor th• Syrien National Social Party received 
any eupport . Ten •••ta wore tor independent• and tribe 
lead.era . However, tl1at parliament was ch.aracterized as a 
puppet, had no power and was uaed aa a shadow to legali:e 
Aah1ahakli'a authority . 
On Pebru&J7 25, 1954, Colonel Aahiahakl1 waa ousted 
from power which concluded the role or the Arab Liberation 
llovoment 1n that regime . Later tho Movement waa accused 
ot pertioipetJ.na 1n ao1•ing power illegally and •a• con-
sidered responsible tor the conaequoncoa ot that reg1"'e . 
nowev•r, the3e charges •ere defeated in Court and the Move-
ment waa proven to be innocent . ln tho prooent Parliament 
the Arab Liberation Vove~ent i1 represented by aeven repre-
sentatives but they have no co- operation a"'1 tor this reaaon 
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tho7 don't pro•ent auch a Parl1..,.nta%'7 rront as to inrLu-
once tuo dec1aion of l C'li8.llent 1n :. .• ~ .aJor ~ ••uo• . 
Hom11 Pledge Parties Coalition. 
In the ond of A•hi1hakli 1 s d1etator~al period it waa 
noted tbat parties in the oppoa1t1on, wr.tcb rerra1ned from 
participating 1n tbe elect i on conducted under Asbiahakli'• 
rule on October 9 , 1963, endeavored to sign a pledge to work 
together to undermine tho dictatorial nile . That co-operation 
was agroed upon and waa aigned by t ho People 1 1 Party , the 
l•ational Party and tho Arab Resur roct1oniat Party. SoQe in-
dependent• alao ai<.nod the Pledge . 
T"ne idea or co-operation &c.ong partioo began aa early aa 
1960 . Our1.Dg the work ot the National A11embl7 tue People•a 
Party tried to co- 01erate with pertiea 1n that Aasembly to 
meet the front ot oppoaition Which h9d been tonaed by the 
Peoplo•i Party outaido tho National Aaaombly but without suc-
cess . Parties in the National Aoeembly co-operated only in a 
national question •aupporting Egypt 1n her atand against Bri-
tain tor tLe 1936 treaty aboli tion• and "in the rejection or 
tt.e proposed oootel"n dotenae a llianco . • 
On Novei::ber 14, 1951, all political partiea po.rt1c1patod 
• mutual demonstration to aupport Egypt and to proteat the 
proposed Western do!anae alli ance . Betwoon November 29, 1961 , 
and February 25, 195•, •• a result ot disagreoment between 
parties 1n the National Asaembly , Ashiahakli'a dictatorial 
rule again appeared and ai.elYed the conetitution or that Aaaem-
bl7. That ji3;ute between parties could not be reco~cilod. 
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Party leaders could ne t t1.nd any workable way for agree-
ment . On April 6 , 1952, the Government headed by Fowzri 
Solu aolved tho tollowing parties, closed their offices and 
con!iscated their asseta 
l . Tho Arab Rosurrect1onist Party 
2 . The Arab Socialist Co-operative Party 
3 . The Syrian Nat ional Social Party 
4 . The National Party 
&. Tho Republican Domoc·rat1c Party 
6 . The People 1 s Party 
7 . The Islamic Socialiot Front 
On July 10, 1953, a neYt preoidontial constitution was 
declared and on Septecber 12, decree No . 47, regulating po-
litical parties, was issued. According to that decree poli-
tical parties were permitted to roaumo their act1v1t1o3 to 
a certain limit and their internal administration and finan-
cial composition had to bo subject to government inspection. 
Somo parties recognized that log1alation and adjusted their 
compooit1on accordingly, such as the Socialiot Co-operative 
Party and tho Syrian National Social Party, but some other 
parties rotuoed to adjust themselves to tho new legislation, 
indicating not only disapproval of the legislation but also 
not recognizing that regime and secretly working against it . 
In September, 1953 , a conference was held in Hocia and was 
attended by the leadel'a of tho People'• Party, tho National-
ist Psrty and the Arab Re-birth Socialist Party 1n an en-
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deavor to reach a aort or co-oreratlon to unite their et-
tort• tor brinaing more reaiatance to race A•hiahakli'a 
reign. P1n&lly, they agreed to fora a national front a:od 
i11ued a Joint C~mique in which they deir.•nded, on behalf 
ot the Syrian public, the eetabliebment or a treo and doco-
oratie life, freo or an;r form or internal and external pree-
auro, and pledged thomaolves to bring about tho following 
major point1 1-
1. No recognition or arcr torm ot authority except 
that it cac:e to power thro\l&b a purely deco-
cra tic channo l. 
2. Public freedom """t be relea1ed to make every 
citizen reel tl.at ilia liberty is ••cured by 
l•• · 
3. Protection or the Country trom botn internal 
and external conap1rac1oe . 
' · The Army is the nati on ' • backbone . It ia the 
nation's responsibility to buil t it up and 
etrengtben it so that it .,., aeeocpliah tho 
detenae of the Country. 
Th• mentioned above three pa.rtie1 quit tne 1953 election 
alld roraed an executive coOlld.ttee to or(ani•• the national 
errort1 and to orient the public opinion to••r<I• a better 
democratic llfe . <60) ':'ho document••• dooa:ed to be a real 
nationa l Pledge signed b; ex-pre11dcnt Ha1h:..O Alat&si and 
Sultan Alatraab, leader of tao Syrian revolution, bss1des 
(60) Soo text of the Communique In tho New Syrian Paper, 
dat ed September 19, 1953. 
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the t hroe parties loaders and so~e independent politiciano. 
Thia unity and tbia co-operation of tho national front gave 
t he people sel1'- conf1den.ce and consolidated their r•nka to 
exert t'urther efforts to res i st dictatorship up to the minute 
t he Army responded to the people ' s dosire to throw off d1c-
tatorsoip on Februa ry- 25 , 1954 . 
Again after the last army movement t he signa~oriea of 
the Pledge d1d not agree upon national government formation. 
A national coalition government waa formed under the premier-
ship of Sahri Alasali , l eader of the llational Party , supported 
by some independent politicians. The non-participation ot the 
Arab Reaurrectioniat Party bro.lgbt about the res ignation of 
that government on June 11, 1954. On June 14 , 1954, a neu-
tral goverrui:ent was f orn:ed by Sa 1 14 Alghazi to conduct a free 
e lection. Alghazi ' s cabinet was approved by all political 
groups without exception. V.an:y problems beset this government, 
such as the strike of laborers for better wages . The People's 
Party accused t he government ot inability to guarantee free 
elections . On September 4 , 195• , tho People's Party issued 
a statement in •h1ch it r endered its decision to qu1t elections . 
However, elections took pl ace during September and October and 
all political parties participated without exception including 
the People's Party . The election was free to a degree that 
it could be depicted aa a unique one in the Arab eount r1ea 
generally and 1n Syri a 1n particular. On October 14, 1954, 
the present Parliament t ook the responsibil ity or its legisla-
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tive autl:oritJ according to tt.e constitution of 1950. Tno 
rao11lta ot the election ••re •• tollowa: 
Part:r Laader Seate 
1 . People 1 a Party Ruahadi Al.kl.lch7a 4~ 
2 . Arab Reaurrectioniat Arlak, Albaitar and 
Alhourani 16 
~ . The llational Part7 Sabri Alaaali 12 
4 . Ia lamic Front !'uetafa Aaaiba 1 i 4 
5, Socialist Cooperative Fai sal Alaaall 2 
6 . Coamuniats Khalid Beckdaah l 
7 . SJTi&n National 
Social Geor e Abdul vaas1h l 
In Parliament there are llA1lJ lndeP41nuent politicians 
and aavert.l parl1&10enta17 bloca, auch aa tho tribes bloc, 
the danocratic bloc (headed b7 repreaentative Khalid Alad-
hwa), and other blocs headed b7 11.unir Alap:elanl. J;UJ:1ber1 
of parl18J:lontary blocs cannot be lino• exactly because of 
tho fickle attitude of their r epreoentativea. Tho f i rst 
problem to taco the new parl 1a.mont waa the abae~ce of c~e 
part y majority to f orm the soverruoent. Therefore it became 
obv1oue that a coalition sovernaent or two parties or more 
had to take reponsib1litr 1r it •ere 11>po1olule to bring 
about a national gover,.,,ent to include all political par-
tiea . On October 19, 19~~. Faria Al.khuri (independent 
polit1c1an) fori:ed a cabi.net rrOll t• e People's Party, tho 
National Party, some 1ndopel1denta anj tribes leaders . '.rho 
government could not last longer th&~ ?obruary 7, 1955~ be-
cauoe ot diaagreoment between tho two o.ain major parties 
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(the People's and the National) on many domeatie questions 
relating to matters important to tne1r eleet~on interests . 
Anouier coa.Ll.t1on govei·nm.ttnie , the pre.,eac goverrunenc, was 
formed roproaentl.ng the People's Party , tho Arab Resur-
rection1st Party , tho Arab Re -birth Socialist Party and ~~• 
Democratic Bloc under tho Pr emiership ot Sahri Alasali, 
leader of the Peoplo'a Party. Although t.~ People's Party 
and tho Arab Resurrectionist Party had proviously had some 
differoneos, tllis coalit~on 1n the present governmene 1a 
due to tho1r mueua1 agreoment upon tneir fore1pn policy 
regarding opposition to tho proposed military alliance with 
t ho Wost and regarding thei:r agr oomont to follow tho Arabian 
national and independent po1i ey . 
CllAPTZR Ill 
IllAQIAI! POLITICAL P.lR'?IKS 
Parties under the Brit1eh Occupation 1914-1921. 
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( 1) Iraq, 1"'9 S7r1a, n111&1nad a part ot tbo Ottoaan DD-
pire until tho end ot World liar I . 'l'he Turkish 701<1 •aa n -
placed bf the Brit1ab 7oke . Two 7eara ot Br1ti•h Occupation 
(1918-1920) with a aat•up ot military &da1n1etrat1on Without 
a e1gn or national rule waa an 1ndicat1on ot perpetuating 
th1e now foreign 7oko . On April 25, 1920, Britain ••• •••1gn•d 
th• •andator,. state over Iraq, according to the receCCEondat1ona 
ot the Allied BiSI> Council and 1n contol'Ol1tJ •1th Article 22 ot 
th• League ot Nation'• Covenant . The Iraq1an people , like 
their brotbora, tbe 5Jri&na, wore not con•ulted about their 
aolt- detorm1nation according to President W1laon' a Fourteen 
Points ot January 8, 1918. T~a Iraqiana, llko other Arabi , 
contributed to the war arrort • and participated with the Al-
li•• in the war againat Turk•J on the ground or aalt-deterai-
nation and on the ba•i• or previous undaratandinp between th• 
Araba and the Br1t1ab 1n regard to tho illdependenca and the 
unit)' or tho Arab kingdom 1n the Arab ttrr1tor1ao . In m14-
oussor or 1920 a national blood7 revolution was launched againat 
the Br1t1ah forcee all over th• countr,.. The a1x-11ontb nation-
al revolution tor rreedam waa ooneluded with heavy loaaea on 
both a1daa . The Iraq1an nat101U1lista deaanded haediate tor-
•t1on or Iraqian national goval'nMnt, national aaa•ablf, and 
!rt• election. 
Cl) 
(2) 
(2) During th1• period (1918- 1920) th•re .... no organ1&•4 
See Ira% 1060 to 1060, by StaPtion H. LOngri.cut . 
Seo Hl a ¥ry of M6dern Irag1en Politlca , 6y A. Albaaean1 , ~, p . 22 • vol . 
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political parties or political fronts recognited by tne Bri-
tish Occupation Authorities . We vertheloas, there were '°"'" 
secr ot nat i onal organizations which supported and inspi red the 
national movement ot 1920. Tile background ot theae organl-
tati ons go back to th• TUrkisb period •hon tho l.rab national-
i1t1 began their ettort1 to awaken tho l.rabi&n nation and to 
propagate for liberation trom the Tllrkiab yoke . 
Parties under the Britiah manda t e 1921- 1932. 
(3) I r aqian parliamentary life began immediately after 
ending the British Occupation a.nd f orming the national govern-
ment •1th tho acceas1on or King Faisal I to tne Iraq1an throne 
on Augu•t 23, 1921. In t!lio period, the 1JXl1v1dual and per-
1onal parties ware e1tabliohod and b7 and largo agreed on one 
baaic object : to stand fir.=ly against the Britiab Autboriti•• 
in Iraq and to act together to tranater thoae Authorities to 
the Iraq i nn bands . Partiea in this period were formed when an 
influential political per1onal1ty came into power and needed a 
party to support bis personal position in tho government and 
uphold Ols progr .... in parliuont. ?en political parties wer. 
founded in this period, but on17 throe or tA•• deserve brier 
discussion because tnoy bad explicit influence upon the orien-
tation ot the lraq1an public opJ.nion towards tba national pros-
perity, unity an:I independence. For tho benotit of the dis-
t !5) The kiddie Baet In World Att a i r a , by Lenczo•akl, pp . 57,58, 
7S, 74 ,75,76 ,77,8S. Seo alao ~he M&k1n£ ot Modern Irag, bJ 
Henry A. ?oator, p. 90. Al>O'Jt Partloe ID thla per{Od see 
Iraq 1900 to 1950, b)' Stephe n H. Longri86, pp. 141 a:>d 177. 
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cusoion it 1• ta•ourabl• to d1.acuaa two parti•• ot tbe oppo-
aition wbieh had national l•an1ng1 and one which bad Br1tiab 
as well aa palace l•anill6• (4.) 
1. The Iraqian llational Party. 
2. Th• Jlational Brotberbood Party. 
3. Th• •co••nant• Party. 
(5)Tbe Iraqian lational Party waa tormulat•d bJ Oatar Abu 
Atte..,en on Auguat 2, 1922· Abu Atte ... •n waa a national figure 
Wbo advocated the to,,..tion ot political part1ea during the 
mandate in spite ot the Br1t1ah and the lt11l6'• opposition. Abu 
Attemmen waa the tirst politician to get otticial p&l'Wl1as1on 
tor party formation •• earl7 aa Auguat 2, 1922. Kan7 prC>lli.nent 
leader• aupported bi• part7. On Koveab•r 16, 1931, the Iraqian 
National Party and tb.e lationa l Brotberbood Party r.aebed an 
agreelll9nt to oppoae tb• British polie7 in I raq aa it ia ex-
plained in more detail in tbe ~ational Brotherhood Party. How-
ever, when the latter agreed to participate in the government 
ot Reab.eed Alli Oaillani'• •iolating th• agr••••nt, i t ••• ac-
cuaed b7 tb.e Kational Party ot acting againat tbe principl•a ot 
the mutual &gre••nt and the principle• ot the parties. BnaJ.ty 
between the two parti•• then broke out . Tb• Ir.qian National 
Part7 iaaued tbia atatement• • • ••• peopl• 1na1de and outa1d• 
(4) The r.aE or Ehe ten parties ar<1 (I) Renal11ance Party, (2) 
Tn• Iraqian Pr.e Part7, (3) Tho Prosr••• Party, (4) The llation 
Party, (5) Tbe IDd•P•ndenc• Party, (6) Tbe •ational Det•n•• Par-
ty, (7) Tbe People• Part7. All tbeae part1•• bad leadership, 
• ritt•n prograaa and papers , but bad no 1.ntluence at all and 
••re abort-lived . 
(5) S.e IJ-aq 1900-1950, b7 Stephen Lon&ri.&g, pp. 177 , 184 
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th• count17 are ••kin€ about that tuous agrooir;ent bJ •hich 
tho t•o parties agreed to stand together against treat1ea 
and oppoae all1ancoa with Britain •••• • 
Tbe Iraq1an National Party ther. declared that tho agreo-
mont •aa invalid and that it neod no longer abide by ita pro-
vioions . The Iraqian National Party cone1derod tho part1c1-
p& tion ot t he loader ot tho National Brothorbood Part7, Yaa1n 
Albaaom1, and SOl!IO or hi• prom1nont party m•lllbera in the 
govarm:ient formed by Rosheed AJ.8ailllni an absolute violation 
ot tho main principle• to •hicb they had agreed. Moreover, 
they regal'ded this aa a constitutional violation. The Iraqian 
National Party ended it• statement by saying that •auch me-
thods make the people doubt and diatruat whether t he ~•n •••k-
ing their welfare can be depended on. • 
'I'h• cloae relationship and co-operation between tho two 
parties waa ended, and O!'l J\lno 9 , 193<5, th• I raqian National 
Party held a meet i ng in its Baglldad control office tor annual 
budgetary diacuasion. This wa o followed b7 another atatemont 
in Which th• llational Brotherhood Party and Gailan1' a govern-
ment were attacked. In this statement the Iraq1an National 
Party •aJ"Dod the Iraqian people ot the danger boaotting tho 
count17. Upon the re t irement ot the loader or tho Party tree 
politics, their party was diooolvod and moat of ita mombere 
joined other partiea while othora rel:!&inod independent or non-
party memb1r1 . Tho Party's program atreaaed the 1.ndepend.ence 
ot Iraq, th• loyal ty of the Party to the constitutional monar-
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ehy, t.Dd plann.d tor econ02':ic polic7 to lapro•• the aethod 
or aer1culture, to ra1•• the standard or 11v1ng, and to 1n-
cre••• the national 1ncome. llaey aape<>ta or ao1>1al rotora 
were indicated. 
Betore end1D& the diacusai on ot the part1ea or thia 
Period, I would 111c• to -ke it clear that th••• partiea ••re 
atrictly per aonal par~i•• and that th••• peraonalitiee larg•-
11 t1nanced the par ti•• · The:r iD..fluenced th• elections 1n 
tavor ot their party 1£ellbera by their support. !lo part7 had 
a large n\llllber or mombora because or tho lower level or edu-
cated people. '!'here Coro , the people aupportod the leader ot 
the party beceu ae or hi• taa1}1 , popular it7 ' or peraonal 
ability, or boc..,.ae the IL1ng and the Britiah 111..fluencad the 
election to br1JI& a corta1n part1 to power bocauae the7 want ed 
the party'• leader t o paaa • certain la• throug)l the parlia-
ment or to s1.gn a treaty and enforce it b7 parliamentary ac-
ceptance. 
'l'h• National Brotherhood Party (Hi•b Aleldi a• Al•atani} 
eatabliahed b7 Yaa1n Paaha Aln.ashe&i, Reeheed Alli Algeilani, 
"and ~ otb.ar great peraonalitieo• on lovollber ~. 1930. 
Thit party co-oper.ttd cloae~ •1th the other part7, "the 
Iraqian National Part7• . These t wo perti•• a1gnod a tamoua 
agreement (document) known ae 'l'•akhi (brotherhood) , dated 
November 16, 1931, in which they agreed to act together to 
amend the Anglo-Iraqian Treaty ot Juno 30, 1930, which they 
beliet'td waa not 1n national favor ot Iraq. Theae two partiea 
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ret'u••d to participate 1.n &ZJ:f so•erzimont before tbe aaenda.nt 
or tbe 19:50 treaty. The lational Brotberoood Party expreaaed 
it• •i••• on many oecaa1ona about tb• neoeaaity to act aceord-
iJ>S to tbe prineiplea ot tbe document . On ~arch 9, 19~, juat 
eight dt.ya beroro participat i ng 1.n tho government, the Party 
published the following atate"1ent 1 
l . The Party aeta aooor<11.ng to it• principle• to 
support eonatitutiont.l treedoa, tt.c111tate tho1r 
practice, respect or lt.wa, and •lao •eta •ceor<1-
1ng to ita own .,.thoda ot reeiet1ng t.ll behavior 
wbich dcea not &gl'ee •1th it• prinoiplea. 
2 . 'l'ba Party aeta aecor<11ng to tbe agraeEent •1th 
th• Iraqian lationt.l Party. 
3. Tbe Party endeavora to achieve the aima tor which 
it waa eat•bliahed and oppoaea any idea, act or 
enactment wh1cb do.., not agree with Party pr1.n-
oiplea. (6 ) 
Tha Party•a pr1.nc1plea • •r• tbe t.aondllent ot the Analo-
Iraqian Treaty of 1930, and tbe d1aaol•1.ng ot the present par-
lit.aent becauae 1t does not repreaent th• nation. 1.nJ govern-
••nt Which coooea to power aboul4 tora ita policy on these t•o 
b••••· 
light <1&71 after tn1a atateaent, Reabeed A1ga1lani • •• 1.n 
{&) See H1ato~ of MOdern Iraqlin Po11tlca, 67 X. Alhaasan1, 
Vol. 3, P• to , arid a l so I r aq dur!ne Oocupati<>n and ~andata, 
Vol. 2, p. 266, b7 the aame author . Aleo aoe Iiidepelldent Iraq, 
b7 l(haddur1 , PP• 66 , 66 
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power. Thia oocurred after the resignation ot the t1rat 
oabinet of llour1 sa1d, which the llati onal Brotherhood Part7 
and the Iraqian National Part; had agreed to oppose . Re-
1hoed Algailan1, b:y aocepting the reopon1ibilit7 to form tho 
goYeMment and b:y giving all po1ta to bil part7 .. llber1 with• 
out inviting eo,.. aamber1 of tho Iraq1an llational Part7 w1tb 
wbOll be bad 11gned a brotherhood and co-operation agre..,ent 
and without referring to the amendment ot the l9W Treat7, 
invited broad cr1t1o1•• · 
fbe main teaturea ot tb1a party ' • program • ere , 1n brief , 
that tbe part; endea•ored to give additional effort 1n call-
ing the Iraqian people'• attention to the political, economic 
and &dm1n1atratri•e dangers beaett1n& t.b••· Tb• Part:y re-
1iated personal a11bebav1or •h1cb did not agree • 1th the pub-
lic interest. 'lbe Part7 acted to create a aatu.NI Iraq1an 
public opinion, to contend tor an integrated Iraqian indepen-
dence, and to aoh1e•e a pure Iraqian un1t:y . C7 l 
The loader of the Part7, Yaain Alha1hea1 , died 1n Beirut 
on January 21, 1937, •• a re.,..lt ot a heart attack. He bad 
preY1oualy been obliged to roa1gn troa the go•ern..nt on 
October 26 , 1936, boo11111e of the armed revolution of c;.neral 
Boker S1dk1. <9 l 
The •covenant• Part7 (Hizb Alabd) wae founded b:y Houri 
(7) See "Part711 program• Hiator;r of KOdorn Iragian Po11£1ce, 
Vol . 3 , p. 248, b:y A· Alba1oani . 
(8) See Independent Ir!!• b7 JI, l!lladdur1, pp. 71-9~ 
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;\a3a1d wnen he t~or:nod 'the governmeni; for tho t1r$t time on 
:.larch 23, 1113". (>I) 
Nouri Assa1d, '7u yeai:s uld , or1gina.l.ly \v&s a m111 e&ry man 
in the ~\lrl<iSh Anny . He part1c1patea 1n the Big Aral> Jlevolu-
tion of 1915 against 1\lrkey an participatec 1:1 most ot' tne Ire.q-
is.n governments (luring the mandate . He occupi&d the post of De-
fense ~t1nlster 1n tho early l9~U•s and Minister of Fl:>roign A!'-
fa1r4 in the early 1~3o 1 s . He became Prime Y.1n1ster tor the 
first time on March 2~, l93U and 1ormeo n: s pnrl1amentnry party 
"under review" i;o support h18 policy of pro - Br1t1sh and pro-
pa!aco . Qn J'une .:J:> , 1930, he signed the famous Anglo-Iraqi an 
•i•reaty whicn was especially known tor putting Iraq under a strong 
British grip from that date almost to the present timo . In spite 
of the adverse national reaction to the 1·reaty it passed through 
a puppet parliament which wa• brought lntO oe1ng through fal se 
election 1n order to rat1f1 the Treaty. Assa1d since that time 
became loyal to Britain and whenever a strong man is needen to 
curl> national uprising tne 8r1 ti•ll cal.l upon llim. He has sup-
porters G.??1ong tribes , in ~ne Army and among cne educateo people . 
He Decame Prime 1~1n1ster not less than tnirteen times . Be sup-
pressed all Comoun1ats an~ subversive movemen~s . Flnal!y, he 
brougnt Iraq to be a member ot the Baghdad Paet , and suppressed 
all political parties in 1952, using th& Army oven thoug11 ne 
was noc then 1n power . 
•11his •covenant" Party encountered. :rc1t'.f oppos1 t1on froc the 
other parties , part1euierly from tne Nat1ona~ Brochernood Party 
r~i ~ee !req 1goo to 1gsu, by Stepnen li . Longr!gg, p . 184 . 
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and Tb• Iraqian Na t ional Party. Thia Party aay be character-
ized •• being pro-pel.ac• and pro-Britiah. Tb• outatan41ng 
teatura of ita program waa tllat of achieving general domestic 
ratoraa and aupport1ng tho Iraqian Royal Palace policy to an 
extreme extent. The leader of tb• Part7, aa aoon •• be came 
to po•ar, began negotiation• with the British to torn.ulata a 
treat7 to replace the one unaatiafaotor,. to the nationaliato. 
Tho nationalists had opposed Britiah participation 1n the 
Turkiah-Iraqian covenant. 
( lO)On J\1nAI 30, 1930, aa abo•e Mnt1oned, tho Britiah high 
ccmaiaaion and Nouri Aloa1d ai;;l>ed a now All6lo-Iraqian treat7. 
Tb• treat7 provided tor a twenty-tive- 7ear alliance between 
Britt.in and Iraq. It confirmed Britain'• intention to aupport 
Iraq'• ada1aa1on to the JAague ot Nation• in 19:52 and proclaU..d 
Iraq•• tull 1ndependenc• and th• tera1nat1on ot Britiah manda-
tory reaponeibilit1ea on tbe data ot Iraq•a entr,. into the 
IAagua . Tho treaty did not bring about any change in the po-
litical atatua of Iraq. It merely changed th• name of the 
Analo-Iraq1an relation• from mandate to alliance. Political, 
econoaic and a111tar,. 1ntereat1 ot Britain were retained. Th• 
•covenant• Part7 continued it• political act1•1t1e• until it 
waa declared illegal 1n 1936 arter tile anoed revolt ltd b7 
General B•k•r Sidki. ( ll ) 
(10) 
( 11) 
S•• *Hiotcgt of KOdern Ii'a~lan Poll£lca1 , by l . Alhaoaanl' 
v. :5, pp. o- 112. lloo "T o Kiddle Riat in World Arta1ra , 
by Lenczowak1, pp. 218-2 • 
St• "In4opondont Iraq•, by x. !Chaddur1, pp. 71-94 
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Partioe During the Independence 1932•1937 . 
(l2)Th• Rational Unitr Partr waa oatabliauod on August 27 , 
1934, bJ Ali Alai Eubbi , a tormer member ot the Iraqian 
National Partr and a cabinet melll>er of MJ>7 govol"lmenta dur-
ing the mandate . When he formed hie tirat cabinet in 1934, 
Alai lubbi published a 1tatement to the people in which ho 
el<}>lainod t!le .. in rea1on h• established hie own partr . Ho 
eaid .•••. •our oxperienoe proved that thAI stability or the 
nation oanftot b• obtained without tue unitr and th• co-
operation of all partie1, groupa, and or. anisati ona.• He 
also said that "we are willing to take tho laat valuable ad· 
•ice of tlle departed lt1ng (Faisal I) to diacard our dittor-
encaa and misunderstanding• by fornoing a plan br which we can 
achieve tlle unity ot the nation and advance the oountrr b7 
taking tiN stop• forward without fear or retreat. • 
The Party'• program emphasized the tact that it ineurod 
tho tull independence ot Iraq bJ building a strong nati ona l 
detenao , br creating a ot rong &l'llQ', by 1:aprov1n;! the security 
ot national detonee, by increaeing meane or domeetic eecurity, 
br raiail>6 the atandardo ot adm1ni1tration, bJ awaken1ng tile 
peoplo ot the country, by oduoating the nation b7 the modern 
••tbod1 ot education, b7 iaplomonting too compul1ory education 
in the prl.marr 1cboola, by incroa1ing induetrial and technical 
atudioa , and, finally , bJ placing the economic and financial 
policioa ot tllo atate on atrong tounda~iona . 
!12) Seo Iraq 1000 to IO!o, by Stephen H. tOngrigg, p. 2!0 . 
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Wot ..an:r people Joined tbia Part7, end no pol1tieal pe.rt;7 
wiahed to co-operate with tho Unit7 Part7. On tho contra17, 
the period or the Un1t7 Part1 leadorahip 1n governaent came to 
b• characterized b7 1nstabilit7 and the appearance ot Comr.uniam 
1n Iraq ror the firat time.( 13) Many armed nomadical tribes 
were encouraged by other party loader• to torco Alai Eubb1 to 
reaign. On Pebrua17 23, 1935, h• resigned and his party•a 
parliamenta17 members withdrew their momborah1p 1n his party. 
In briot, his resignation waa a hint ot tile aelt-d1aaolut1on 
ot tho perty. 
The People'• Reform Partz!l•) 
'11th tno ad•ent ot General 
Beker S1dlci 1 a an:ied revolt on October 29 , 1936, the two reioa1n-
ini p•rtiea, Tb• National Brotherhood, Which waa then 1n power , 
and The •co•enant• Part)", were declared illegal; and a now 
period Of dictatorship began. The ltadtra of t ho revolt CCll-
prom1eed themaelvea to a younger g r oup or Iraqi 1ntell1genta1a 
and rounded a national tront similar to the Turkiab People Par-
ty eatabliabed b7 Kamal, such front t o be knctrn as "The People•a 
RotoN• . Iraq's lack of prog.M•a and governmental instability 
••~ contrasted •1th the apectacular ach1•••D1nta or the new 
Turlciab regt.e. Tne new People 1 a Retorm waa a government.al 
party becauee it was pro-governa.nt even though it called tor 
aoeial reforms . ( 15) Three .,embera ot tho People• a Reform were 
(~) 
( 14) 
( 111) 
see Comrr.un1am alid Natlona!iam ln tl1e Middle East , by W.I. 
Laqueur, p. 176 
See The Middle East 1n 7/orld Atta11·a, by Lanczowaki, p. 
221, alid Middle Baat Journal, Jul7 , 1948. 
See Iraq 1900 to 1950, by Stephen H. Lonar1gg, pp. 249- 250 
Mllbore ot Hilmrut; Sulelaan Cal>inot which na tol'llllld accordlllg 
to tbo doll&Dda or tho al'll)' chief ot et&tt. Y&n7 loaders &nd 
aollber1 ot the old partiea part icip&tod in thia new national 
grouping. A:oong tboae was Gatar Abu Atto,..on, leader of tbo 
Iraqian llational Party. llaJl7 educated men joined Who wero 
particularly known for their Communiat trend, auch aa Abdul 
lt.adir Iema1l . The purposes of tbi• grcup wore not cloar to 
eom• people and, of courae, tblt can be attributed to the 
general low level ot education. Tn• People's Rotor~ Part7 in-
tended t o conduct a policy or a oloeer roletionanip with other 
Arebia· a tates , otreJIC!th•n1.-.g ocntact •1th group• or JM!Ople, 
and dealing• With the 11e1gbbor1ng &114 tore1.gn etatea accord-
ing to th• principle• or equalit7. Th17 •i•h•d to build a 
otrong al'll)', air force, and police tore• tor domeotic security. 
The7 •l•h•d to give the people tull democratic freedom, especi-
all7 the group carrying out advanced idoale. Th17 also wanted 
to raiee tho standards of living. In addition, th17 sought 
monopol7 of the state insofar aa traneportatlon, telephone, 
telegraph, water aupplies, and electric power wera concerned . 
Tbe7 wanted to enact lo•a tor l&bor and ta1'111r protect;ion. (l&) 
Tne Poopl•'• Rofor;:a put proeaure on Prime kinlster H1kllut 
SUlel.aan to declare it •• a atrong political part7 but bocauae 
ot lte apparent C'"""'"n iat1c principle• he did not respond aa 
he • •• atraid that this recognition •i?ht be cono1dorod an in-
(16) See IDdepelidont Iraq, 67 j, ithaddur!, pp . 05-99. 
'fitat1on t o Commw\ioa 1n the countl'J' . (l7 ) 
Tbe aaoassiDation ot General Beker Sidki at Moueul Airport 
and h!.a colleague, Gawad, b7 their r1•al..o 1.n th• al'lq - Aaaaid'a 
and tho British auppor tere - on August ll, 1937, dre• a curtain 
not onlJ on the "People'• Reform Part7•, but also upon the lives 
or all political partiea trca 1937 to 194&, at Which ti.me a 
period ot dictatorahip dominated. Tills waa known aa "The n.rk-
neas Period". 
Parties Lite atter World War II 194&- 1949 . 
(lS)Th• practical lite or political parti•• 1.n Iraq came to an 
end •hen Yaein Alhaahemi (extreme rigbt national leader) abo-
l1ah•d the act1Y1tiea ot hi• part7 on 1(&7 17, 1935. A current 
or tribeamen •1olat1ons ewept c11rreront part• or Iraq, concluded 
by a aerie• or mil1ta17 coupe d ' etat . In 1941, the ruling ele-
aenta •1th th• aupport or tbe Britiah .lrmy controlled the poli-
tical aituation, rooted out the influence or the Army and put 
an end to its 1nteJ"fention 1n pol1tica. Pro- Br1t1ab rull..ag 
eleaent• cue into tiria control . Parl1amentary lite becblO 
zero. Parliamentary repreoentattion was by appointment . Tbe 
pro-Britiah rul~ ele~ent ach1•••d that vict01'7 arter baYl..ag 
tilled jails •1tb all lett1ato , nat1onal1ata and any one elae 
wbo had. •DJ' kind or oppoa1tion to tbat atan41ng regl.&e. That 
dictatorahip laated to the earl7 pert or 194&. That period waa 
initiated by internal preeaure tor the return ot political par-
I 1'7) 
( 18) 
Coic:Nnism and Vatlonallr.: tn the Middle l!ist, b7 f . z. 
Liqueur, pp. 1'77-178 
Seo History or I raqian Ministries, b7 A. AlhaaaaD1, Vol . 
7 , PP • 19=.0 
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tie a and normal parliaaentary lite. 'l'ewtik Aa1wa1di, a pr0111-
nent per1onalit7, ro,...d the governaent on April 23, 1946, and 
responded to the n&tional wish••· Prince Abdul Elah, Regent 
of the Iraqian throne, •no• Crown Prince• , declared 1n a speech 
doltvorod at Baghdad Cit7 Ball that tho return or political 
psrtie1 under the oup.ort and auper•iaion ot tho government wa1 
a great necessit7 to guide the abip ot the countrr to the eate 
shore, tn oonformit7 with the genuine democratic rules . Vol'J 
soon, rtve political parties •ere permitted, two or which • ere 
Corna•ni1t1 , - the P1opl1 1 1 Party and the llation&l Unity Party. 
One wa1 an extreme Socialiat Party, - the Mational Democratic 
Part7 . Another wae or oxtrem& Arab leaning, - t ho Indepen-
dence Party, and the laot was aodorate , - th• Liberals Party, 
but both the l.Ddependenco and the Liborala wore conaiderod, 10 
tar a1 the government . .. concerned, or lert tat leanings. 
All these partioe were pel'lllitted arter tbey bad submitted 
their progralll8 and leadero to tho M1niatl'J or the Interior. 
All their prog,....1 atreaaod the CO!lq)llte 1'ldepend1nc1 ot I:r<aq, 
and tor:aing equal ralat1onsh1p and friendship on the baaia or 
mutual interests and in oontormity •1th the United Nationa 
Charter . All streaaod close relat1onab1p with Arab states and 
atr<>nger relations •1th 'l'Urkey and Iran, aa well aa with all 
countri•• which reapected eho Iraqian 1.ndependenc• and believed 
1n democracy and loved peace . Di fferent aspect• or ratorm ••r• 
included, especially in agriculture, industry •nd 1n education. 
In other words, their programs ••re tar advanced 1n comparlaon 
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to the period durtna 1921- 1932. On llo••aber 21, 1946, th• 
Liberals and the National Democrati c parties participated 1n 
tho Cabinet of Nouri Aaaaid on the baai. or tree preas, a•ao-
oietion, and rree election. But becauae ot the tailure ot 
Aaaaid to br1ns about the tultillment ot his prolllis•• the 
above mentioned parties withdrew trOlll his cab1net.< 19 l 
All t1ve partiea were extre.,.17 eagor to aeo aoce politi-
cal, social and econo~ic chango but th• 1946- 1949 period waa a 
very critical one due to the political aituation i n Paleat1ne, 
to the deman4• ot parties tor aore libert7, and, tinall7, to 
the de.,.n4s tor changins the Anglo- Iraqian Treaty ot l93G.C20) 
All the•• demands created unpleasant political events, led to 
many de1:10n.atr~tlona and riota which, un.t'ortunatel7, •ere con• 
oludod b7 violenco and r esulted 1n l:lAny oasualtloa. All po-
liticnl part1ea wore in agreement in regard to the dishoneat 
•tand or ~~• Iraqian govornmeot on tho Palest1n• question. 
All partioa, 1nd1·11duall7 and collectively, proteated tho 
~ova:rnment •a cruelty 1n usins the polio• torco against the 
people'• demonstration w"neo tlley appealed to tho 0overnment 
to take a better stand 1n regard to th• Pales t1nlan ques tion 
or when th•J' did not accept tile Portsmouth Treat;r or 1948 . 
On August 30, 1946, a contereo.oo attended by core than 5000 
persons waa arrangod. by tho th.roo lefti&t Partion (the Pooplo•s 
Party, the National Unity Part1 and the National Democratic 
Party) to protest tho d.~ctator•h1p ot too government 1n power 
(Ill) Seo History of Iraqlan W!ii1atriea, by l . Alheaoani, Vol . 
7, p. 130. 
(20) Ibid., Vol . 7, p. 110 
142 
(Ar•had Al a\Ul1$ri was Prime U1n1•t•r) and the supp~ssion 
of the organs of tne oppos1t1on parties by try1n~ tholr 
editors tor violating the honesty ot a free pre•• nnd by 
spreading disorder and creating undesirable feelings Bl!long 
t he citizens . <21 > 
~any party leaders and members were arrested because 
t hey com:r.enied on the government 's misbel'levlor and dictator-
snip , - a nat ional right and ind1v1nua1 duty or every citi-
zen in a count ry which enjoys eonsti cut1onal life . The 
leftist parties with the eo-opore.tion of tho Independence 
Party and th~ L1b~rals , snn the •upport of all poli tical 
tronts , toreed the government or Alaumar1 ~o resign on 
November 14, 1~46 . A cabinet was headed by Nouri Said to 
cunduct a f ree e i ection and t o give the demanded freedom 
and such ceb1net .finally ca.:m.e into power . Al~houg.."1 t'ritne 
JUniater AssaiCI included two parties to inaioate hi s good 
intentions to introauce freedoms and t o guaran~ee free 
elections , notbing as such was reached . Party minis ters 
rosign.ed, and parties quit e1ections because or governmen-
t al autnor1ty interference 1n ravor of its candidates . un 
~\arcn >:\! , 11147, Assa1<1 res1gneo and Saleh Jab or 1·ormed the 
gove"1l!lent . His governmen< met with stiff opposition trom 
par~1es under ~v1ew . •1•her-et'ore1 o!'l ::sepc,emt>or 2'd , 194? , 
tho governmont w1 ~bdre-.. tne ot1·1c1al perm1ss1on ror the 
People • s Part y and <he National Unity Party on the grou.nda 
(21) Kleto't of the Ir:J!Ian Mlnl• trles, by A. Alh8ssani ,Vol . 
7 , p . SV, and Al aI1 and Azzma.n Papers , tfo . 2870 , 
dated 11.at>cb 18, 1114'/ , anc:t No . i35'/ , dated Maren l? , 
1947 . 
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that those two part1ee recei.vea .t1nanc1a1 a1c 1·ro:n \L"lbown 
resources . '!'ho otner parties did not 1·1nd. any logical rea-
son for such rupture ano tbey tberefore 1nd1v1auaiiy pro-
tested aucn l•l•gai action ~o the [1n1at17 ot the Interior . 
on April 16, 1~4e, Prime ~1~1ater ~lib Jabor reached 
L~ nonoarable long-ter.:a &@'ree?:aut witn Br1t11.:l to replace 
l\l:lv Treaty . <22> '!n• new Anglo-1raq1an Treaty o:: April 
16, 1948, lm.own as toe Portsmou~n Treaty, ••• created at the 
t1::ne when tho que1t:01on 01· falesr;ine had roached the climax 
of 1ta precarious state . Britain encuuragod the Iraqian 
off1c1ala to 1~od1atoly begin neFot1at1ona to a1vert the 
_raqian public opinion to t~e treaty <N••t1~n rether i;han to 
tr.e Palestinian qieation . 3r1ta1n, b7 doing ao, was o~e nun-
dreo. per cent sacceaot\J.l. Pol1t1ea.1. part1•• were eonac1oua 
ot i;hat purpose and they success1'111ly opposea botb the treaty 
ana the a1shonourab!e 1~ana of ~be governmen~ on ~he question 
o.r Palestine . 'fbe parties pro;;ested and led national move-
ments ot stiff oppo11t1on which resulted 1n the r••1gnat1on 
ot tbe goverru:z.ent L~d the derea~ ot t~e Porta~ouch ~reaty . 
·nrortunacely, that aucceas •as crownec bJ a costiy bloody 
revolution between ~h• eava£a rulin ele:nenta, whicb were 
pro-British, using gun-tire and the dloar.ned educated and un-
educated people wh.oae a.&.ugan was "LOng live independent Iraq. u 
Tnis was primarily the etrussle of tn• Parties, Independent• 
and the Dz=.an of the atreet• . Br1ca1n won cbe str~gFle . Pales-
(2~) b1scory of 1raiian Ui.ni3trlea, 01 A. llliissani, Vol . 7, 
pp . 21~-274. •· Incependent Iraa , b l! . !:haddur~. p . 
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l<H 
tine bad £On• to the Z1on1st• and tne Iraqian nationalists 
were slain by the orders or t .e1r outcoers in tr.e govern-
( i.>) 
:ient . Pol1t1eel par;iea ltn• L1bera.1.s, the ?le.t1onal 
DezOCr9t1o ana •be .ndepend•nc• p•rt1••1 pub11shea a jo1nt 
1tatezont by •nl.Ch they attr1butea the blovdy events ot 
JanU&l'l' 5- :Jo, 1948, to tho ruling elements wnlch 1gnorod 
the nat1on 1a desires, and the advent or aucoessive govern· 
mente had no popular support . ~art1ea repeate~ly de~anaed 
a cnange or the political situation to eu1t the nation's 
.1.n~•resta but no responaiola person i1steneo u..~t1l le was 
too late a..'\a itany vletic:ea were sacrltic~ . 
(23) 
':be Political Parties t:bere1·ore de,.onc!ed: 
l . ·.1.ne aboli"&ion ot the Portsmouth 11reaty . 
2 . -rho investigation ot· roapona1b1• otr1c1a1s wno 
gave oroers to r1re on ene people d'.lring tbe 
domonstrat1on1 ot protest againat the Portsmouth 
'l'reaty and t ne stand <:>t tbe government on the 
Pa1estin1an question . 
3 . The dlssolucion ot che preaent Parliament and 
call~~g ror tree elecclona . 
4. A respect tor constltut1onal troodo~s . 
S . ,bo •cc~vicioa ot ch• Part1•• shou!d have more 
latitude, ana cno part1ea ahould teol tree to 
or1ticize cho government . 
.:lee l11stoH ot iraqlan 
7, Page G . ~ee also 
LOngrlgg, pp. 344- 351 . 
1(haddur1, p . 268 
V.lnia,rlea, by A. Alhassan1 ,Voi . 
Iraq !\IOU t~ 1950, by Stephen H. 
i.oe alao Independent Iraa, by !l . 
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The govemment ot Sa!el>- J&bur was followed bJ a cabi-
net t'ur:zied. by V.una:r::r:a<1 Assad1r, one ot ~he pl"OID1nent S.tu. '1 
loader• (;;aleh J&bor was l>ll1 1 1 al10) . Prime li1n1oter A1sa-
d1r 1.nv1ted two leaders of the lndepvndence and L1borsls 
Parties to participate with n1m 1n conducting the new govern-
ment . •tc• tormer accepted . 1h• latter rer~sed . 
Toe govern.:zient responded. to moat or tne three parties ' 
deman4• wn1cb ied tne tnree pol1t1oa~ parties to publlsb a 
Joint •PP••~ t o the public on Janua17 ~. l94ti , tu close 
rank• and to follow tbe orders ot the government an<! retrain 
from p1rt101patint 1n any form ot de~onstrat1on 1n1smucn aa 
t he people had won their demanaa . ::$\lch jo1nt appeal .furt ner 
stated that le wao time that everybody should bo engaged 1n 
hie own pa~1cular work and leave the pol1tlcal question• to 
the Parties a.nc cne natlonai go•er:lment . In apite ot the 
fact ~hat the government in power waa a moderate one and tor 
the p•ople, it encountered oppoa1t1on rl'Qm a oerta1n subver-
s1vu group , or groupa , such aa tn• auppor~era o! ~aleb Jabor, 
the re•lgn&d. Prl.!fte W1n1ster, tbo pro-Sr1t1en ele=ents , th• 
z1on11ta and ~h~ Co~un1acs wno a!ways spread rumours to take 
advantage ot tho nat1onal1sts end to create a teel1ng ot un-
certainty as to the tu.cu~ of th• government and lta acn1eve-
menta . 
On Ju.ne 15, l\148, the government cond·J.cted a Parl1amen· 
tary eloo tlon and tried 1ts boat to prevent any kind of 1n-
ter1·eNnce but the pro-Brltl1h elements , the 1upportera ot 
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the Portsmouth Treaty, used torco to influence the voters . 
They killed many people dur1na the election and thus terr1-
f1ed the people. The govornm.ent could do nothing about it. 
Seventy- one seats out of 138 ot the old parliament were re -
gained by the pro- Brit1oh . Few seats were g• inod by tho 
three parties (tne Liberals, Independonco and the .National 
Democratic Parties) in the opposition. 
Tho crimes ccm~itted by tho pro-Brit1oh ruling olomenta 
during the last election of Juno 15, 1949, and tho intor-
terence of the g01Pernment in favor of some m1r1isters, made 
it impossible for tho three liberal parties to continue 
their activi t i es under the prevailing circumstances of 
torroriam. They had no free preso . Their leaders had to 
go back and forth to court for trials becauoe of statements 
or comments on the political s1tuat1on . The executive com· 
mitteos of the Liberal Party and toe :1ational :>emocratic 
Party hold a joint ooosion to review the political s1tu-
at1o~ and came to the ca>clu~ion that their Parties could 
not continue thetr political activities undor then exiot-
ing circumatnncos and oo decided to coase thoir activities 
until more propitious circumstances should prevail . Both 
partioa published a memorandum in which thoy explained tho 
reaaon tor "freezing" their political activities. Th• memo-
randum contained an oxcellent review ot the background of 
lraqian politico, particularly with reference to tho 1n-
14'/ 
tluenoe of the Br1t18h autnor1G1ea and thelr partisans •ho 
co- opei·attoa w1"'h sucn autnvr.J.tl.ott to paralyze the growtb 
01· democracy 1n Iraq . ·1·he .lraq1an c onstitu'tion gusrant;ood 
such democratic life but t he Bri t i sh opposition to such 
steps began 1n 1921 and still existed to t he ~inute of t he 
writing of this memorandum. <24 l 
·rne independence Par~ :sicoed aJ.one unt:il it was .9UP .. 
pressed by the Royal Decree No . 19 for associations, uttered 
in 1955. 
The People's Party (The C0111:11W1iat) . <25l 
This party was established on April 2, 1946, by edu-
cated young men, such as Az1:z Sharit , Tewfik Muni r and Fahd, <25l 
with a group representing different minorities . This group 
participated with other groups i n publ ishing a daily paper 
called Alahali (The People) . Aziz Sharl.r did not think this 
paper waa autticient and therefore published a secret iaaue 
which was to be dist ributed over the entire country. These 
publications were known as "Rebirth Messages• and called for 
education in polit ics, economies, history, philosophy and 
democracy . In these publications they concentrated on demo-
cracy, the atruggle tor peac• and the Paleat1.tle question , 1.tl 
addi t i on to the Syrian and Loebanese struggl e tor national 
freodom and independence. They wrote about the tall ot the 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
Th• text of the memorandl.llll £0 contained in Hiato~ of 
Iraqian Mi ni stri es , by A. Alhassani, Vol. 8 , pp.-49. 
See Communism arid Nationalism 1n the Middle Eaet, by w. 
z. Le.queur , pp . 185 , 188. 
The t"ull name of tbo leader of the Cotimuni ot Party i s 
Yuail Salman Yousif . 
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tb1rod Prencb Republic. Tbe7 attacked Faac1aa, Naziaa, and tbe 
otber r<1actlonar7 element• in power in Iraq. Tbey urged tbe 
Iraq1an people to put preasure on tbe autborltie1 to allow 
tbe parties to return and practi ce t be democratic r1gbta 
granted tbem by tbe Iraqian constitution. 
As aoon as tbe part7 • aa allowed b7 the go••r..,..nt, a .... 
ot people responded to ita call tor partic1petion 1n its .. eaber-
ab1p . 'l.'b•7 bad known ot 1t because ot tbe earlier progr8lll and 
tbro"8h tho secret "Rebirth Ueaoagea" , aa well ae through the 
current program 1t had aet up. 'Jibe main feature• of this latter 
program were:127 ) 
l . The Part7 called tor real deaooratic lite 1n tbe 
countl')' . 
2 . !he Part7 conaidered that the independence and th• 
supremac7 or Iraq were atill incomplete . 
&. Tb• Part7 called tor a 1olution to the problems ot 
l and and wiabed to brillg modern 1ndu1tr1 to Iraq. 
'· The Part7 conaidered that nomadiaa and landlords 
dcainated th• countl')' and •1abed to traneter th11 
d""1nation to a c1•il1ze4 atage . 
The Part7 attributed the pr oblems ot I raq to tbe tore"8;n 
intluene• , the non-apptaranee and m1auae ot de•oorac7, and the 
tact tbat the land and 1nduatl')7 were not developed 1n tbe ooun-
tl')' • Th• Part7 believed that tb••• probl••• were knitted to-
(27) Peoplef a Part7 program, and also llerwa KagazliM, Piib-
liehed b7 .Uerwa Aeaoo1at1 on 1n the lliirloan trnl •erait7 
ot B<lirut, p. 27 
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gether and should be given priority for solution. Tho theory 
of the pQrty was a theory of quick transition from tho back-
ward stage to a new modern 3tage. The Party's program waa 
a progressive and practical one, suitable tor quick reforms. 
But it opposed the landlords and tho people 1n power and the 
British policy 1n Iroq •hich was still superior. 
The Party's program<20>con1iated of only eight main ar-
ticles, but these wore interpreted in such detail that they 
treated all problems ot the society and the intereste or the 
country. In Article ~ the interpretation or de~ocraoy called 
for tbo absolute freedom of preas , speech, ~eetinga and belief. 
It called tor cOQPlote equality between different group1 , 
natio!Ullitiea, and minorities . In tbia Article the Part)' de-
manded the abolishment ot tho exceptional laws (martial law) 
which had been proclaiJlled durin8 the tiJlle or unrest and which 
had violated democratic treodom. Tho Party demanded that there 
be Judiciary independence and sought to increase their authori-
ty to protect public freedom. Yoreovor, they demanded that 
municipal and parli...,entary elections be made tree, direct 
and proportional. Finally, tho Party demanded the purifi-
cation ot the governmental eyatem of some elements that had 
misused the authorities and/or had used t hem tor personal in-
terests. 
In Article 4 the Party considered that tho indopondenco 
of Iraq and 1ta security could be achieved through tho strength-
(28) Party's program. 
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ening or Iraq1a" .. ..,, ot det•na•, rai11ng the standards or 
the soldiers, and 1nap1r1ng thom with th• national 1pir1t. 
Co-operation with all Arab coW>tri•s, and 1ncN1a11d political 
and oconooic relation• •1th all d8!1locratic countri•• accord-
ing to th• principle• or mutual 1ntere1t1, 11 the beat ··-
curltf tor independence. Tll• Party cmcluded tb11 Article 
b7 calling tor •atabliahing Anglo-Iraq1an rolationa on the 
baaia of r11p1ct1ng the Iraqia;n national indopondonca and 
1uproi::.ac7. 
ln Article 5 the Part7 dealt with tho land probloa b7 
distributing the atato llll:ld to tho farmora and tho tribeaaon, 
thoreb7 aettling tbea 1n particular areaa. It called tor tbe 
eatabliabmont of state banks to make loan1 to tbe tarmera and 
tribeaaon. It alao e1tabli1bed co-operative a1soc1ationa and 
cancelled all the old agricultural rul11 and practices 'micb 
Yiolated th• r1gbta or tho tarm•r• and bad kept tho countrr 
1n a back11a1'd stage . 
In Article 6 the Part7 pr•••nted a plan b7 •bich the 
national econ""'7 should be developed around the eatablisbmont 
ot national 1nduatr7 tor it• protection. The go••rnaont 
ahOUld nndlrtake the building Of bO&Yf 1ndU8trJ, Wbicil the 
ccuntrr 1or1l7 needed, 1n addition to 1ncroaaod railroad 171-
t••• and other ""'an1 ot COl!llllUJ11cat1on. It also called tor 
protection ot Iraq1an exporta t'roa the torel;;n cocpenioa; 
bringing modern oachinos to be used 1n agriculture; eatabl1an-
1ng atate balllta to finance the projact1; control ot the atate 
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treaalll'Y; and the building or large d..,. tor tbe control 
ot tbe T1grea and Euphratee rivers tor add1t1onal land 1r-
rl.gat1on. The Part7 deinanded the preYent1on ot illegal 
tuea and 1.nval14 cuet<*AI and soug):it to 1-poae tues on in-
come and illheritance according to tbe 1ncreaaed proportion-
ate rate . 
In J.rticle 7 the Part7 treated tbe probleu ot tbe 
workers 1n Iraq. Toe Part7 was aat1at1ed •1th the workers• 
law paaeed b7 Parl 1aaent but the worker•' rl.gbte bad to be 
1ncreaeed and lJoprcved, r&rt1cularl; thoao that concerned 
tbe time or work and tbe 111n1.1CW1 wage a. 'l'be Part7 supported 
their rl.gbte to eatabliah laborera' un1ona 1.n order to daran4 
their rl.gbta. JUdiciarr action••• called on to deal with 
laborers• atraira. 4 apecial enactment waa required for tbe 
workora' securit7. 
Tbe Party concluded it• program with Article 8 which 
treated ma~ •ocial matter• , such a• 1ll1terac7. The Part7 
cona14ered tbe state reapona1ble tor paaa1ng a la• ma1<1ne 
prl.&aey education ccmpulaorr and tree l.n all 1t• •tag•• alld 
tor broadenir.g technical and protesa1onal education. ~· 
Party emphasized and encouraged assoc1at1ona and club• which 
embraced teachers, poet1, artists and mua1c1ana . It alao 
emphasized the aecur1t7 of tbe health or tb1 people b7 advo-
cating tree treatment, increasing the number or boap1tala, 
an4 improving the ccndit1cna ot those in ex1atence. Tb1a ar-
1S2 
ticle aleo appeal9d to the people to co-operate •1th the 
government i n following tho health protection auggestiona 
to avoid treatment. The Parey did not neglect the towns 
and villages but oallod on tho government to organize tb•m 
to be modern &nd boal t1>7. Thia article ••• concluded b7 
calling ror tho 9ducat1on or tbs Iraq1an women 10 tbtt t0.7 
would bo qual1!1ed to p&rtic i.pe.te 1.n political lire. 
The Arab Union 1.n the Part71 s Opinion. 
The Part7 treated thia 1.n Article 4 and conaidered the 
co-operation among Arab countries 1.nevitable aa a aoaaure ot 
1ecur1ng their independence . Tho Part7 coll9d on the Arab 
goYerm:ents to remOY• all political , eeonoM1c, bound.arr and 
artificial obatacl••• to rac1.11tate th• connection and co-
oporaticn &!tong the domocr&ti.c com:unitiea , to bring about 
the 1.deal or an Arab Leacu•, to defend Arab 1.ndependence, 
to do!end Arab 1.ntereata, and to prevent tho danger ot im-
perialism, 1.nclud1ng the Zionist danger. 
The Party thought that un1t7 aboul.11 be achieved by 
gradual dovolo-nt, b7 achieving r1.r1t th• abo•e l!ODtioned 
que1tiona and by executl.Jl6 &ore acute &atter1 until the unit7 
bee*"'" a natural utter. The Part7 thought that the Arab 
un1t7, like aey national question of an:r countrf, should be 
approached OD logical !cundat~on for lolut1on. Actually, it 
waa to develop from a 11.mple to a coaipl1cated atage . 
I 
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IJ>ternal Organization ot th• Part1 
The Party consisted or th• following oacmitteoa1<29J 
1 . General Committee. Th1• committee repre1ented the total 
.. aberahip and held it• yearly oon .. ention in Baghdad. Thi• com-
m1ttee was invited to convene whenever nece1anry tor a second 
or a third t1ae. 'fbe convention was called by a de:t.&nd ot ona-
third ot the total .,.abera or b7 a deciaion ot tbe Central 
Committee. The conference planned tho eeneral policy of the 
party tor the enau.l.ng 7ear and elected th• leader ot the party 
and the .. .i.ers ot the Central Committee for 1uch 7ear. Th• 
convention delegates bad ti.. r'-Sbt to amend the interior •1•-
te .. ot the party •• well aa it• prograa. 
2. Central COllllllitt••· It conaiated ot the part7 leader 
and a memberahi p ot not less than aix. Ito main t\lnction waa 
that ot exeout1r.g deoiaiona or the General C.....S.tt••• exaatn•ng 
application• ot new .,.llbera, and inviting the General Cocaittee 
to tbe 7earl7 convention. Thi• CalU!littee gave a report to tb• 
General Ccmalttee about the part71 a activitiea, it• financial 
atatua, and it• probl••• · It aubmitted its own auggeet1ona 
tor opening new branch•• and aup.rv1a1ng the adminiatrative 
c.-ittea and guiding it. It alao treated all -ttera occurring 
between the meeting• ot tbe two oonventiona and either tried 
membera or aubmitted their trial to a aub-committ••· 
3 . Adm!niatrati•• CCCR1ttea. Thia c.,..ittae conaiated ot 
not leeo than five meabera, according to the directions ot the 
(®} Xlerwa R£iaxine, 67 l l erwa Xeaociation in tlli Alierican 
Uni .. ere! of Beirut, p. ro. Aleo eee COl2'.Ullim am 
Hationali'"" in the kiddle Eaat, b7 w. z. Laqueur, p. 190. 
Central CClllllitteo. Th• meabera of thia COlll"J.ttoo elect a 
chairman, oeeretary and troaourer. Ite membora are elected 
by tho party membera . The Adlll1n1otratr1ve Com..1ttee execute 
tho dec1a1ona of the General Co=ittee and the Central Com-
a1ttee, try the aeabera •ho belong to it• branch, and iaoue 
judgment• other than tho penalty of diuiaaal. 
4. Other eamoittoea may be establiahed by the Central 
Committee according to the party•o o;r.tem. lloot important 
among th••• ••re Tho Political Office Comaittee , The Organiz-
1"8 CCD)itte•, The Proao and Propaganda Committee, The I.&borera' 
CommJ.ttee and Th• Accounting C""""1tt••· 
The People'• Party tried to link tho purpoaea of the or-
ganisation. Tho Partr al• aya aoditied it• o:othod• to ••t 
th• circ1matancoa ao •ell aa ebe pu.rpoaoa. Tho Party l:lan&god 
ita polieiea on centralixod democratic baaoa. It followed 
demooratic method• beoauoo it believed tbat tho democratic 
methods were tho boat and the right way tor 1ecurit7 1n •loot-
ing ouccoostul loadorohip. Tho leadorabip bad to be aatiatac-
tory to the ae.:berabip, tor the meabero had to be aaaurod about 
tho 1ntogrit7 of docioiona. 'rb• Part7 followed contrallaat1on 
baoically to guarantao tho un1.t)' of doeiaiona and to ouperY1ao 
tho execution of docia1ona ot the majorit7. Tho minority had 
to obey the majority . It may be aa1d that according to tbo 
leadorahip ot Tho Poopl•'• Party the two aattore ot democracy 
alld centreli£ation coincided. 'rn1a ia one roaoon tor tho Partr '• 
power and a aajor reaaon tor its auccoao 1n inordinate ciroua-
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staneee When tho part7 overe8lll.• aanr political ditticultiea 
brousht about b7 a111tarr law. 
Kellbera ot the Part7. 
<3o)Tbe People'• Part7 had atarted the etruggle tor the nor-
aal exiatence ot the Parliament all4 the partiee tbree yeara 
betore the othera. Tb.eretore, it• aellberahip ••• larger than 
that or other parti•• in Iraq, partioularl7 tor a abort par1o4. 
Its memberehip ••• eat!Joated at about 10,000. 
Tb• Part7 had proteeoional leader• who did nothing but 
organ1•• the Part7 &114 •-rvLae. It was reported that no 
party bad thee• characteristic• other t han the Peopl•'• Part7. 
Th• Part7 bad no brancbee 1n other Arab countriee becauao , 
according to 1te internal structure, it bad no legal rigllt to 
Joill or contact other partiee. 87 the .... token, it had no 
branch•• 1n other Iraq1an towna, 1n 1pite ot 1te penetrQtion 
to the towns and villag••· Having no branch•• 1n other l.rab 
countriea did not mean that the party waa isolated trcoo l.rabian 
un1t7. On tho eantrarr, the pe.rt7 pledged 1taelt to detend 
the l.rabi&n attaira and rigbta . 
The People'• Part7 leaders Joined the leadera ot the 
National Democratic Part7 tor a certain length ot tiae b\lt, 
becauae the torser eetabliahed an eztre~e lett wing, the two 
ap11t and then decided to work aa aeparate parti•• under th••• 
name1. The Part7 wae ready to co- operate with everi democratic 
and national tront 1n Iraq, aa well aa 1n the entire Arab world. 
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However, tho experience ot the Part7 ••• aucb th.at 1oco 
democratic olonent1 did not havo the courage to call on 
tbe govorlll!lent to make tbe neceaaarr 111med1ate reforms 
and oppoae it1 1mperial1at1e proj1ot1. Moreo•er, tbe leadora 
ot other national tront1 were quite mator1al11tic and had no 
deti.nJ.t• progreaa {though 1t "the7 did ha•• progr&1111, •hen 
th•7 c~ into power, tbe7 did not execute th-). Th• 
leader• ot tho Part7 bad contacted moat ot tho leader• ot 
other partiea for co-operation and unit7, but tbe othera did 
not indicate any do11ro tor such unit7 and co-operation. Ho•• 
••er, The People' a Partr •a• :read7 t o co-operate •1th all 
partioa, particularl7 on the aoat Japortant queation.a in the 
national field. Tbia co-operation ••• ot great neceaait; b•· 
cauae ot tb• •••kn••••• ot the national mOYemont. 
Inaar;uch aa Th• People'• Party aponaorod democratic 
1deala in addition to national funet1one directly main~ 
toward Iraq1an indepondenca, practicing real domocrac7, and 
t1nd1ng a solution to tbe land problem• and tbo induatr1ali-
&ation of tho ccunt1"7, it invited all Iraqiana regardleaa or 
rel1g1on,aect and cla11 to take part in tho atore-cont1oned 
purpo1e1 and to work tor tbea- But a cloae •tud7 ot the tJpe1 
of people who Joined Th• Part7 1nd1catea a majority ot laborera, 
farmere, educated liberala and prof1111onal1. The Party wa1 
1upported by a majorlt7 ot students and profeoaora and received 
a great deal or •rapatb7 from lawrera, doctor• and •ng1neero. 
In other worda, tbe I raq1an 1ntoll1genta1a ••re in tavor ot 
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tho part7 ••on thoUS)l tt.17 did not participate 1n l ta ....i>e:r-
ehip. llan:t ot tho rich , landlords , •nd the ott1c1•l• or Iraq 
joined or recommended 1ta prograaa. 
The Paper ot the Partz. 
'!be Part7 iaauod ita own paper , Al• atan, before tho Part)' 
• aa gi•on legal pena1aa1on to eXiat. It waa 111....t at tirat 
aa a •••kl7 political .-gazlne; then 1n Janual'f , 111<&6 , it be-
e...,• a dail7 political paper. Twice the government 1uppr<1aaed 
its publication. Ot courae, thia ••• due to ita diacloaureo 
about 1mper1•11at1c conterencea 1n Iraq and because or its at-
tacking go•ernaent leadera, tho pro-Britiah and t ho pro-palace. 
Tho govermoent tr11d t o pare.l7te 1ta act1v1t1•• and retuaed to 
permi t enotber publication ot tbe paper b7 tho Part7. '!'hue , 
the Part7 oontinuod to publieb tbo periodical iaauoa under tho 
nao:e ot "Th• Rebirth Xeoaagea• and tho •111u11 ot the People'• 
Part7· " 
Tho .t.ch1eve=onta ot tho Partz. 
(Zllno PartT achi1v1d llAll3' ,.. ttora alone or with other parti eo . 
Sea• ot these • ttera ••r• ot i:aportant conc•rn to town.a or 
•illagea , but the Part7 kopt theae 1.Qportant mattore a secret . 
Tb• Part7 gave tho tollo•ing .. ttora it• diroot conoideration. 
l . Tho theory upon which tho notional mo•omont otanda. 
(!1) 
Tho Party regarded ita own program ao being tho t1rst otato-
lierwa M~zlno, publl1b1d by llorwa liooclatlon In tho 
liirlcaveraitS ot Beirut, spacial 111u1 about politi-
cal parti11, P• :5' . 
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ment concerning the reality of the national queatione &nd ita 
program aa being the only practical solution for the Iraqian 
prcblema. The leaders of the Party accused the national1sta 
of having no firm program or &nT guide i n their worl<. Tbe7 
described public opinion tr.at existed before Tbe People'• Part7 
c&Jte into exietence a.s au,ggesting 5omeone wandering in the 
deeert or floundering in the ocean not knowing whore to go. 
They eaid that public opinion was divided: sQl!e people thought 
that independence could not be &ch1ovod without tbe help of 
that tol'ilign atate; othera believed that another state could be 
used to achieve the aame purpose. A third group believed that 
the progrui of a party 1n tbe other atate was the beat guide 
to follow to achieve 1.ndependenoe and carry out reform meaau...a . 
In brief, the Commun1ata regarded themaolvee as rospon11ble for 
the establishment of tbo national movement; and they were the 
first to place the cornerstone for nationalism and tor rotors. 
It is true to a great extent th&t they gave the nationalists a 
lesson in perseverance and loyalty to their beliete. 
Interestingly enough, the C ommuniat Party did not admit 
that they wore Co.....niata . They l'ilforred to t heir principle• 
aa being moderate, particularly when they aaid that • •• • tbe 
principles of the People's Party had encountered, in tbe be-
ginning, 8lllple oppoait1on and were or1tie1zed severely by the 
extreme right and b7 the moderate leftists! Party members en-
gaged 1n many arguments and controversies to perauade the people 
concerning the etf1ciency ot tbe1r principles and the capab1lit7 
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ot tbeir party'• progroa. Th• Party bel1•••d that thoae who 
critic1•ed ita progrt.11 quoted onl7 a part or its program and 
a part of 1t• pr1nc1plAa and attacbed their orit1c1amo to the 
Part7' a progrr w1 th or •1 thO\lt cll&Jlge. Th•7 eupported their 
argwaenta •1th the tact that tn• 1r progr..,• were aat up three 
7eara betor• parties ware ott1ciall7 pera1tt•d and b•tore other 
part1ee had ••t up th•ir progr .... 
2. De=ocracr and Partr Lite . 
'fhe eatablilhment ot Th• People 1a Part7 an4 til• 1nclua1on 
ot tho11 who th•n join-4 the Part7 repr11•nted th• t1rat or-
gani••d group to en&age in the battle to bring real democrao7 
to the countr,. The7 pretend.94 tl:.at th•7 alone atood aga1n1t 
th• rulina autboriti•• 1n an •Ddeavor to bring about democrac7 
and parlioaentarr lite on the one halld aJld, on tbe otber hand , 
to con•1.nc• th• peopl• or th• cec•ea1ty or t~e return or par-
ti•• until th• goverment reapoDded to tb11 neceeo1t7 and per-
mitted part1ae to praotioe tb•1r normal political act1v1t1ea. 
In br1•t , th• c ...... •ntata b•l1•••d that tbe return or part1•• 
to thair a ct1v1t1ee 1n April, 1968, c&111e a1 the truit or th•ir 
etruggl• · 
3. T'be Pal••t1ne (\ueation. 
The People•a Party devoted '8Jllple eftort to d11oloae the 
Z1on1at conap1rac1aa and t heir danger to the .lrabian countri.1, 
aa well aa to Paleatin•· Th• Part7 ana171ed thie danger on a 
logical baai• tar removed troa tanat1c1 .. and prejudice . Th• 
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Party made 1harp d1ttoront1at1ono between Zioni1m and Juda1•• · 
l'lhen Jlr , Bevin aent hi• 1nqu1r)' cc.mitt•• to tho Arab 
world, tll• Party ignored th• cocmitt•• and tbo leader retuaed 
to meet th• chairman or tho cOlll.Cdttee to give hi• op1n1ona on 
the queat1on. Soon afterward the Party iasued a atatoment 
which called tor non-coo oration • 1th the Brit1ah c°"""ittoe. 
Tho Party deacr1bed tbe atatemoot •• being very u1etul. It 
was admi.r•d by the nat1onal1sta both 1na1do and out11de Iraqi.an 
territor7. In thia area th• Part7, tosother w1t11 other 1"'rtie1, 
formed a OOllll:ittee tor the dete11.1e ot Pale1t1ne. l'bey called 
tor a general atr1l<• to expr••• the teol1:11£e ot th• p.oplo. 
They w11bed to go to Pale1t1ne to h•lp tno1r Ar•b brothera 1n 
this hard a1tuat1on. In tact , the7 did nothing but agitate 
and car.paign tor Stalin and the bread . 
4. 'l'he Party participated •1th other part1ee 1n oppoa1ng th• 
Alalllll&ri ~overnment, ao tLat it • •• obliged to reaign beoaua• 
of ita dictatorship and it1 arbitrary behavior towards the 
People'• Party, aa well a1 towarda othera. Many ot the Eetab•ra 
ot tbe People •a Part1 were arrested and tried. Among th••• 
••• A&1c Sharit, th• Party•a loader. It ahould be aent1onad at 
thia po1nt that the CoDWUDiots upread a lot or propaganda on 
the tloor or tho Court and benet1ted a good deal tr.,. tbeae 
trial• · They called the attention ot the p-.iblio to what ti.07 
stood tor . Thia reeulted 1n a great deal or 1:yapatby. They 
gained ma~ supportera. 
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5 . Th• Partr alao oppo••d tne cabinet ot Nouri AAl••id, • hioh 
replac•d tn• Al&umari cabinet b•c•u•• th• roraer c._. to 
achieve what the latter bad tailed to achieve 1:>eotar ae 
tore1&n l.Jlporialiem ••• concerned . llouri Aaaaid'• govern-
ment announced that it bad come to bring tree •lectlona and 
to gi•• tbe preaa treedc. and to persit PArtiea to open 
brancbea 1n the town• · Tb• People' a Part7 did not ••it, how-
ever, but attacked the new cabinet on the ground that tne7 
were an English puppet and octuall7 paral7zed th• legal tr••-
dom.a ot apoech, ;ire a a, an..\ meetin&. IC&n;f ot th• C01mUDiat 
ae.ml>era ••r• tried ard executed 1n ftagbdad v.11>11c aquarea and 
othera ••r• sentenced to prison tor titteen and twent7 7eara.(l5e) 
Other• were deported t.nd lost their Iraq1an olti&enship. Tbua, 
the Part,. 1 e accwsationa regard.inc the government were true 1n-
aotar aa ita action• aga1net t<>e Part7 ••r• concer:ied. 
Betore concluding the diacueaion ot the People'• Part7 
(which could be conaidered as the extreae lett) it 1a worth 
.. ntionl..n,!r that there • •• aalle evidence that it ••• 1n contact 
with an organization pol'!a1tted b7 the go•eM111ent known aa "Th• 
.\Jlaooiation tor Contention AG•1nat Zionin. • (l5l5) lloat ot th• 
mombera, •• Joeopb Zellch (•ho loat hia Iraq1an oitizenah1p), 
Nagi• Ibrahim Shloail ( eentenced tor ti.tteen 71ar1), and Jacob 
(S2) 
(33) 
'Phe l1ldillo !!i•t ID World l??alr•, b7 Lenczow•kl, p. 228. 
Xl•o aee Ccornmlam iliid Na tionaliom in the lliddle Eaat, b7 W. z. Laqueur, pp. 191-202. 
Communism and Nationalism i n the Middle Eaat, b7 w. z. 
Liqueur, p. 1116 
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Massai ( sontoncod tor twenty years) ••re Jews . These two 
groups may be characterized as representing axtreme left 
positions. It was proven that they were directed by the 
secret Iraql.&n Communist Party. Moreover, loaders of these 
tlro groupa were among tho d istinguished and ro•pona1ble 
l eadera ot the secret party. 
The advent o! llouri Aaaaid to power 1n 1954 and his 
rougll auppression of theao dangerous groupo (as far as the 
govermnont was concerned) wao tollo•ed by another period 1n 
which the aa~e old part io• returned t o their polit ical acti-
vities , 1n addition to now partioa that wore eetabl1shod. 
Part tee 1949-1955. 
In tho previous d1aouao1on of partioa attor World War II 
(1946-1949), starting with tho Independence Party , we have 
aeon tive l i beral partioa which advocated nationa l policy, 
published excellent program• and struggled to a great degree 
to oppooe the reactionary pro-British ruling elements. Theae 
tive parties made it c lear that the Iro.qian Nation wanted com-
plete independence, free press, free associations, and tr.e 
election•. Purthennore, they wanted to practice tho democratic 
principle which the conotitutLon guaranteed tor them. They 
no longer could endure the eueceas1ve governments' reatr1ot1ona 
to party expansion and to party political activities. Suooess-
1ve governments were vory hostila to the liberal political par-
ties, - so much ao that on September 27 , 1947 , two parties 
were deelnred illegal (tho People's Party and the National 
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Un1t:r Part:rl. Two others (the Liberal Part:r and tho National 
Domoerat1c Party) were obliged to auapend their pol1tieal ao-
t1vitiea beoauae of the 1Jnpoas1b1lity of democratic activit7 
under dictatorship. The Independence Part:r •as the onl7 one 
•h1oh survived and continued opposition with a tangible re-
duot1on to the ruling element•' boatilit;r. It baa to be 
clear~ understood that the People'• Part:r and tho Nati onal 
Unity Part:r were C"""1IUllists; tlle National Democratic Part:r wore 
soc1a11ats; and the Indepanden.ca Party wars extreme nationaliats1, 
w1th visible leanings toward aoe1aliam. Th1o does not mean that 
the other partiee had no national loaning or tendenc:r, but the 
auecoas1vo governttenta, to destroy them, aecuaed them of extre=o 
eommun1em. 
Tho Independonco Party, hoadod b;r i!Uhammad lo!ahd1 K\J.bba , an 
Iraqian nationalist, a prominent figure and a professional poli-
tician, who ostabliabed the party with a group of young edu-
cated men witb nationalist tendencies, such ae Daoud Alsa 1ad1 , 
and l5111A1l Alghan1m, on March 12, 1946. The Party's program 
was set up to oat 1sty all m1norit1eo in Iraq. The Party, to 
•in supporters, empbasi:od the tact that the nation is the 
source of aupremae:r and therefore tho party to reach its objec-
tives depends upon tho support ot the maaaes . The inner aim 
of tho party was to bring most of the interests ot the people 
•1th1n a m1n1mum standard of l.iving. The Party's program mad• 
1t clear that curing disease, ignorance and povorty should be 
the immediate role for progree a. An 1Jnportant feature of the 
Party ' s program••• tho un1t7 of the nation regard.lees of claae, 
164 
religion or race. Thia meant that the Party wanted to remove 
all d1fforencos between the Iraq1an nat1onals , be they politi-
cal, religious or aoe1al. The un1ty of the nation required 
the establishment ot a sol1d social and national front.< 34) 
In general, the Party•• program had ai.x major a1ms deal111g 
with the domestic policy, the ~ore1gn policy, the economic and/or 
financial policy, the national policy, the cultural policy, and, 
finally, a public social policy. Tho independence ot Iraq re-
coived priority 1n tho domesti·c and foreign policies. The un1ty 
of the Arabs and the question ot Palestine received no leao a 
chance. The relationship with Britian was based on the equal 
mutual interests ot the two oountrioa. It was obvious tnat 
the Party•a program was suggestl.nl! three main points: 
(34) 
1. Unitinl! the Iraqian people 1n a strong front behind 
tho Party ao that tho latter could introduce tho 
nocoasary aoeial, political and economic reforma 
required for a progressive noti on. 
2. Uniting the Arabian nation and protecting her terri-
tory from a~ kind ot aggroosion, thereby holping 
the Arabian territories under foreign influence, 
materially and morally, to achieve their indepen-
dence and to join the League ot the Arab Statoa. 
3 . To taJco a noutra l stand 1n the cold war between 
Capitalism and Communism camps. 
See History of !raglan tlin!striea, by A. Alhaosan!, Vol. 
7, p. 28 , arid also soo th~ Partyts Program. 
The In4ependence Party also advocated: 
l. A atrons Arab national. policy. 
2. A moderate aoeial rofo·no . 
3. An anti- British and anti-Ruasian "rig)lt wing" . 
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Most of its members wi1'8 either former members ot Almu-
th&llllA Club or sympathized with Resheod A1gaillani 1 a coup 
d'etat . During the last World War a nUlllber of them were de-
tained 1n internment camps . T'b.ey were suapicioua of fore~ 
iJ>fluenco and were both anti-British and anti- Russian. Their 
leader, lNh.almnad Mahdi KUbba , waa formerly vice-president of 
tho Almuthanna Club, The Party's official organ was, and is, 
t ho Li•a Alist1klal . llany of its mombers, among whom wore 
educated nationalists, as Paek Al aamurra•i and Sadik Shunahill, 
11ero eleetod t o parliament 1n apite of the government'• :force-
tul 1nfluenee. The Party participated with the Liberal parties 
1n oppoaition to the successive dietatorahipa of pro-British 
ruling elements, 1n opposing the shametul stand of the Iraqian 
government in regard t o t he question ot the Paleot1nian Araba, 
and in opposition to the linking of Iraq with Britain 1n an;y 
treaty Whieh might impair Iraqian independence. Many ot its 
leading members were arrested, and its paper was auppres4ed, 
but tho party enthusiasm di.d not change. Loading politicians 
i n t he Party were 1n favor of immodiate unity with Syria but 
they deaitated to do any-thing to hasten that unity due to the 
fact tbat Syria enjoyed more independence than did Iraq. The 
leading elements of the Indopendence Party therofore felt that 
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such unity would bring a Br1t1sh 1nfluence to Syr1a •h1ch would 
mean that Syr1a ga1ned nothing except ths impairment of tne ou-
premacy tor •bl.oh she fought long ago. 
The Party co- operated •1th the L1beral part1es in the past 
and ia roady to co- operate w1th any party i t that co- operation 
will lead to the national interest but Will never co-operate 
wi th parties that serve foreign interests. The Party baa no 
branches in towns other than Baghdad but it does have support-
ers all over the country. It baa no formal conneot1on with 
parties 1n Syr1a or Egypt but its national policy ia approved 
by many part1es 1n Iraq as well aa 1n other Arab states . The 
Party played a tremendous role in the opposition and proved 
to be a very enlightened group. In spite or extraordinary 
political circumstances, the Independence Party struggled tor 
existence to such a degree that it aurvived where other parties 
could not . It survived up to November 23, 1952, when the pro-
Britioh ruling elements could not endure opposition any further . 
Certain projects ot military alliance had to be carried out, 
martial law was declared, political part1os wore declarod illegal 
and their organs were auppressed . <35 J The Independence Party 
bad to suspend its political activities by force . Today, the 
Independence Party ia alive 1ll practioo but dead by law . 
The Party could be characterized a s assuming the position 
of extreme nat1onaliam. It a1msd at uni fying t he Arabian 
countries under a National Socialiat Syatem. It was one ot the 
(35) See History ot Iraqlan Mliiistrlea, by A. XlhaasaD!, Vol . 
8 , P• 344, and alao aee Iraq 1960 to 1950, by Stephen H. 
Longr1gg , p . 355 
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parties that oxpreaaed hoatilitz toward the a1stem ot the 
monarch1 and called for the republican system. rt did not 
participate in the eloction campaign of 1947 and protestod 
against govornmontal interteronce. Its legality was aboliahed, 
lll<e that ot other parties, b7 RO)'al deoroo i n August , 1951, 
by Nour1 Aasa1d's government, but it ~an.aged , aa atated above, 
to survive until November 23 , 1952. Moot of its members were 
middle - class, students, and professional men. No rich people 
were enrolled 1n its memborsh.ip. 
constitutional Uni on Partz. 
(36 lon November 21, 1949, Prim• Minister Nouri Asoaid (then 
1n power), taking advant.ige or the partial lull 1n partz ac-
tivitz, decided to found his own partz. Aasaid in a speech 
delivered troo the national broadcasting station invited the 
Iraqian nation to support his party, Which he described aa a 
new progressive movement aiming to bring national awakening, 
to guarantee national unity, independence and proaperitz. 
Very aoon thereafter Aasaid published bis part1' s program 
•hicll could be described ae an exceptional program of Arab 
brotherhood, friendship wi th all nations, anti- CO!lll:lUnistic, 
for treaty revision, and progress to national greatness at 
home and abroad. <37J 
Tbo Party was composed ~t various elements of conaerva-
tism alld vested intereata, tr1bal and urban, and found oo-
(36) 
(37) 
See Iras 1966 to 1960,by· Stephen H. LOngrigg, p. !65, 
and also Iraqlan Mlnletriea, by A. Alhasoani, p, llS. 
See the Part~'• Program.. Alao see Azzman Papar No . 3686 , 
dated Nov. 2 , 1949. 
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heaion 1n a comlllon devotion to Aeeaid, the Palace, and, ao 
long as Aaaaid remained 1n power, to tho British. Very soon 
this Party became tho greatest and the most powertul and the 
most amenable of the partiee. It coul.4 not but dominate tho 
Psrliamont. No wonder that it was joined by an imposing ar-
ray of ex-ministers and ministrablesl 
l!ost of the lllembora of Parli&"1ent joined ite membership 
and for this reason the Party wae t be majority party 1n Par-
liament . Thia Party can also bo characterized as a nomadical 
party inasmuch as lllOst of the tribe- chieftains were enrolled 
in its membership . Tho Party wae known by tho opposition as 
the "Party of Landlordiam" or the "United Party ot Landlordiam." 
Many personalities trom Shi1a and Sunna were among its mombsrs . 
llany students wore encouraged to enroll. The Party's political 
tendencies 1n general were pro-Wast . The Party participated 
effectivel y in engineering lll&llY political developments in tho 
l!iddle Bast, particularly regarding the military coup d'etat 
that took place 1n Syria in 1949. It published a daily poli-
tical paper carrying the name of the Party and many other 
paora as Elkabas and Elnathir. Article 2 or the Party's pro-
gram mentioned the purpose ot the Party to "•·• ach ieve general 
reforms 1n political, economic. aoo1al, and cul tural fields 
according to an enlightened program •• • • and in Arti c le ~ ot 
the program expl~ined tho foreign policy as tollows: " ••• tying 
tbe brotherhood connection and broadening understanding between 
tho Arab countries by enoourag1.ng certain projects which in-
crease tho rolationship between tb.eae countries " . . . . , 
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ing tho Anglo-Iraqi.an treaty allianoo to secure Iraq1o.n 
national indopondenoo and JUpromacy •••• • ln fact, the party 
now 1n power did change the Alnglo-Irnqi.an relations to another 
d1.mens1on by bringing about tho Midd le East defense and by 
signing tho Baghdad-Ankn.ra treaty, which wao lately joined by 
London , Karachi, and Teberan. Also, " · · ·· continuous struggle 
to support the Arabs of Palestine and to save Paleat1ne ae 
well aa the other Arabian coum.triea from the dangors or Zi on-
ism •• .• " And, finally, tho article oought international co-
oporation 1n the areaa of po11t1ca, economies , and peac e with-
in the United Nations. 
Tho National Socialist Party. 
This party was established by Saleh Jaber and a group of 
Shia 1 s leaders and a minority ot Sunna on .iuno 23 , 1951. The 
Party did not add anything no~ i n i ts pr ogr am that d iffered 
trom t hat or the Constitutional Party , except for tbe follow-
ing f ive main points . 
l . It called for Arab unity through a federation 
to be 1n1t1ated by otateo willing to ente r such 
a federation. 
2 . It affiliated itself • 1th aoo1al1om but, practi-
cally, it was too tar removed because the toundera 
or tho party wore lanOlords . They wore not a1n-
cero in the1r 1deala. Moreover, they were in 
power several times an1 did nothing t o prove 
tbe1r sincerity. 
~. '!'bey ealled for oocial refo1"11a juot ao the 
Conotitutional Party h&d done , becauoe they 
realized the danaero o! eorrupt1on in govern-
mental department• and 1n the occial atmoa-
pbere . 
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'. Tbe Party pr ogram eouiated ot o:ore t ban one 
hund.red artielee in which were d11cu11ed the 
toreign, 1001&1, eeonomic , pol1t1cal, ooemter-
eial, t1naneial, agricultural , 1nduetrial and 
cultural probleme to be dealt •1th when the 
Party eeme to power . However, the Party could 
not come to power inasmuch aa the leader or 
the Party eigned the Porto:coutb Treaty ot 
JanUAry 15, 19(8, Which had been retuoed by 
the people . He, Saleh Jabor , then bad to re-
sign. 
5 . The Party aloo called tor uni ty between Sunna 
and Shia. Actually, however, the Party wao 
not only pro-Shi& but also called tor their au-
prei::acy ao well because they CCll:::pri aed the 
cajorit7 of tho population, Moreover, they 
•ere not i.n tavor of the ~onarch.7 •11tem be -
cauae the molUlrob was a Sunna and wao in 
f avor of tho Sunna ••et. The Br1t1eh noted 
thia natural pheno=enon and aupported the 
SUnna Porty ot Nouri 43aa1d (tbe Con.etitutional 
Party) to balance the po•er between tbe t•o 
par t iea. In 19f.8, wban Jahr ••• 1n po•er , 
he e liminated moat or the Sunna i n tho gove r n-
ment and brought back his supporter• · Then 
• hen Aaaaid 01&• back to power he brought the 
Sunna. 4a tar aa I ean tell, th• Kational 
Sooial Party, 1n r aot , is quite caP41ble or 
bringing about a r evoluti on aga1net the preaont 
regime through the police or t he al'llcy' or through 
aomo trieke17, eapeeially 11' the Conatitutional 
Party dooa not permit partiea to return to tho 
normal political aeopa &Dd remain 1.D power. 
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Tbe Party pub liahed m&07 papers 1.D t ho naa• or Elo=oa 
(The liation) a lld El.nab& (Tho •e•a). 'l'h• Party •as atroag and 
• ae represented 1.D the Parliament. A amll part7, the Aleeel&h 
Party , "Tb• Reform• , • •• omalgamatod with tho National Social-
iat Party. Tb1a small party was represented 1n tbo Parliament 
by one member. Tbe National Party •aa aboliehed by Royal de-
cree 1.D August, 1951, aa were otber parties . 
The liational Democratic Partz. <3el 
Thia Part;r waa established by ma~ educated Ireqian.a under 
the l eadership or K.am11 Elchadorch1 on APr1l 2, 1946. The 
foreign polic7 or tho party does not d1tter tran that or tbe 
othor part i es 1n r egard to the Arab unity . Ho•ever, regard-
ing the Anglo-Il'aqian relatione, the Party •anted absolute 
(SS) see c=miam &rid llat!ona1Llill In the lliadlo East , by W.z. 
Laqueur, p. l!IO 
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equality according to the provisions of the Ul! charter . Tho 
Party progra~ •~phasized that the relationship between Iraq 
and other countries be based on justice , brotherhood and 
national freedom. 
The domestic policy or the Party emphasized the reaponai-
bility of tho government to a parliament elected directly 
throlJ8h the proportional repreaontation system. The Party 
considered the neoessity of th~ growth of the political l1r• 
ot the parties as being of major importance and supported 
democratic treodom, parti cularly indivi dual freedom and rroo-
dom of the preea, speech, meetings, and belief , The a:noy, 
police, judicial department and gove rnment departments d•-
manded r eform. Particular emphasis was placed on the 1ndepen-
dence or justice to guarantee ·tho rights of the people . 
The Party doee not diatl..11,guish between Iraqi ana (Arnbe, 
X\lrda, Armenians , and Assyrian•), and the Iraqian House is tho 
place for thom to co- operate on the basis of mutual interoat, 
freedom , equality, and juotice . 
The economic policy of th·• Party regarded Iraq ae lagging 
behind because of lower productivity and the sharp distinction 
among the economic groups . Ig;norance , disease and poverty 
cannot be cured. without a Quiel< increaee in productivity. 
Thia indicates the necessity ot a project tor general reform 
in accordance with a firm plan to be achi eved over a period 
or time. This plan should give priority to the building or 
dama and irrigation projeoto , to the bringing of agricultural 
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indu.otrr md aaehinea to the oountrr b7 uaa or the experiaen-
tal agrleulturaJ. ranas, and b;r •ocou.r&ging the co-operat1Ye 
moYe.,.nta . The Party gave a oert&ln ...,unt or •"'pbaai1 to 
th• produotion or an1mala aod prov!.dina tor the necaaaarr 
ara•ina· 
The Party attempted to aolve the land problem by diatri-
butina the state land to the rarmora and by break.ing down 
larger private property into smaller private property. It 
waa al10 concerned with the settling down or the tribes on 
the !&l"'IU. 
The Party advieed that the tollo•ina 1tep1 ahould be 
tann. 
l . The Stet• u:ua t undertake to bring about such 
public aerY1cea aa water auppliea, eleotricit7, 
transportation proJ•ota, buaes, railroads and 
atreet car e . 
2. The State muat undert&lce the projects or oil 
production, mining, md other undeveloped mines 
Which ma7 bave been l&tel7 diacove,..d . 
3 . Tb• monopoly or the State or m1 project that .:ay 
baner1t the public. 
4. Tha Stete muse watch , orient, and encourage 
national capital b7 bu.1lding induttrial oomp&n.ioa 
1n Which 1ndiv1duaJ.1 participate. 
6 . The State muat gi ve aome consideration to the c0lt-
merc1al attaira through ccmmitteea or the t 1P" or 
organ1zat1ona that would d1root national comi:erce. 
1?4 
6. The State muat establish auper•i1017 com:mitteea 
to superviae and orient tho national m&rketa and 
establieh a national bank to control the eurioency 
and all matter• related to money atta1re (the 
national bank bas already been eatabl1obed), and 
other coaz:ercial, industrial, and agricultural 
banks (alreadr eetablllhed) to deal with national 
econooiy and make loans to tarmer1, 1ll4uetr1al1ata 
and merchant• on easy terms and over long periode. 
? . The State must undertake a project of ~•d build-
1.ns and the 11\provectent ot air, river and land 
camr.unication tbrougbCJUt the year 1n order to 
facilitate the transportation ot tbe product• to 
•111 part or the country. 
The Party 1n 1te p~sram tl'eated ta~ well all problems 
about Which eociety bad compla ined, particularly the proble=e 
of the laborera, tarmera, and middla-olaae membere. 
The Partz Paper. 
The •voice ot the Peoplen was tho Party•a paper and was 
known t o the people betore the Party wae ott1c1ally recognized 
1n 194? . It was 1aaued early 1n 19~4 t o re place the Elahab 
paper which waa aboliabed by the sovernmant ot Yasin Alhaabem1 
becauee of 1ta 1nB1etenoe on public treodcm. The "Voice or 
the People" waa aboliabed m&llJf t1.mea by the dictator govern-
,...nta. It i• now tho lars••t ot t he publications and ia read 
by moat ot the people. 
l?f> 
llr. ltamil Blchaderch1 was arrested aeveral taee and. 
tr1od because or the lll&ter1al he bad wr1tten in tho paper 
and because or what had boon wr1tten by othore 1n tho "Voice 
ot the People" 1naemucb as be was the manager and the ed1tor . 
He wae alao arrested tor the activities or h1a party. 
Tbro"6h the •voice ot tbe People" the poarty urg6d tbe 
Arab countrus to negotiate quickly tor their unity. Thie 
was the theme ot lll&ll7 art1olea wr1tt•n on August 21, 194<1, 
1n November ot 19•~. and. on ICarcb 22, 196~, and aleo ot many 
other articlee written on difterent occaeione. Tbe Party 
presented a good plan tor unity that did not d1trer too 
greatly trom tlat ot the People' • Party. 
Ae a cean1 ot comparing the llat1onal De.,ocrat1c Party 
with the others, we could oban.cterUe it ae a moderate left 
party -- th0\l8h more real1et1c. I have no doubt that it 
followed real democratic meth·od• and so"6ht democracy to a 
great extent . No wonder, then , that it wae aupported by the 
fa,,..r alld the laborer a e well as by tho intelligentsia ot 
Iraq. The pr1nc1pl•• a nd. the progl"&m ot th11 party u-. s1.a1-
1ar to the pr1nc1plea and program ot t ho People•a Party, •1th 
one exception. The latt.r waa too tar to the lett. Tbe Party 
••• tairly well repreaented 1n Parliament and, while the Party 
nev•r disclosed bow many members conat1tuted 1t1 membership, 
it was clear that none ot the landlords, 1beiks, and 1ntluen-
t1al pol1t 1c1aru1 were among its l!!elllbore. 
Tbo acbi•vement1 ot this party did not d1tter trom thoae 
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or the People'• Part7 regard111g fore~n pol107 and 1ts stand 
aga1nat 1mper1al1at1o bargaining. Tile Party waa the beet 
rapreaontativo ot tho people , tor it defended their cauaoa 
and disclosed their complaints . The •voice ot the People" 
was conatantl7 in touch •1th the different claaaee of peopla 
regard less or their location 1n the cou.ntr7. 
Thia P•rtT, too, ••• dec lared illegal along •1th the 
other pa.rties by the Ro7al decree ot Auguat, 1951, for 
achieving other 1.mper1alistic bargaining 1 Tile Pact ot the 
Middle East . 
Prom August, 1951, until today, Iraq once more 1a in 
the darkness period . The Iraqian foreign pol107 is split 
• 1th tb• general polic7 ot the other Arabian countries regard-
ing the conflict between Bast and West . The contradictory 
Ir•qian tore1sn polic7 h•• been directed, or course, without 
regard to the •111 or the people . The people cannot speak 
because the preaa baa been s uppressed and t he parties have 
been declared illegal. llart1al law baa been declared. 
To conclude thia particular portion ot tbe diacu1e1on, 
I would 11ke to rater to the factor I ldntioned in the intro-
duction, - that in lhia Arabic country, I raq, the eenae or 
democracy has not been realized until now; and the political 
leaders Who eetabliahed tho1r own part1eo on democratic baeee , 
which they mentioned 1n their part7 progroma, have attempted 
t o trample on democrac7 without regard to public opinion 1n 
their country or without regard to international opinion. 
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The United Popular Front . 
On April 14, 1951\39 ) a group of 2;l moderate and en-
lig)>tened leading politicians of both Shi 'a and. Sunna headed 
by Taha Alhashemi, llUZahl.JD Alpacbachi, Yuhnlnl!lB.d Redha Alahe-
b1b1 a.-W. Nassrut Alfares1 •• • etc., submitted application too 
the Iraqlan Ministr y of tho Interior to be peno.l.tted to torm 
a party to be known aa Algebhuh Aahshab1yah Almuttehdub, -
The United Popular Front . On April 26, 1951, the group was 
granted the official permiss i on and a new party of old and 
now politicians emerged , in the opposition. Th• United Popu-
l ar Front briefed the Iraqian nation with its program which 
contained the following major points. 
l. The unity of all national elements . 
2 . The introduction ot a quick and general reform. 
3 . The achievemont of the independence and the su-
premacy of Iraq from any foreign lnfluoneo . 
4. The achievement of full co- operation with the 
Arab ~ague to make lt able to protect and de-
fend tho interests of the Arabian people, to 
secure their freedom, independence and unity. 
5 . The stand that Palestine ls a part and parcel 
of tho Arab land. 
6 . The adoption of a neutral stand between the East 
and West atrusgle , 
In the dOl!lestio policy the United Popular Front advo-
cated Iraqian unity, croatlng a politic& l situation based 
on applying the constitutional la• under which tho government 
(39) ~~·;.~~ ot Iraqian Ministries, by A. Alhasaan1, Vol. 8, 
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must be responsible to a tree and d1reotly- olooted parliament 
whicb secures the individual a:n political liberties. The new 
group made it clear that they would act and co-operate to bring 
about a democratic constitutional reproaentation h•aod on l aw, 
respece, and 1ndopolldence or Judicature authority. Political 
part1oa and unioo or~anillationa •111 be gi•en tull treedcai to 
practice their aotiv1ti•• throushout the country. All exiat-
i ng laws contradicting theae aims w1ll be aboliahad. A naw 
l•gislntion will be drawn to try miniatere for viol&ting th• 
organic law, tor niau11ng their authorities, and tor illegal 
wealth . Close attention is to be given to tho corrupted 
go•enm:ental departaonta. These deparb:>onta c:ust be clarified 
from the corrupted ele1r.onta, by putting an olld t<> bribery and 
ai.milar illegal aggrandi:ement of poaition 1n tho govorxm:ent 
tor peracnal gain. But mean• must be found to guarantee that 
the laws don't contradict the constitution . 
In tho oconoN1o policy t be United Popular Front waa aware 
ot the tact that Iraq !ell victim to torei~n exploitation of 
it• econo"J' . Toe Iraqit.11 roeourcea ..uat be aaved tor tho 
nation•• benetita, particularly becauae tho ..-aa ot the people 
outter ooverely troa oxtrece poverty. Following a policy of 
planned econollQ', there omerged a plannod progr""' to develope 
tho moat important agricultural, commercial, and induotrial 
project whicb would 1ncreaae the nation•a econocic abilities . 
Tribes, farmers and laborers aho received the att,e.nt1on 
ot the United Popular Front. A corta1n arrongemont waa intro-
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duced to encOUl'Q;!e tribea to• ettle down and work in agri-
culture . Farmera we l'e to be given financial aid and tech-
nical ins tructions to improve and increaae their production. 
In the case or laborers, they needed oxtrece attention, ea-
peoiall7 in the improvement of their health and in the pro-
tection ot their ri£bta . 'l'be beat protection method regard-
ing their rights waa to tollow the social eacurit7 principle. 
A etudy of the programs ot the National Democratic Part7 
a.'ld tee United Popular Front Party reveal• a similarity in 
their princ1plea, particularly 1n their toreJ.an policy reeard-
1ng the neutrality ot Iraq and i n avoiding any participation 
in destructive warfare. Their policiea were alao ahiilar 1n 
r egard to linking Iraq to a aerong Arabian tront rather than 
to link the country to an alliance with Capitalietic or Com-
munistic oaepa which would exploit the count..,.•• econ<>=:r and 
uae the land •• baaea tor aggreeaion. The latter link would 
be very unwise . Thi• 11.tnilarity in their foreign policies, aa 
well aa in 12>eir do&aat!c policies, and their deep reeling 
that the aecurity or the count-t7 coupled •1th tbe experience 
they underwent during their country'• abort independence, 
brought them to unite tbeir et torts and to co- opera ta to re-
al at any k1nd ot toreien alli&J1ce -.bich might impair the 
country ' • auprecacy . To that and the National Democratic 
Part7 and the United Popul ar Front Part7 1aoued a Joint atato-
ment in Which tbe7 declared th• unity ot their otand •1th re-
gard to the tuture ot the country ' s politics and economics . 
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They alao reviewed the internal a1tuat1on, particularly tbo 
policy or tho pro-British elemonta •h1ch atood to dotend tho 
toro1gn 1nterosta at tho expenao or the ~oplo . The current 
intertoronce ot the exocut1vo author1tiea (goverNtent) in th• 
parli&l!lentary election• 1n order to aecure aupportera waa a 
1or1ous violation ot t be conet1tution and ••• •1rtuall7 a 
•iolat1on ot tho right• or tb• 1nd1v1dual citizen •• •ell •• 
a violation ot the collective r1gh.te ot the nation . The pub-
lic state.,.,nt l:lllde it clear that th• deterioration ot the in-
ternal political situation and the obvioua discontent ot 
dirterent element• in tbe nation, particularly •1th regard to 
th• miatroatzient or political priaonera ot oppoa1ticn by th• 
aucceaeive govornmenta and the hoatilit7 or theee governments 
to parti•• and their leadera, dictated the unit1 ot ettort by 
1incero national leaders to reveal to the nation the reality 
ot tho dangers on the path along which the ruling element• 
were leading the nation. It i• the duty ot thoee leader• to 
warn the ruling eleaents ot tbl di.r. con1equence1 a1 a reault 
ot their continuation to conduct the nation 1n tho aame old 
taehi on 1n 1pite or the deter1orat1on 1n different aspects ot 
the country• a llfe. 
The 1tatement pointed out that theoe two parties dec~nded 
the imll:ediate accomplishment or tour l.&portant i:oatters, n..,.ly: 
l. Iraq J:IU.St not be uoed aa a military baae tor ag-
greaa1on aga1nat any nation. 
2. So neutral1z1ng Iraq that i t m1gh.t retrain tra:i 
participating 1n an 1nternat1onal camp which 
would lead the country to be a battltield tor 
a destructive war 1n which Iraq would have 
nothing to ga in. 
~ . Tho nation mliat be the source of aupremAlcy. 
Constitutional treedomo must be guaranteed. 
The government must r espect the law and a 
goverrui:ent responsible to a trao and directly-
e lec ted parliament which enjoya the confidence 
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or the people must conduct the country's affairs . 
A deoand waa alao made tor investigat i on into 
t he events of tor turi ng political prisoners , 
for punishing th• persons responsible tor such 
torture and f or violating tho aacredneso of law 
and jus tice . They demanded the abrogation or 
poli tical jail s and the treatment of prisoners 
according to t he proviai ona of law. 
4. Duo t o the shor tage of food and c l othes, with 
thoir attendant h i gh prices, the people demanded 
to be provided W1 th food and clothing at reason-
able prices, and that the monopoly i n the market 
be ended . Purtherm.oFe, a demand tor the security 
ot farmers and laborers was expreased . 
The statement was conclllded by appeal1ng to the nation 
to close ranks , resort to un i ty , and sacrifice and s truggle 
for national independence and aupromacy following a method 
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ot organized political &eta. The statement waa ai@ned by the 
heads of the two political parties, K&mil Alchaderchi and Tab& 
Alhaahem1. 
The aucceaaivo military coups d'etat in Syria of March 
~. 1949, or Auguat 14, 1949, and or December 19, 1949, and 
t~.e l:lilitary co-~p d'etat 1n B.grpt or July 23, 1962, and 1n 
Lebanon on September 18, 1962 , called tor a change 1n the old 
reactionary rule . (40) The United Popular Front &a well aa 
the National Demooratic and tile Independence Parties submi tted 
a memorandum to the Regent (C:rown Prince) appealing to h 1m to 
interfere for tbe a&ke or improving the deteriorated situation 
brought about becauae or the absence or an enlJ.ebtened and 
aature legislative autborit7, and bacauae or th• l.ndif!erent 
aucceaaive governmenta . These partie1 referred to tbe tact 
that all Arab and Iolamic countriea were advancing 1n poli-
tical , social and aconomic !iolds but that Iraq was being 
latt behind. The memorandum ••• an appeal on one hand and a 
warning on tho other. A 111!.ilar memorandum ••• submitted to 
the Prl..!te Kinister by tno Nat1orutl Social11t Party tor the 
aa::e purpose . ( 41) 
The Regent replied to the pertiea• mecoranduma, admitting 
tbe tact tbat there was a deterioration and a change for the 
alLke or reform ehould be introduced. He made it clear that he 
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was not responsible for the behavior of the successive govern-
ments inasmuch as that responsibility falls on the legislative 
authority and also pointed out that the constitution was drawn 
up by respected people with high levels of education and mo-
rality. He denied that he was hindering any kind of reform 
or any of the parties• demands . He again referred t hem to 
the responsible government and t he parlil1lllent . 
It became obvious to the parties and to public opinion 
that there was no responsible authority to bring about the de-
sired reform. This led to a "Wild deCionstration Which coul d 
not be control led by the police . The government reaigned on 
October 23 , 1952, and the Arm:y occupied Baghdad. •!artial law 
was declared . Arcry Chief ot Staff (Nouri Ad.din V.ahmud) formed 
the governmont and euspended political parties and their or-
gans . A group of 22 persona were arrested , among them minis-
ters, house representatives , journalists and party leaders . 
A mass of 2999 persons wore tried by the Military Council. 
Threo were aenteneed to death . 958 were sentenced to 1mpr1eon-
ment and 262 wer& !ined. 294 were r eleaeed on bail. 1161 
woro declared 1nnoeent. C42 l 
The suspension of political partie• and their organs was 
believed to be tet1porary beeauee ot its illegality. Thel'erore 
the Iruiependonce Party and the llational Democratic Party on 
January 31, 1953, and on February l, 1953, protested the 
government's decioion to suspend the political parties and 
t heir paper• · They poioted out that the military governor 
(42) Risto~ of Iraqian M!n!atr!es, by A. Alhaasani, Vo!. 8, 
pp. 3 - 31!3. 
184 
who mAde that decision violated the constitution and violated 
the al.Jr.pleat principles of democracy. Prime Kinister Jamail 
Al.medfa'i did not respond to the partieo• demnnd and they were 
kept suspended. However, they were struggling to bring back 
the semi-democratic period, and they made it clear to the 
Prime ).!1nister 1n their corre.spondence .. 1th him that they 
would continue to propagate against the dictatorship and that 
they would encourage people to raise their voices to bring 
about a rule which did not violate their rights . The situation 
remained without parties until tho Royal Decree No . 19, or 
1955, abrogated political parties and such abrogation has 
lasted till the minute of writing this subject . 
To conclude the Iraqian parties it ia my duty to praiee 
the Iraqian nationalists and the moderate Iraqian leaders tor 
their struggle and sacrifice to keep their dignity and to 
throw off the British influence and tho pr e-Brit ish ruling 
elemsnta. Although up to this date t he nationalist& could not 
bring about a freo election or even remove the British in-
fluence which bad already been thrown off all Asian countries, 
I have t o register the fact that these courageous people 
seized every opportunity ·llbioh arose to shake ott that foreign 
1mpor1al1am which, unfortunat~ly, was welco~ed and supported 
by the Royal Family and by the reactionary old pol iticians who 
preferred to serve the foreig·n 1ntereata at the expense of 
their nation and welcomed alliance with foreign nations rath•~ 
than welcoming alliance with their Arab brothers. Those ele-
le& 
aenta llnew ver'f well that th•:r had no honest background on 
which they could gain the people ' • confidence and tbat t hey 
therefore bad t o keep nandling the atta1rs of th• country 
on the basea ot supporting foreigners to further their l.n-
toreata and to back their powor . 
It 1• no secret to state that Syria and Eg;:rpt now enjOJ 
a cOl:!plete independence which the Iraql.ane have not yet 
reached . 
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CO!iCLUSIOll 
Factora ot democracy's tailure 1n tho Arab cOU.Dtri&s and 
rea1on1 that led Parties to be 1nett•otive as tar as deaocraoy 
and parl1amontary life are concerned . 
So tar as I can see tho po1nte or woaknoos i n tho Arabian 
political , aoc1ol and oconom1o aooietiee, I point out the tollow-
1ng tac tors: 
l . Party leaders have lll&lliteated d11oontont 1n regard to 
tho n•o•aslty or working on tho ba1i1 ot maae organization. 
':'hoy do not realise that public policy 1houl4 rela:r on the or-
ganization and orientation ot the ma1ao1. Unfortunately, party 
leaders think too much ot getting rid or the obligations ot 
their parties. 
2 . Th• absence ot organizat ion abllitioa is one of tho most 
outetanding phenomena of tho politioal lit e ot the partloo 1n 
tho Arab World, aa they discovered recent ly. It is vory often 
h.al'd to tind an .U-abian pol1t1o•l loader wbo poss••••• the 
charactorlatica of leaderehip ouch aa etrona pereonality and 
broad •ducation. Potential leadera , tor the most part, lack 
tho underat•ndln8 necessary to ati-.11 the iaportance or organi-
zation apirlt. Tboao capable leadera -.bo led parties, such aa 
Sa'ad ZasJ>lul, Aasaid, Alquowat ll and llaasar , and many othere, 
could not, 1n practice, orient their oupportora and a:ympathi-
z1r1 and amalgamate thaa 1n a atrong organization to encounter 
whatever might occur on the ho.rizon ot political eventa. Suell 
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an organ1:at1on, strong enough to execute auccasatul plans 
on tho one hani and ros1at such expectable political eventa 
on the other, bad not y•t appeared. Party leadera, we have 
aeen, roaorted to unprepared ma.neuvres &n4 immature movements 
dictat-4 by sadden circum.ata.ncea 1n an endeavor to meet tbe 
existing situation without th1nkin8 or tho adverse conae-
quenc1a ot such ao-taken measu.rea . Those lead.ere depended 
tul17 and caoplete1y on their own personal abilit ies 1n the 
aocompl1abment ot such unprepared maneu~r•• and immature 
aoveconts . 
3. !t is very true that many pol1~1cin~• took u; poli-
tics and part, affairs merely aa an occupation to till in 
theil' o:opt, 111'• and to uea thaa aa a means tor a liv1.ng. To 
that and, they did not 1dent1ty tbo1r purposes or reveal they 
were plann.l.ng a certain policy to roach a apecial goal. Demo-
cratic principles r.eoesaitate abaolute concentration or tbeil' 
activities within the p&rt7 a~ta1rs regarding the party's 
prog,....., pol107 and prino1pl<>a. Tboae protaosional politi-
cians must abide by the part7•1 policy, principles and de-
c1s1ona. 
It is a aarious problem that pol1tic1.ans who belong to 
a certain party would transfer to another one and atand aga1nat 
theil' old party becauae or bet ter personal gain. Purthormore, 
they would not hesitate to give up thoir role 1n tho party'• 
careor because or a minor political trouble that might bold 
tbom roaponalble, tor the:r do not know the value or reaponai-
b1lit7. In other •orda, the7 are 1rreapona1bl• and unroll.able. 
•· Tho people 1 a dl•truat or a part7 1 1 organization 1• a 
natural phenomena . Irre•pon11b111ty or leadera alwa70 br1nga 
the diatruat ot th• people whom they are guiding. Public 
opinion haa to deny !1cklopol1t1oian1, and hae t o criticize 1r-
roaponaiblo loaders •ho deny their party ' s principles because 
or their personal profit . How can democracy prevail and tlou-
r11h When the existence ot non-contldence between people and 
their leader• dom1nate1 tbe reeling or every aomber 1n the Par-
ty l.1ld occupies the lll1nd ct every aoaber ot tho aoc1etJT 
5. llanJ parties •ore abort-lived becauoe tho7 wore fo""'ed 
prl.aaril.J tor acc"'1pli1h1ng a non-1aportant object. It may be 
peraonal, and whenever that purpoa• ii pe,..,.ount tno part:y dia-
appeara forever . Because of tho absence of fara1shtodnosa and 
oon11quont tru1tloso ach1ovomont1, tho pol itical framework ot 
tho Part7 crumbles and it cannot long 1urvivo. 
6 . It ia ver:r necosaary to refer to tho moat important fac-
tor 1n tho failure ot tho 1overal parties •hicb severely attectod 
desccratic lite 1n tho Arab countries. That factor was the 
effort• ot foreign h&nda, play1ng 1n tho dark, 1n an attempt to 
truatrate t he do110cratic ••:r ot lite. It i• an 1nd1s;iutablo 
tact that auccess of deQooraoy 1.n the Arab lands ~&llt the auc -
ce11 of organized res1etanco to the intoro•t• or those tore1gn 
otataa which •ill never tolerate tho 1ucc111 ot democracy. It 
11 very regrettable to find out that ma07 Arab loaders co-
operated with and to a l argo extent 1upportod that foreign in-
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tervention and upheld those fore i gn interests •hich were not 
in favor of democratic success and the stability of party 
life . It is regrettable to k:ncw that the inLluence of those 
Arab leaders played ths main ro l e of weakening tho party's 
spirit and confusing people Who evinced great interest in the 
field of party affai rs . 
To conclude this •ork, i t is Ve't"J wise to admit the fact 
that most of the political parties , if not all of them, were 
not founded on the basis of the national public 1nterost. 
Parties are not in conformity w1ti1 the moat observed 
methods or democratic countries, bocaWJ.e or eontlicting idea• 
and contradicting pri nciples , and because of many occasions of 
ter1•oris.m an.1 conspiracies wb1eh were conducted secretly to 
undermine the constitutional life of the country. Many handi-
caps were brought forward to :1J:lpede the progress ot tho coun-
try• a political life as a democratic otate . Whatever could be 
said about one Arabian state could be applied to the r oot of 
the Arabian states with no exception. The progress of parties 
and parliamentary l ife in any Arabian atate was discouraged as 
early as the establishment of the states . Although states re -
mained strong, u.nt'ortunatel:y parties did not progress equally 
with the state . 'l'b1a uneven equality 1n progress between 
states and parties r esulted 1n a r emarkable corruption in the 
construction of the states• machine't"J, disunity of the Al>ab1an 
states, and m1sWlderstanding on the part of Arabian p~blic 
opinion. 
CvSC!ZSlVll, ColLt A Ri:;()Jl AllD ~ .C:!(.)UliAL 
UB<>i<RVA l'IOll 
• 
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A pollt1C&l party 1s an organ1tat1oo, acts &a a un1-
t1ea mass of people, and •x•rta greot effort to attain 
power in ol'der to put 1ta principles enc progr&111a into 
practice. Pol1~1ca1 partieo are not merely a necessity ot 
the democratic parliamentary system; perti•• are part and 
parcel of that system. Th• a7stem does not succeed without 
••11-or~t.ni•ed parties acting 1n a well-prepared aoc1ety . 
Any country practicing domooracy without parties or ·•1th 
unorganized parties is too tar trot deuocracy. De=ocracy 
1n the Arab world i• a gooo exa:nple or a democratic country 
with unorgnnized parties ana with an unprepared aociety . 
Even 1n !rital.D., the c:ot:ber ot· tbe p1.rl1amenta.ry sy$te::a, 
there did not; ex1at a real decocracy before weil -orge.01r.ed 
pol itical partieo emerged into the poiltical platrorm nnd 
representation . Br1ta1n die not have a real de~ocracy be· 
tore parties bGC&.QO a part of the I\J.llng system, and the 
leader of opposition 1n the Parliament is beinf peid trom 
the state treasury . 
Character1st1ca ot part1es 1n a d.e:noerat1e country 'NniCb 
parties of the Arab Viorld .b.a ve not yet learned. 
l . ~o.1tiea! per,1es represent the beat ~eans ror ex-
pressing public op1nbn or tno major part or public opinion . 
'l'hrougb party act1v1t1es, including apeecne.s, lectures, and 
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1nveat1gaticns, public opinion can be tocuaed and cry-
stallized on certain programs, for aet1n1te pr1.~c1rlea 
1nd1cate cle1rly the w1ahes ot' the majority . )tureover, 
t:ne leaaere ot the pol1t1CI- or~an1zat1ena al•ays en-
deavor to unOnrstand the d1~terent current~ ot the nat1onal 
soc1et 'CO m~!.ty tne1r p1.r-.:.y 1 s prog~=-s accord.in~ to pub -
lic demands tor they wian to entice the people . These 
principles thorerore not only repreaent the 0-1.:liona or 
the 1:1tociber& ot tne party , but ot cne u:ajo1••tY or the voters 
1n ;n• nation as well . 
z. \Ve.L.1.- vrgani•ec! po11t1oa1 partie• secure the unity 
ot tho e:torts ot t~e people who ~eve sim.!.iar pr1nc1plea 
and 1deals . toe leaders endeavor t:o avoiw anarcny antt e1s-
underotacd1ng 1.n tne nation. No ~atter how good the general 
pr1nc1p .... es are and no matter how m&nV' s-.lp~orters they have , 
they w1~1 not 1nrJ.uence the attaira or a n~t1on unless they 
are part or a party progra?!I tor there •hey bring desirable 
result• . 
3 . Parties are goo-. 1cnoola tor teacn.lc~ tbe1r ~Cl..ll>ers 
the bases 01' ruling, 1ncluoin11 pol1.t1cal o.nd "dm1n1strat1ve 
rule1i . '.i:h••• scnooJ.s give th• leaders a. cntince to l.:lpoee 
<he1r principle• and publicize them throuF;n the dltterent 
aet1v1t1es or the pert1 . Part7 lea~ers und~ ri;ake tno task 
or e<1ucatinF' the aass ot the people . Party leaders, aa well 
as Ott.er party ~tm.b~ra , prae~1oe within the party system 
political and a<1ministrat1ve methods that can be app11ed to 
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tte atate adm1n11trat1ve public ar1a1rs . 
4 . YoJ..1tlcaJ. p•rt1oa car17 out 1i.1portent taal£s or 
tee (!O't'omment before •nd attor elections . l'art1os or-
gan1t• tb.e eJ.eet1on cupa1gc.a 1·or ca.nd1detes an1 watch 
the 1ntegr1ty of tne vot1ng . After the elect1ona , parti es 
psrt1c1pate 1n parl1ezentar:; lite ettect1vely •hen the 
D1.ajor1ty pany comes lnto power ena tne m1nor1t·1 perty 
occup1es oypos1;1on seata 1n tne Y•rliatt.ent . ·1·.n• .1norlty 
party aids 1n standing agai nst ~he ~overnment and a t tempte 
tc l••d tne puoilo opinion :1n po1nt1np out the ~1atsk•• or 
the majority party. "'nla l'e rJ.1amentar; supervision on the 
part ot t~e op~oa1t1on part, 1• meant tu g&in tne :ajorlty 
01· tn• vut e• and tu roaon power 1n tr.e. next elec t ion . 
s . _ae •:art11o :,ystem incroasea the ad.herence or the 
nation by atanai.nr againat reJ..1,10~1, resional, ar.a claaa 
tanat1c1sm. ~at1onal1sm neceeaitat~a meeting tho 01tferent 
ele=ents ot the n•tion 1n a meltinr pot 1l' order to make 
one eoncret• mas• ot democratle people . ~art1es adopting 
pub11e nationai principles ~•t ne~lec~ sucn CL4t1nc~1ona 
10 o1'Clor to put an end to t he poor thoughts ot tanetic1em. 
Araba 1n particl.llar need 8\lcb pol1t1e1J. p1rt1ea more than 
do tne westem sooie t i.ea becau.4e ot· the cons1e1.era-e,1ons of 
.tan•t1c1sa. 
J,;nertt was a time when perti es in r.ho atate ••re supposed 
to come r;o an ag~e=ent in th•lr prvgrs.;na based on a solo 
poJ.1oy regarding tne1r pol1t1ca! e);1atence ond d1ffer onl; 
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on m1nur matters . But becauae o~ the appearances ot ~ac1~, 
N&zla~ and COatQU.n1S=, which beca:ne 1nt•rnat1onal power eon-
tlicta with other patten>• ot nil1ng in m•n; oount~l•• 1n 
tbe •oria, no aucn &£ree=•n~ cvula be reached between par-
ties . Ritn tno exception or Great 3rlta1n a.ne tne United 
~~at oa , th• m'Jlt1 - oart1te ayste!!I prevaila over tne entire 
world . Tnla system h&a inrl uonced tno toro1gn pol1c1ea or 
Yranoe, ~weden ana ~w1tzerland t o a great extent . Regardt.nE 
the Britlon p&rt1ea , tn.ey •re 1n agr eoruent on th• basic do -
"'oat1c pol1c:y ar.o on toe main l1nea 01' toro1gn policy . 
Lr .. re1•arct to tee Arab countr1es , aemocraey 1• a new 
prect1ce . !I~ parlla=ene was elect.ea occorc11ng to reaJ. de:r.o-
cratic principles and accord.inf tu real pare1 Orf&nization 
CtJmpet1t1on . However, t:hat 11 a reflection to en.e ract 
tnat a.Li A.1 .. b cvuntr1es d1d not reacn & certa1 n soc1a1 and 
political loveL wn1ch is a requirement tor tho democratic 
a7ate: • lt 1• not to be aen1ed t!at tneae cu ntrlos <lid not 
reac.n th.ai; stage at wb1en a nation co'.lla. practice democracy 
suoc11atu1J.y . \Vhe~ we speak u1· ae:nocrac1ea we usuai.;.y en1nk 
1.,,,,eal.atoly 01· Greet Br1te1n, tile lfn1tod State• and Prence; 
but it ls true enat tnere are amali countriea as ~wiegerland , 
HvJ.ia.nO, 1vrway anQ ~weaen enjoyiny better ae=ocracy wn!ch 
11 du• to the ruse leve1 or eoucat~~n, ana en• soc1a1 and 
p0!1 t1C81 ~y~te%& . 
Heturn1n,- to the d.1scuaa1on 01· tho dnocratic i.11·e 1n 
tne Areo cuun-criee s 'l'hero are many 1·acturs that; ir.aAe it 1.a:.-
posalt>.1.e to rank tnem side b· side w1 en 1A'831iern democracies . 
It.norance, d1seaae and poverty aru preva1i1n · 1n tne$e 10-
c1et1oa to a11·rerttnt aegrees . ll<1rieovor, regiona.1. and rol1-
g1oue 1·anet1e1$:t1 an<' la:Jdi.ord.11:= are t.ne uators ot tbeae 
eoc1ec1os . 'l'n1.s 11 nuc o.1.1., 1·or there are cond1 cions which 
are even worse . ~• 1.nner1 ted. r1d.1culoas th.o.ighs ·ro:n tne 
'J.\lrk1an, Br1tisn an.a French periods . \Ye consider tn.e present 
·ov ernmente to be 11m1lar to tnose ot the prev1ou1 per1oCs 
durins toe ru1~ of the tore1.gn govommom;s . ·1•ney do not 
repre.ent 1;11.e people . i'nOy are 1et up jus1;1 cc.; ut.1J.1 ze the 
pooplo . I • 1$ thoretoro tho dut1 ot the people t o stand 
again1t th~~, to rea1!t tnem, and to roruso tu reapect t.he1r 
lawa . 1:ne ~tational.l.St goverr:u:i•n1.s wn1en caoe atter 1·ore1gn 
occ~pation unfort~atoly did not attempt to avold such 
1deolog1es; i·or w1 th deep so:rro• ~ say 'tbat these govel"!Ul•ote 
tended to enlar ge tne gap betwoon tho~selvea and the pooplo 
they niled . 
In tne Arab euunt r1es cnero are many par~1ee, but very 
te• or tee= are ~arttes 1.D ch• de:::.oc~t1c ••nse . 1ne1r 1n-
riuence 1.n tno general Arab public op1n1on 1• not clear 
enough . .i.cie r:sajor1ty ot pare1•• ar• aenoni.national organ1-
zat1ona cnat are not 1n tavor ot the na tional public interest . 
vtners are personal, landlor<1 !&:1-Y or tribe• blocs; and 
th1a, ot course, does no~ co1.no1de with the sl.::pleot r~les 
or trood~ . Moreover, tnese orran1tet1ona have no for::nal or 
1.ntonzial pr1nc1~lee wb.J.cn would mar< the~ •• pol1t1co..l part1ea . 
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1.>1na117, those blocs do noc obe7 law a.~a order w1tnout 
th• uae ot eove~~o~ta~ torce . 
un the bas11 ~r what no• oeon sa1d, I would auggeat 
a careful se...:.a7 ol' t¥h&t ::trust be done 1-n our no.tlonal and 
suc1aJ. ar1·a1rs . i.n adait i on to tho ractor ur ralsing tne 
Arab atanda~ or P'.Jb.lte eo.aeatioi , part1c :larly 1n the par .. 
ty ayate?J, ot.ner !acturs ere L PortL"'lt. -- but 11h1.s factor 
1s v1tal in order tu organ1ze the partiea accord.in~ to 
aucceestul dO~ocracy . 
1 . Tho well-educate<! Arab youth =>st get to~•ther N>d 
tor• a bloc aa • P• •1t1cal part;, not onl> to enJor tne1r 
political and c1v11 rights , but olso to perform their 
natiuna1 aut7 to partie1pato 1n p 'bl1c atra1r1 a.1Cl guid• 
publ1c opinion 1.., tne di rec t1on ot public property and 
natio:>el welfare . Tn~• :i:ust not be based on 1el1-prci'1t 
because the mot1voa ot such a party muse be air·cted toward 
th• national interest . lnd1viduaL profi t como1 aooner or 
later as a ::0%.ber t1!' • cooa soc i ety . 
2 . Yarty leaders and orf1c1ela must devote thei r entire 
t1111e to part; a.fra1r, . 'l'n•y 1ho·1la not occ<1py any ot11er 
Job . ·1·11eir t!.me N><I etfort CIU&t ~e offered to •n• ;>o.r1'7 ' a 
pol1t!.ca1 arra1ra . ·1c.e7 Jll'J.:St oe pali !>7 tne pare., . ?art7 
leade~an.lp ::mst not be g1ven ~o an7one who ......._, ano~her Job 
because party aftairs are suppoaed to be i;1ven priori t y , and 
a leader w1tb another Job cencot serve th• party as a party 
lead•r Rust . Po11~1ca~ work ~~u1res a gooQ deal ot time 
ana e1·rort . 
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3 . Party polltica! contests mu.st be carried out accord-
ing to lega.l an<I log1cal means and methoCI• . 'l'he m1nor1 ty 
must defer to the judgments of i;ne majority . 'this 1s i;ne 1n-
d1cat1on by which a nstion may be considered as being on the 
right level of pOJ.1 tics ln pract.1c1ng democracy . Ho,~evor, 
when force and defamation a:re used. , and personal national pres-
tige i s offended. , and many pevp.le are ltllled, and a great 
deal of damage oune, thore 1s no sbado~ present of a democracy . 
4. Army ort!cers antt c~v11 oftleers must not join poli-
tical pari;ies . ·1ne army is the protector ot tne country trom 
roreign e.ggress1on and mu.at not lntert'ere 10 C1omesc1c atta1r.s , 
except 1n ene ease 01· a revo.lut1cn age.inst the cons ti tut1onal 
authorities when the police 1·orces cannot control the situ-
ation . As for cne civil 01·t1cers , -cney are 1n charge of tn.e 
main deparl;tr.&ni.s fo1• '"hich i;he government was created in order 
to secure equally tho 1ntorosts of the people and the affairs 
ot -cne sta"t& . t•ney thus mu.s"& remain oui.s1ae of per--cy preju-
d1eo . 
5 . '!'he Arabian youth must look to tne Arab1an peop_e tor 
inspiration to carry out tbe solutions co their problems . 
'1•oe youth must; avoid "&ntt govornmencaJ. rurm.al sphere and the 
elassloal political schools conterect upon ene leadersn1p or 
resulting rrom the regional, aenom1nationa!, or individual 
1ntere3ts . 
6 . As the Arab people hope to reach a particular stage 01· 
advancement: and co-operation wb1ch would enable then to become 
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unified 1n a poi1tical union, parties snould be established 
according to these hopes and aims . Arab1sn notior.al1sm 
!ll1).St be understood pr1nc1pally and must bO illustrated 
thoroughly . '!'n.1• uncierstanding depends on the lmowleage of 
the n1story, eaucat10nt snd the interests ot the Arabs . 
Unity of history , education, and interests musz be re -
garded as ?!l\J.Ch as possible . As £01· the organization of the 
party, - every- party must have a branch 1n every country, 
and every branch must bave broad autnor1ty 1n the circles 
in which its activities are located . In other words, the 
local or regiona1 orancn must oe 1ndependent to a great ex-
tent . An agreement must be reached X"lgarding leadersn1p and 
superv1s1on in order to connect all the brancoes according 
to t.b.e main principles and the general mutual err·orts . In 
the event that such a centraiized party ls l.mposs1b1e, 1n-
d1v1a.us..i a.~d smailer parties may oe establ.1Sned v11th prior 
agree~ent concern1ng the unity of na:nes , principles , aims , 
end rnethoas . '!'n1s unity 0£ pri~c~ples and alms must be 
agreed on at the time ot' the establ1sh!nent, en<! the develop -
ment tnlat be discussed et pet•iodic cont·eronces or by cor-
respondence or by exen.ange of representatives . 
? • 'J:o~o.s..L~ .L ''ould l1ke to ro.t'er to tne morals and 
manners as pa.rt and parcel of the party ' s programs and 
methods . ~nere somo people believe that tho ends justify 
tne means , particularly 1n pol1t1cs , I think that the means 
arei a part of tho purpose 1n every matter and L, every ques -
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tion . In v~r pol1t1cal life and 1n our co:teerc1a~ and 
soc1a~ roJ.ationa 1t 1a untrue to resort to tne ph1losoph7 
wn1ch just11·1e1 takl.n adv.e.ntage and encouraging corrup-
tion ot' uur p;oua. morale . "J:h•re.rore , 1n our national es-
taOl.1:jnmenta, 1nclua.1ner po11~1ceJ. pertie1, we .should deal 
honestly and respecttu••Y 1n order to ra1ea tne atanderd 
or more_s 1n tne Arab c~untr1es wnile parties approeeh 
tnelr respeet1v• national ideals . 
v. 
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